State v. Chavez

Decision Date20 March 2008
Docket NumberNo. 79265-8.,79265-8.
CourtWashington Supreme Court
PartiesSTATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Azel L. CHAVEZ, Petitioner.

Jodi R. Backlund, Manek R. Mistry, Backhand & Mistry, Olympia, WA, for Petitioner/Appellant.

Tracey L. Lassus, Clallam County Prosecutor's Office, Port Angeles, WA, for Appellee/Respondent.

C. JOHNSON, J.

¶ 1 This case asks us to determine whether a juvenile charged with a violent or serious violent offense has a state constitutional right to a jury trial, though other juveniles do not, and whether the legislature's failure to define assault and the judiciary's development of the elements of the crime violate constitutional separation of powers. We affirm the Court of Appeals and hold Azel L. Chavez had no right to a jury trial in juvenile proceedings and that the legislature did not violate the separation of powers doctrine by permitting the judiciary to define assault.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2 Azel L. Chavez1 was charged in juvenile court with three counts of attempted first degree murder, second degree unlawful possession of a firearm, first degree robbery while armed with a firearm, second degree assault while armed with a firearm, and second degree taking a motor vehicle without permission while armed with a firearm.2 Clerk's Papers (CP) at 16-18. Upon charging, the State moved for a discretionary decline hearing to have Chavez tried as an adult, which Chavez challenged. As a result, two psychological experts were appointed, one for the State and one for the defense, and both opined that Chavez would be better served if he remained in the juvenile system. Both believed that the maximum sentence allowable in the juvenile system plus placement in the juvenile rehabilitation administration (JRA) would facilitate rehabilitation. Tr. of Sentencing at 22-25 (Apr. 15, 2005).

¶ 3 The State's motion to decline jurisdiction was denied, and the case proceeded to bench trial, where the trial judge found Chavez guilty on all seven counts. Chavez had no criminal history and was given a standard range disposition on the three counts of attempted murder. Pursuant to the 300 percent rule, no disposition was imposed on the other counts.3 Chavez was sentenced to 309 to 387 weeks, plus a 12-month firearm enhancement. CP at 8-11.

¶ 4 In his appeal to the Court of Appeals, Chavez argued that juvenile offenders have a right to jury trial under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and under article I, sections 21 and 22 of the Washington State Constitution, and alternatively, that juveniles charged with serious offenses have the right to a jury trial under the federal and state constitutions, even if other juveniles do not. Chavez also argued that the absence of a legislative definition of the elements of assault and consequent judicially created definition violates the separation of powers doctrine.4

¶ 5 The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court and held that the legislature did not violate the separation of powers doctrine by allowing the judiciary to define statutory terms with the common law. State v. Chavez, 134 Wash.App. 657, 659, 142 P.3d 1110 (2006). The court also held that Chavez had no right to a jury trial in juvenile proceedings. In rejecting Chavez's argument that juveniles must be afforded jury trials once juvenile proceedings become akin to adult criminal prosecutions, the court found that despite numerous amendments to the Juvenile Justice Act (JJA) of 1977, chapter 13.40 RCW, the system remains focused on rehabilitation. Chavez, 134 Wash.App. at 664-65, 142 P.3d 1110.

¶ 6 The court also rejected Chavez's claim that even if the bench trial requirement is constitutional in its general application, as applied to him it is not. In arriving at its conclusion, the court found that the trial judge's sentencing approach, which relied heavily on the psychological experts' opinions, was more focused on rehabilitation than the adult criminal system would have been. Chavez, 134 Wash.App. at 665, 142 P.3d 1110.

ISSUES

A. Whether a juvenile charged with a serious offense has a right to a jury trial, though other juveniles do not.

B. Whether the legislature's failure to define assault and the judiciary's development of the elements of the crime violate constitutional separation of powers.

ANALYSIS
Right to Jury Trial

¶ 7 We review the constitutionality of a statute de novo. State v. Eckblad, 152 Wash.2d 515, 518, 98 P.3d 1184 (2004). Under Washington Constitution article I, section 21, "[t]he right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate" and under article I, section 22, "[i]n criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right ... to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury." The legislature has mandated, however, that "[c]ases in the juvenile court shall be tried without a jury." RCW 13.04.021(2).

