State v. Cheshire

• Decision Date: 22 June 1982
• Docket Number: No. 15383,15383
• Citation: 170 W.Va. 217,292 S.E.2d 628
• Court: West Virginia Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of West Virginia v. Georgia Jean CHESHIRE.

Page 628

292 S.E.2d 628

170 W.Va. 217

STATE of West Virginia v. Georgia Jean CHESHIRE.

No. 15383.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

June 22, 1982.

Syllabus by the Court

1. "To be competent to stand trial, a defendant must exhibit a sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and a rational, as well as factual, understanding of the proceedings against him." Syllabus Point 2, State v. Arnold, 159 W.Va. 158, 219 S.E.2d 922 (1975); Syllabus Point 4, State ex rel. Williams v. Narick, 164 W.Va. 632, 264 S.E.2d 851 (1980).

2. The test for mental competency to stand trial and the test for mental competency to plead guilty are the same.

Laurie J. Garrigan, Asst. Atty. Gen., Charleston, for appellee.

V. Alan Riley, Keyser, for appellant.

McGRAW, Justice:

This is an appeal by Georgia Jean Cheshire from her convictions for two offenses of forgery and uttering in the Circuit Court of Mineral County. Conviction was had for each offense upon a guilty plea. The appellant was sentenced to two concurrent terms of imprisonment in the West Virginia State Prison for Women at Pence Springs of not less than one nor more than ten years. The appellant contends she is mentally incompetent and the circuit court therefore erred in accepting her guilty pleas and in denying her motion to set aside her convictions. She also argues that the court should not have considered, for the purpose of denying probation, a confession in which the appellant admitted having committed arson while free on bond pending her sentencing hearing. We find that the lower court did not conduct a proper hearing on the issue of the appellant's competence to enter her guilty pleas, and, therefore, remand the case for further proceedings.

On January 8, 1980, three indictments were returned against the appellant for forgery and uttering. The appellant agreed to plead guilty to one of the charges against her in return for the State's promise to nolle prosequi the remaining indictments, and to make no objection to the granting of probation. This agreement was accepted by the trial court. Sentencing was delayed pending the completion of a presentence investigation report.

On May 6, 1980, while awaiting her sentencing hearing, the appellant was indicted for five additional forgery offenses. On May 7, 1980, the appellant's pre-sentence investigation report was filed with the court. On May 8, 1980, a hearing was held at which counsel for the appellant made a request for psychiatric and psychological examination of the appellant. The court granted this request. The appellant was subsequently examined at the Potomac Highlands Mental Health Guild, and at Weston State Hospital. Examination of the appellant yielded four reports, all of which reached the anomalous conclusion that the appellant was competent to stand trial, but would be unable to assist in the preparation of her own defense.

On August 15, 1980 a hearing was held at which the circuit court, upon review of the appellant's psychological and psychiatric reports, determined that the appellant was competent to stand trial. Sentencing of the appellant in connection with her original guilty plea was delayed pending disposition of the five additional charges.

A plea bargain was subsequently struck between the appellant and the State, similar in terms as the first agreement. At a hearing held August 22, 1980, the circuit court accepted the agreement. Sentencing was again delayed pending an up-date of the previous pre-sentence investigation and the formulation of a plan of restitution.

A few days prior to the scheduled sentencing hearing, the appellant was arrested and charged with second degree arson. At a hearing held February 11, 1981 the prosecuting attorney alleged that the appellant had admitted culpability for the arson in a statement given to the fire marshal. The court commented that if the appellant did make a voluntary statement admitting that she committed arson, probation would be refused. At this time counsel for the appellant requested further psychiatric and psychological evaluation of the appellant for the purpose of determining the appellant's competency to enter the guilty pleas. Counsel also requested a continuance of the sentencing hearing. The court denied further evaluation concerning the guilty pleas entered in the forgery cases, but permitted further testing concerning the arson charge. ¹

At a hearing held March 13, 1981, the prosecuting attorney introduced the testimony of the fire marshal who stated that the appellant had confessed to committing arson. Sentencing of the appellant was finally had on April 24, 1981. At the final hearing the testimony of Dr. Patricia Miller, the clinical psychologist who had previously examined the appellant, was presented. Dr. Miller's testimony indicated that the appellant was moderately retarded, that she was not competent to stand trial, and that she would not be able to comprehend the consequences of giving a confession. At the conclusion of the hearing the court denied the appellant's motions to vacate her forgery convictions, and to disregard her confession of arson for purposes of probation, ruling that the appellant was competent to enter her guilty pleas, and, without passing on the issue of the appellant's capacity to understand her Miranda rights and to waive them, that the fact of arson was sufficiently established to deny probation. The appellant received two concurrent terms of imprisonment of not less than one, nor more than ten years.

