State v. Chaussee

• Decision Date: 23 August 2011
• Docket Number: No. DA 11–0064.,DA 11–0064.
• Citation: 259 P.3d 783,2011 MT 203,361 Mont. 433
• Parties: STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Appellee,v.John Scott CHAUSSEE, Jr., Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

361 Mont. 433

259 P.3d 783

2011 MT 203

STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.John Scott CHAUSSEE, Jr., Defendant and Appellant.

No. DA 11–0064.

Supreme Court of Montana.

Submitted on Briefs June 22, 2011.Decided Aug. 23, 2011.

For Appellant: Robin A. Meguire, Meguirelaw.com, Great Falls, Montana.For Appellee: Steve Bullock, Montana Attorney General, Matthew T. Cochenour, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana, Fred Van Valkenburg, Missoula County Attorney, Patricia C. Bower, Deputy County Attorney, Missoula, Montana.Justice JAMES C. NELSON delivered the Opinion of the Court.

[361 Mont. 434] ¶ 1 This is an appeal from the Fourth Judicial District Court, Missoula County. The State of Montana charged John Scott Chaussee Jr. with driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI), in violation of § 61–8–401(1)(a), MCA. The offense, which occurred on or about December 16, 2009, was alleged to be Chaussee's fourth DUI conviction, making it a felony. See § 61–8–731(1), MCA (a person convicted of DUI, who has three or more prior DUI convictions, is guilty of a felony). Chaussee filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that two of his prior DUI convictions are constitutionally invalid. The District Court denied the motion. Chaussee then pleaded guilty, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion.

¶ 2 The issue on appeal is whether Chaussee sufficiently demonstrated that his prior convictions are constitutionally infirm. We conclude that he did not, and we thus affirm the District Court's denial of his motion to dismiss. Our review of the District Court's ruling is de novo. State v. Burns, 2011 MT 167, ¶ 17, 361 Mont. 191, 256 P.3d 944.

BACKGROUND

¶ 3 Chaussee has three prior convictions of DUI: 1997 in Missoula Municipal Court, 1999 in Darby City Court, and 2008 in Missoula Municipal Court. He challenged the 1997 and 1999 convictions on the ground that he did not validly waive his right to counsel in either case.

[361 Mont. 435] ¶ 4 The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article II, Section 24 of the Montana Constitution guarantee that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the fundamental right to the assistance of counsel. State v. Howard, 2002 MT 276, ¶ 11, 312 Mont. 359, 59 P.3d 1075. A defendant without means to hire an attorney is entitled to legal representation by court-appointed counsel at public expense. Howard, ¶ 11. The defendant may waive the right to counsel. Howard, ¶ 12. But, to be valid, any such waiver must be made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. Howard, ¶ 12 (“[A]ny waiver of a constitutional right must be made specifically, voluntarily, and knowingly.”); Woodruff v. Bretz, Inc., 2009 MT 329, ¶ 15, 353 Mont. 6, 218 P.3d 486 (“[T]he waiver of fundamental constitutional rights must be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.”); Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 129 S.Ct. 2079, 2085, 173 L.Ed.2d 955 (2009) (“[T]he Sixth Amendment right to counsel may be waived by a defendant, so long as relinquishment of the right is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.”); cf. State v. Main, 2011 MT 123, ¶ 21, 360 Mont. 470, 255 P.3d 1240 (“A suspect may waive his 5th Amendment rights if such a waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.”).

¶ 5 In support of his motion to dismiss, Chaussee attached court records relating to the 1997 and 1999 convictions. He asserted that these records contain no indication that he knowingly waived his right to counsel. ¹ Chaussee requested an evidentiary hearing on his motion.

¶ 6 The 1997 record from the Missoula Municipal Court consists of a document entitled “Court Minutes,” which has entries dated from March to October of 1997. There is a preprinted statement on the face of the document stating: “defendant appeared, was advised of his constitutional rights, was arraigned, and entered a plea of.” The word “not guilty” is handwritten under this preprinted statement. There is a date stamp indicating that Chaussee made his appearance on March 17. Further below, there is a handwritten notation “ASUM” next to the dates March 28 and March 31. (“ASUM” refers to Associated Students of the University of Montana Legal Services.) However, a notation dated April 9 states: “[Defendant] not rep. by ASUM.” The District Court reasoned from these notations that “there was a dialogue between the court and the Defendant about his right to an attorney and then, some nine or more days later, a subsequent discussion on the same point followed by a waiver of counsel by the Defendant.”