¶ 8 This court has consistently concluded that because of well-defined differences between Washington's juvenile justice and adult criminal systems, the JJA does not violate these constitutional provisions. See State v. Weber, 159 Wash.2d 252, 264-65, 149 P.3d 646 (2006); Monroe v. Soliz, 132 Wash.2d 414, 939 P.2d 205 (1997); State v. Schaaf, 109 Wash.2d 1, 743 P.2d 240 (1987); State v. Lawley, 91 Wash.2d 654, 591 P.2d 772 (1979); Estes v. Hopp, 73 Wash.2d 263, 438 P.2d 205 (1968). While punishment is the paramount purpose of the adult criminal system, the policies of the JJA are twofold: to establish a system of having primary responsibility for, being accountable for, and responding to the needs of youthful offenders, and to hold juveniles accountable for their offenses. State v. Posey, 161 Wash.2d 638, 645, 167 P.3d 560 (2007).

¶ 9 Chavez does not propose wholesale invalidation of the JJA; in fact, Chavez concedes that under the act, minor offenses may still be dealt with in an informal, flexible manner geared toward rehabilitation. Rather, Chavez argues that for a juvenile, such as himself, who has been charged with a serious offense, the balance struck between punitive and rehabilitative philosophies is identical to that struck for adult offenders. He claims that except for the length of his sentence and conditions of his confinement he was treated as an adult. For instance, because Chavez was charged with at least one violent offense, he was ineligible for deferred disposition.5 He has been fingerprinted and photographed, has provided a DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) sample, and has the possibility of being transferred to adult prison to complete his disposition. Also, Chavez argues the records relating to his offenses will never be sealed or destroyed and if he was to commit a crime as an adult, these offenses would be calculated into his offender score as adult convictions. Thus, petitioner argues that for juveniles such as himself, juvenile court is a formal, adversarial system with serious consequences and that failure to provide a jury trial mandates reversal of his adjudications. He cites to no case authority, however, supporting the remedy he is requesting.

¶ 10 In support of his argument, Chavez includes an analysis of the six Gunwall6 factors, asserting that the juvenile jury trial issue does not fall squarely within any controlling precedent. This court analyzed the Gunwall factors on this precise issue in Schaaf, 109 Wash.2d 1, 743 P.2d 240, and concluded that juvenile offenders are not entitled to jury trials under our state constitution. Important to the analysis was consideration of long-standing precedent and the state of law at that time, under which juvenile proceedings were still distinguishable from adult criminal prosecution. Schaaf, 109 Wash.2d at 16, 743 P.2d 240.

¶ 11 In his argument, Chavez highlights amendments to portions of the JJA, many occurring in 1997, and argues these changes make juvenile proceedings more akin to adult criminal prosecutions. These 1997 amendments were considered in State v. J.H., 96 Wash.App. 167, 978 P.2d 1121, review denied, 139 Wash.2d 1014, 994 P.2d 849 (1999), where appellants likewise claimed as juveniles the right to a jury trial. After thorough consideration of statutory amendments, including the amendment giving "adjudication" the same meaning as "conviction" for purposes of future adult prosecutions, the court concluded Schaaf's reasoning still applied: `"while juvenile proceedings are similar to adult criminal prosecutions, enough distinctions still exist to justify denying juvenile offenders the right to a trial by jury."' J.H., 96 Wash.App. at 183-84, 978 P.2d 1121, quoting Schaaf, 109 Wash.2d at 22, 743 P.2d 240, see also State v. Tai N., 127 Wash.App. 733, 740, 113 P.3d 19 (2005) (finding "recent decisions do not compel a change to well-established precedent holding that nonjury trials of juvenile offenders are constitutionally sound"), review denied, 156 Wash.2d 1019, 132 P.3d 735 (2006). We find the court's reasoning in J.H. to be convincing and the holding in accord with longstanding precedent.

¶ 12 Indeed, the claim that changes to the juvenile justice system make its focus punitive and no longer rehabilitative has been posited and consistently rejected by this court. See cf. Weber, 159 Wash.2d at 264, 149 P.3d 646 (finding that while a goal of juvenile adjudication is rehabilitation, where individuals are not rehabilitated and reoffend as adults, they may be punished in a manner that considers their preceding juvenile criminal behavior).7 After enactment of the JJA in 1977, this court rejected the argument that the act created a system that was no longer rehabilitative, despite the act's new emphasis on the juvenile's accountability for criminal behavior. Lawley, 91 Wash.2d at 656-59, 591 P.2d 772.

¶ 13 This court has since concluded that amendments to the JJA have not changed the rehabilitative nature of the juvenile system to the extent that a jury trial would be required. Recently, we recognized an...

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