State v. Chasse

• Citation: 2000 ME 90,750 A.2d 586
• Parties: STATE of Maine v. Michael CHASSE.
• Decision Date: 17 May 2000
• Court: Supreme Judicial Court of Maine (US)

750 A.2d 586

2000 ME 90

STATE of Maine v. Michael CHASSE.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Submitted on Briefs February 25, 2000.

Decided May 17, 2000.

R. Christopher Almy, District Attorney, Michael P. Roberts, Deputy Dist. Atty., C. Daniel Wood, Asst. Dist. Atty., Bangor, for State.

Randy G. Day, Garland, for defendant (on appeal).

Before WATHEN, C.J., and CLIFFORD, RUDMAN, DANA, SAUFLEY, ALEXANDER and CALKINS, JJ.

DANA, J.

[¶ 1] Michael Chasse appeals from a judgment of the Superior Court (Piscataquis County, Marden, J.) following his conviction by a jury of robbery (Class A) in violation of 17-A M.R.S.A. § 651 (1983),¹ conspiracy to commit robbery (Class B) in violation of 17-A M.R.S.A. §§ 151 & 651 (1983),² aggravated assault (Class B) in violation of 17-A M.R.S.A. § 208 (1983),³ and burglary (Class B) in violation of 17-A M.R.S.A. § 401 (1983).⁴ The court sentenced him to twelve years, eight years, four years and two years respectively, to be served concurrently. Chasse argues on appeal that the court denied him his constitutional right to testify on his own behalf, he was unduly prejudiced by his appearance before the jury in prison garb following his escape and capture during the trial, he was placed in double jeopardy by being convicted of both robbery and aggravated assault based on the same facts, the court abused its discretion by failing to grant his motion for a mistrial, and the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of Class A robbery. Finding no error, we affirm.

I. FACTUAL SUMMARY

[¶ 2] On February 25, 1997, Detective Sergeant Perry Antone responded to a call from a residence in Brewer that someone had been shot. When he arrived on the scene he found the homeowner on the lawn holding a gun. After securing the gun, he entered the house and found a man, later identified as Chasse, laying on the floor. He also found a knife on the floor just inside the doorway of the house.

[¶ 3] Chasse was eventually indicted on charges of robbery, conspiracy to commit robbery, aggravated assault and burglary stemming from the incident. On the fourth day of his jury trial, Chasse effected an escape that was captured on video by a local journalist. Chasse's attorney sought a continuance and a new trial based on Chasse's absence and his resulting inability to testify. The court, having viewed the video of the escape, determined Chasse's absence to be voluntary. The court delayed the proceedings for a couple of hours, but ultimately denied the motions for a continuance and a mistrial after conducting a voir dire of the jury and determining that they were not aware of the escape. The court also determined that Chasse had waived his right to testify by voluntarily absenting himself from the trial.

[¶ 4] The court instructed the jury that Chasse had elected to be absent from the trial and that the jury should accord this fact no weight whatsoever and the trial proceeded. Chasse's attorney called his last remaining witness who was a hostile witness. In the course of his testimony, the witness made reference to Chasse "run[ning] away." Chasse's attorney objected and the court instructed the jury to disregard the statement. The attorney again moved for a mistrial, but the court denied the motion, noting that the jury was not even aware of the fact that Chasse had been in custody during the trial. With no more witnesses, both the State and Chasse's attorney rested.

[¶ 5] Later that day, while in conference with both attorneys, the court was informed that Chasse had been captured. Chasse's attorney moved to reopen the evidence. The court denied this motion, again finding that Chasse had waived his right to testify by absenting himself during the presentation of the evidence and noting its concern that if the trial were continued over the weekend, the jury could potentially become tainted by exposure to news of the escape.

[¶ 6] Court was reconvened late in the afternoon for closing arguments. Chasse was present. At Chasse's request the court again advised the jury that no inferences were to be drawn from a defendant's presence or absence in court in the course of a trial. Closing arguments were made and the court instructed the jury. At a bench conference following this, Chasse's attorney requested that the record reflect that his client was clad in prison garb. Nevertheless, the attorney made no objection to Chasse's attire at that time or previously, nor did he request a mistrial based on the attire.

[¶ 7] The jury returned a verdict of guilty on all charges and Chasse brought this appeal.

