State v. Charbonneau, Def. ID# 0207003810 (Del. Super. 9/8/2006), Def. ID# 0207003810.

• Decision Date: 08 September 2006
• Docket Number: Def. ID# 0207003810.
• Parties: STATE OF DELAWARE v. LINDA L. CHARBONNEAU, Defendant.
• Court: Superior Court of Delaware

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STATE OF DELAWARE v. LINDA L. CHARBONNEAU, Defendant.

Def. ID# 0207003810.

Superior Court of Delaware, Sussex County.

Certification denied by Supreme Court: June 19, 2006.

Decided: September 8, 2006.

James W. Adkins, Esquire and Paula T. Ryan, Esquire, Department of Justice, 114 E. Market Street, Georgetown, DE 19947, attorneys for State of Delaware

Craig A. Karsnitz, Esquire, Young, Conaway, Stargatt & Taylor, 110 S. Pine Street, Georgetown, DE 19947 and Thomas A. Pedersen, Esquire, 2 N. Race Street, Georgetown, DE 19947, attorneys for Defendant, Linda L. Charbonneau

MEMORANDUM OPINION

STOKES, J.

Linda L. Charbonneau ("Defendant") has moved to have this judge recuse himself from further participation in this case. Defendant argues that this judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned and cites to sentences in this Court's Findings After Penalty Hearing ("FAPH"). The FAPH was issued on June 4, 2004, after Defendant's convictions in this Court on April 21, 2004. Our Supreme Court overturned those convictions and the sentence on March 1, 2006.

The history of this case involves the reversal and remand of this Court's April 21, 2004, decision and subsequent findings. The case was remanded back to this Court and this judge. In light of the assertions Defendant has made, this judge has re-examined the earlier opinion as well as the statements Defendant cited in the FAPH. The re-examination satisfies this judge that, employing any test that may be applicable in determining the basis for a judge to recuse himself, there is no basis to do so here. For the reasons set forth herein, Defendant's Motion is denied.

BACKGROUND

Defendant was convicted by a jury on April 21, 2004, of two offenses of Murder in the First Degree, 11 Del. C. §636; two offenses of Conspiracy in the First Degree, 11 Del. C. 513(1); and Possession of a Deadly Weapon During the Commission of a Felony, 11 Del. C. §1447(a). The victims were John Charbonneau ("John Charbonneau") and William H. Sproates ("Sproates"), who were killed on or about September 23, 2001, and October 17, 2001, respectively.

In both the guilt and penalty phases of the trial, the jury found the existence of three statutory aggravating factors. Looking at the circumstances surrounding the murder of John Charbonneau, it determined that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances by a vote of 10 — 2. Looking at the circumstances surrounding the murder of Sproates, the jury determined the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances by a vote of 9 — 3. The jury recommended the death penalty for Linda Charbonneau's crimes.

After reviewing the record, the factual findings of the jury, and giving weight to the jury recommendation of the death penalty, this Court sentenced Defendant. On June 4, 2004, this Court issued a FAPH. The Court concluded that the appropriate sentence for Defendant's convictions of Murder in the First Degree of John Charbonneau and Sproates, respectively, was death by lethal injection. This sentence was so ordered.

On March 1, 2006, the Delaware Supreme Court reversed the convictions in this case in Charbonneau v. State, 2006 WL 476996 (Del. Supr.), and remanded the case for re-trial. Defendant's pertinent argument on appeal to the Supreme Court surrounded the testimony of her co-conspirators, Mellisa Rucinski ("Mellisa"), and Willie Tony Brown ("Brown"). Specifically, the reversal of Defendant's convictions was based on the denial of her motion in limine requesting the admission into evidence of Brown's plea and proffer for the purposes of impeaching Mellisa and creating reasonable doubt about the State of Delaware's ("the State") case.

The case was remanded back to the Superior Court without instruction by the Supreme Court as to whether the judge who had originally presided over it should rehear it. The custom in Delaware is for a remanded case to return to the original Superior Court judge, absent an order to the contrary. See Matter of Will of Stotlar, 1985 WL 4782, *1 (Del. Ch.) ("It would also be contrary to the Delaware tradition that the same judge hears a case on remand after a reversal on appeal, even where the trial judge initially sentenced the defendant to death."). Defendant has now made a Motion for Recusal ("Motion") based on Delaware Judges' Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3(C). Defendant's Motion is based on the argument that "the Court has, necessarily, decided a number of issues in the case, and the ultimate issue which necessarily requires recusal."¹ The issues Defendant alleges have already been decided are taken from the wording of the FAPH and are enumerated in Defendant's Motion. Defendant also notes that the wording of the FAPH creates an appearance of impropriety.

