State v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co.

• Decision Date: 10 December 1912
• Citation: 152 S.W. 28,246 Mo. 512
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE ex rel. ROLSTON, Pros. Atty., v. CHICAGO, B. & Q. R. CO.

152 S.W. 28

246 Mo. 512

STATE ex rel. ROLSTON, Pros. Atty., v. CHICAGO, B. & Q. R. CO.

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 2.

December 10, 1912.

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (§ 208) — CLASS LEGISLATION — POWER OF LEGISLATURE.

The constitutional prohibitions against class legislation do not deprive the Legislature

of discretion in defining the classes to which its enactments shall apply, and, unless the classification is arbitrary, unreasonable, and unjust, such discretion as to the classification for legislative purposes is not subject to review by the courts, however unwisely it may seem to have been exercised.

2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (§ 211) — EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAWS — POWER OF LEGISLATURE.

The constitutional guaranty of the equal protection of the laws does not deprive the Legislature of all discretion in defining the classes to which its enactments shall apply.

3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (§ 211) — CLASS LEGISLATION — GROUNDS OF CLASSIFICATION.

A classification for legislative purposes must always rest upon some difference which bears a reasonable and just relation to the act as to which the classification is proposed, and can never be made arbitrarily. It must rest upon some rule of public policy growing out of the conditions of the business of such class, must be such as to mark the objects so classified as peculiarly requiring exclusive legislation, and must account for or justify the restriction of legislation.

4. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (§ 208) — CLASS LEGISLATION — ABANDONMENT OF RAILROAD STATIONS.

While the Legislature may enact laws applicable to railroads as a distinct class, as an incident of its power to enforce the duty of railroads to provide and maintain facilities adequate for the public needs, Rev. St. 1909, §§ 3223-3225, imposing a penalty on a railroad abandoning a station without authority from the board of railroad and warehouse commissioners, and which by section 3223 provides that a railroad which has built a station in consideration of a donation at a place where a post office has been established or a village or town built shall keep and maintain the station in charge of a resident agent and furnish suitable facilities for passengers and freight, is invalid as an arbitrary, unreasonable, and unjust classification, since the fact that a station was built in consideration of a donation has no relevancy on the question whether the public needs require its maintenance, and is not a distinction of a public nature.

5. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (§ 241) — EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS — ABANDONMENT OF RAILROAD STATION.

Such act (Rev. St. 1909, §§ 3223-3225) is also invalid as a denial of the equal protection of the laws.

6. STATUTES (§ 64) — PARTIAL INVALIDITY — EFFECT.

The court cannot eliminate an objectionable classification in a statute, since it cannot extend by construction the scope of the statute, and make it applicable to those to whom the Legislature never intended it should apply, but must hold the entire act invalid.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Schuyler County; Nat M. Shelton, Judge.

Proceeding by the State of Missouri, on the relation of Allen Rolston, prosecuting attorney within and for the county of Schuyler, against the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Allen Rolston, of Lancaster, Dean Davis, and Fogle & Fogle, of Lancaster, for appellant. Higbee & Mills, of Lancaster, Palmer Trimble, of Keokuk, Iowa, and O. M. Spencer, of St. Joseph, for respondent.

BLAIR, C.

This is a proceeding under sections 3223-3225, R. S. 1909, to recover from the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company accumulated penalties for abandoning a depot and station at Guinn, Mo., without being authorized by the board of railroad and warehouse commissioners so to do. The trial court gave judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appealed. In the answer it is averred that the statute under which the action was instituted denies defendant the equal protection of the laws, deprives it of its property without due process of law, and impairs the obligation of its contract with one Dean who, the petition alleges, in 1887 conveyed certain land to defendant's predecessor in title in consideration of the erection of a depot on the line of railway now owned and operated by defendant.

In the view we take of the case, there is but one question it is necessary to discuss. State and federal Constitutions guarantee defendant the equal protection of the laws, and the right to such protection it is necessary to maintain. The first section of the act the constitutionality of which is drawn in question in this case reads as follows: "Sec. 3223. Depots to be maintained at agreed places. — Where the right of way for the construction of a railroad has been granted over and across any tract or tracts of land in this state, or any donation made to and accepted by any railroad corporation in consideration of the location of a depot at a specified place upon such railroad, and such depot has been constructed at the place so agreed upon and a post office has been established there and a village or town built at said place, it shall be the duty of the company managing and operating any such railroad (whether it be the original corporation to which said grant or donation was made, or a corporation succeeding to the rights of such original company) to keep and maintain a depot in charge of a resident agent at said place or places, and to furnish all proper and suitable facilities for the shipment of freight and the transportation of passengers to and from said station." The second section provides that,...