¶ 7 The 1999 record from Darby City Court includes two single-page preprinted forms containing handwritten information filled in by the court. According to these documents, Chaussee was cited for four offenses: no insurance, dangerous drugs, drug paraphernalia, and DUI second offense. Because the court's preprinted forms were set up to address, at most, two charges per form, the first form in Chaussee's case applied to the no insurance and dangerous drugs charges, and the second form applied to the drug paraphernalia and DUI charges. Both forms are dated October 27, 1999, indicating that Chaussee made his initial appearance on all four charges at the same time. The forms contain a preprinted statement near the top listing the defendant's rights, followed by another preprinted statement: “Do you understand your rights? Yes No.” The word “Yes” is circled on the first form, but neither “Yes” nor “No” is circled on the second form. Also, whereas Chaussee's address, phone number, social security number, and employer are written in the appropriate spaces on the first form, this information is omitted from the second form. Further down each form, there is a preprinted statement: “Call an attorney Yes No.” The word “No” is circled on both forms. The District Court reasoned, therefore, that although the second form (which applied to the DUI offense) did not have the word “Yes” or “No” circled after the rights portion of the form, Chaussee obviously was advised of his rights “since he appeared on all four citations at the same time and would have been advised of his rights regarding all four cases together rather than repeating the same soliloquy four times.”

¶ 8 Applying the analytical framework set forth in State v. Okland, 283 Mont. 10, 18, 941 P.2d 431, 436 (1997), the District Court concluded that Chaussee had failed to meet his initial burden of producing direct evidence that the challenged prior convictions are invalid and, therefore, the presumption of regularity that attaches to prior convictions had not been overcome. The court noted that Chaussee had filed no affidavit stating that he was not advised of his right to an attorney in either of the cases. Thus, because Chaussee had not met his burden of going forward with sufficient direct evidence of invalidity, the District Court ruled that he was not entitled to a hearing on this matter and that the State could use the 1997 and 1999 convictions to support a felony charge of DUI.

DISCUSSION

¶ 9 The Due Process Clause of Article II, Section 17 of the Montana Constitution protects a defendant from being sentenced based upon misinformation. State v. Phillips, 2007 MT 117, ¶ 17, 337 Mont. 248, 159 P.3d 1078. A constitutionally infirm prior conviction used for enhancement purposes constitutes “misinformation of constitutional magnitude.” United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447, 92 S.Ct. 589, 592, 30 L.Ed.2d 592 (1972). Thus, “[i]n Montana, it is well established that the State may not use a constitutionally infirm conviction to support an enhanced punishment.” Okland, 283 Mont. at 15, 941 P.2d at 434 (citing Lewis v. State, 153 Mont. 460, 463, 457 P.2d 765, 766 (1969)).

¶ 10 We recently reaffirmed these principles in State v. Maine, 2011 MT 90, ¶¶ 28, 33, 360 Mont. 182, 255 P.3d 64. See also Burns, ¶ 40. We also reaffirmed the general approach set forth in Okland for evaluating collateral challenges to prior convictions: (1) a rebuttable presumption of regularity attaches to the prior conviction, and we presume that the convicting court complied with the law in all respects; (2) the defendant has the initial burden to demonstrate that the prior conviction is constitutionally infirm; and (3) once the defendant has done so, the State has the burden to rebut the defendant's evidence. Maine, ¶ 33. In the application of this framework, however, we modified our approach in two important respects.

¶ 11 Under Okland, the defendant had the initial burden to produce direct evidence that the prior conviction is invalid. Okland, 283 Mont. at 18, 941 P.2d at 436. This could be accomplished simply by filing an affidavit stating, for example, that he was not advised of his right to a court-appointed attorney in the event that he could not afford one. See e.g. State v. Jenni, 283 Mont. 21, 25, 938 P.2d 1318, 1321 (1997); State v. Kvislen, 2003 MT 27, ¶ 11, 314 Mont. 176, 64 P.3d 1006. Once the defendant made this showing, the burden then shifted to the State to produce direct evidence and prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the prior conviction was not entered in violation of the defendant's rights. Okland, 283 Mont. at 18, 941 P.2d at 436.

¶ 12 In Maine, however, we acknowledged that the State has an interest in deterring habitual offenders as well as an interest in the finality of convictions, which are difficult to defend against collateral attacks many years after the fact. Maine, ¶ 29. We thus determined that, as the moving party, the ultimate burden of proof—which includes both the burden of production and the burden of persuasion ²—shall be on the defendant, who must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the conviction is invalid. The burden is not on the State to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the conviction is valid. Maine, ¶ 34. We further held that, to meet his or her burden of proof, the defendant may not simply point to an ambiguous or silent record, but...