II. DISCUSSION

[¶ 8] Chasse's primary argument on appeal is that he was denied a fair trial because of circumstances resulting from his escape and capture. He argues that he was improperly denied his constitutional right to testify on his own behalf by virtue of the court denying: (1) his motion for a continuance during his absence from trial, (2) his motion to re-open the evidence once he was captured, and (3) his motion for a mistrial based on his failure to testify stemming from his absence from the trial. He also argues that he was denied a fair trial by virtue of his appearance before the jury in prison attire during closing arguments despite his failure to object or seek a new trial at the time. Lastly, he argues that the court should have granted his motion for a mistrial following the statement of the hostile witness.

[¶ 9] Every defendant's right to testify on his or her own behalf is rooted in the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause, the Sixth Amendment's compulsory process clause and the corollary to the Fifth Amendment's protection against compelled testimony. See Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 51-52, 107 S.Ct. 2704, 97 L.Ed.2d 37 (1987)

. However, it is within a court's discretion to continue a trial in a defendant's absence once it determines that the absence is voluntary and it affords the defendant an opportunity to explain the absence. See M.R.Crim. P. 43; State v. Butler, 674 A.2d 925, 927 (Me.1996) (finding no abuse of discretion when court continued trial despite defendant's absence and resultant failure to testify). The court was justified in its determination that Chasse had voluntarily waived his right to testify by absconding on the last day of trial and continuing the trial in his absence did not constitute a denial of the right to testify. Therefore its denial of his motion for a continuance at a time when his whereabouts was unknown was not an abuse of discretion.

[¶ 10] We likewise review rulings on motions to reopen evidence for an abuse of discretion. See State v. White, 460 A.2d 1017, 1023 (Me.1983)

(noting factors to be considered when reviewing such motions). The reason for the tardiness of the offer of Chasse's testimony in this case, i.e., his escape from custody and subsequent capture, is not a proper justification. But for his capture, Chasse's absence and his implicit waiver of his right to testify would have been final. "The defendant's right to his day in court does not permit him unilaterally to select whatever date his pleasure dictates." State v. Staples, 354 A.2d 771, 775 (Me.1976). Similarly, a defendant's right to testify does not entitle him to testify only when he sees fit, such as after the close of evidence and his return to custody. The court did not abuse its discretion by denying Chasse's motion to reopen the evidence following his capture.

[¶ 11] With respect to Chasse's motion for a mistrial based on his failure to testify, we have noted in similar circumstances "[i]f a mistrial were to be declared whenever the defendant voluntarily absented himself from trial, the defendant could, after evaluating the course of the proceedings against him, simply leave the courtroom whenever he anticipated an adverse verdict." Id. This statement is no less true simply because the defendant's absence also prevents him from taking the stand. Chasse cannot avoid the consequences of his voluntary absence from trial by declaring prejudice after the fact. The court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to declare a mistrial based on Chasse's voluntary unavailability for testimony during the presentation of evidence.

[¶ 12] Due to Chasse's failure to object or move for a mistrial, we review the trial court's failure to declare one sua sponte based in his appearance in prison garb for obvious error, determining whether the error, if any, is so great that we cannot in good conscience let his conviction stand. See State v. Berkley, 567 A.2d 915, 921 (Me.1989)

. The United States Supreme Court has noted that courts invalidating convictions based on a defendant's being tried in prison garb have generally required that the defendant at least invoke his or her right not to be so tried: "`A defendant may not remain silent and willingly go to trial in prison garb and thereafter claim error.'" Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 508, 96 S.Ct. 1691, 48 L.Ed.2d 126 (1976) (quoting Hernandez v. Beto, 443 F.2d 634, 637 (5th Cir.1971)). The court further noted that the particular evil that such cases sought to deter was the practice of compelling a defendant to be tried in prison attire. See id. at 507, 96 S.Ct. 1691. We cannot say that the court committed obvious error by not declaring a mistrial on its own initiative because of Chasse being clad in prison clothes given that he did not object or seek a mistrial. Cf. State v. Leavitt, 625 A.2d 302, 306 (Me.1993) (court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant's motion for a mistrial after jurors observed him in shackles and handcuffs despite the inability to issue a curative instruction due to the timing of the motion).

[¶ 13] Lastly, the court's refusal to grant a mistrial based on the statement of Chasse's hostile witness was not an abuse of discretion. "A justice's refusal to grant a mistrial represents an abuse of discretion only where there is a reasonable possibility that the objectionable evidence might...