In ruling on the Motion, this Court was faced with possible conflicting precedent on the issue of disqualification of a judge that gave room for pause. See Flonnory v. State, 778 A.2d 1044 (Del. 2001) and Garden v. State, 815 A.2d 327 (Del. 2003). As such, the Court sent a Certificate of Questions of Law to the Supreme Court asking for disposition on the following two questions:

(1) Notwithstanding the trial judge's subjective belief that he is free of bias or prejudice, is there an objective appearance of bias as a matter of law sufficient to cause doubt about his impartiality?

(2) If there is not an objective appearance of bias sufficient to cause doubt about his impartiality, are there unusual circumstances in this case which would warrant reassignment to another judge as a matter of judicial administration?²

After considering the above questions, in light of the particular circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court, in an Order dated June 19, 2006, refused decision on the certified questions. The Supreme Court determined that important and urgent reasons did not exist to justify deviating from the ordinary appellate process available to the parties in this case.³

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Defendant moves for recusal under the Delaware Judges' Code of Judicial Conduct. The Code says, in pertinent part, in Canon 3(C) that a "judge should disqualify himself... in a proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned...." The current jurisprudence on this issue stems in large part from the decision of our Supreme Court in Los v. Los, 595 A.2d 381 (Del. 1991). In Los, at 383, the Court said:

The requirement that judges be impartial is a fundamental principle of the administration of justice. To that end, rules of disqualification have evolved to ensure that no judge shall preside in a case in which he is not disinterested and impartial. As a matter of due process, a litigant is entitled to neutrality on the part of the presiding judge but the standards governing disqualification also require the appearance of impartiality.

Los then went on to establish the two-part test in which judges were to engage when faced with a claim of personal bias or prejudice under Canon 3 C(1). A judge must first, "as a matter of subjective belief, be satisfied that he can proceed to hear the cause free of bias or prejudice concerning that party." Id. at 384-5. The second part of the test requires an objective analysis of whether there is a situation that, actual bias aside, there is an appearance of bias sufficient to cause doubt as to the judge's impartiality. Id. at 385. Recusal is required for situations in which there is either a subjective belief that the judge cannot proceed or there is an appearance of bias sufficient to cause doubt as to the judge's impartiality.

DISCUSSION

Defendant asserts that this Court already has decided "a number of issues," as well as the "ultimate issue" in this case, which "necessarily requires" a recusal.⁴ Defendant lists eight examples of the "conclusions that the Court drew with respect to evidence that was strongly contested by the defendant" (presumably these are the "number of issues").⁵ However, Defendant does not specify what she considers the "ultimate issue." Careful reading of the Motion provides two possibilities: (1) that the "Court has concluded that any testimony which Willie Brown, a likely defense witness in the re-trial, [provides] would be perjury,"⁶ and (2) that the Court has drawn conclusions regarding Linda Charbonneau and her "perceived `masterminding' of this criminal enterprise."⁷ It seems, therefore, that in order to fully understand the issues surrounding this Motion for Recusal, it is important to discuss the events surrounding this Court's decision on Defendant's motion in limine concerning the plea and proffer of Brown, as well as the wording of the FAPH.

A. Denial of Motion in Limine

The State has asserted that it was faced with an ethical dilemma when it determined that Brown was not telling the truth. It decided, therefore, it could not call him as a witness. The defense was aware of the conflicts between Brown and Mellisa's proffers, and had planned to use the discrepancies to discredit both witnesses. However, by not calling Brown as a witness and also not accepting Brown's plea deal before Defendant's trial, the State effectively made it impossible for the defense to introduce the conflicting accounts to the jury.

The Supreme Court does not dispute, at base, that the State may have found itself faced with an ethical dilemma due to the fact that it had two witnesses, both of whom were bound by plea agreements "contingent on their providing truthful proffers and truthful testimony at Linda's trial," who gave conflicting versions of the murders. Charbonneau, at *1. It would clearly taint the trial to allow the State to present two witnesses with inconsistent versions of the same events and assert that both versions are true.

The Supreme Court did, however, find the State's handling of this ethical dilemma problematic. The State was ethically obligated to evaluate the testimony of both Mellisa and Brown and determine which...