It is a fundamental guaranty of due process that a defendant cannot be tried or convicted for a crime while he or she is mentally incompetent. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 95 S.Ct. 896, 43 L.Ed.2d 103 (1975); Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 86 S.Ct. 836, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966); State v. Demastus, 165 W.Va. 572, 270 S.E.2d 649 (1980); State v. Milam, 159 W.Va. 691, 226 S.E.2d 433 (1976); State v. Arnold, 159 W.Va. 158, 219 S.E.2d 922 (1975), overruled on other grounds, State v. Demastus, supra; State v. Harrison, 36 W.Va. 729, 15 S.E. 982 (1892). "To be competent to stand trial, a defendant must exhibit a sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and a rational, as well as factual, understanding of the proceedings against him." Syllabus Point 4, State ex rel. Williams v. Narick, 164 W.Va. 632, 264 S.E.2d 851 (1980); Syllabus Point 2, State v. Arnold, supra; see also, Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824 (1960).

Although the issue has not been addressed in West Virginia, it has generally been held in other jurisdictions that the test for mental competency to stand trial and the test for mental competency to plead guilty are the same. See United States ex rel. McGough v. Hewitt, 528 F.2d 339 (3d Cir. 1975); Malinanskas v. United States, 505 F.2d 649 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Harlan, 480 F.2d 515 (6th Cir. 1973); Wolf v. United States, 430 F.2d 443 (10th Cir. 1970); Grennett v. United States, 403 F.2d 928 (D.C.Cir.1968); Baker v. United States, 334 F.2d 444 (8th Cir. 1964); Clayton v. United States, 302 F.2d 30 (8th Cir. 1962); United States v. Valentino, 283 F.2d 634 (2d Cir. 1960); State v. Contreras, 112 Ariz. 358, 542 P.2d 17 (1975); People v. Heral, 62 Ill.2d 329, 342 N.E.2d 34 (1976); Commonwealth v. Miller, 454 Pa. 67, 309 A.2d 705 (1973); but cf. Sieling v. Eyman, 478 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1973) (higher standard of competency required for guilty plea). We accept this view.

W.Va.Code §§ 27-6A-1 and 27-6A-2 (1980 Replacement Vol.) specify the procedures through which the competence of a defendant to stand trial may be determined. Since the test for mental competency to stand trial and the test for mental competency to plead guilty are the same, the procedures specified in these statutes are also applicable to a determination of a defendant's competence to enter a guilty plea. Generally, the statutes provide for psychiatric or psychological examination of a criminal defendant who is of questionable competence, and for a hearing at which the defendant's competency is determined. ² We have previously held that whenever the trial court is made aware of a possible problem with a defendant's competency, it is an abuse of discretion to deny a motion for psychiatric evaluation. State v. Demastus, supra.

Here, defense counsel first became aware of a possible problem with the appellant's competence after the appellant's first guilty plea. Counsel's concern with the appellant's competence was prompted by information contained in the appellant's pre-sentence investigation report, and by difficulties he had encountered while working with the appellant in the preparation of her case. As a result of his concern, counsel requested psychiatric and psychological examination of the appellant. The trial court properly granted this motion.

Upon subsequent examination, two reports were filed with the court. The trial court, after review of the reports, decided that further examination was necessary to determine the appellant's competence to enter her previous guilty plea and to stand trial on the outstanding charges against her. Accordingly, the court ordered the appellant to be admitted to Weston State Hospital for further observation and examination. See W.Va.Code § 27-6A-1. Examination of the appellant at Weston produced two additional reports on the appellant's competence which were filed with the court on August 1, 1980.

Apparently, the trial court failed to make a finding on the issue of the appellant's competence within five days of receipt of the reports from Weston as is required by W.Va.Code § 27-6A-1(d). However, a hearing was held on the issue on August 15, 1980.

The requirements of a hearing to determine a defendant's competency to stand trial are set out in W.Va.Code § 27-6A-2. In State v. Milam, supra, we stated in regard to...