State v. Chilton

• Decision Date: 05 February 1987
• Docket Number: No. 16220,16220
• Citation: 736 P.2d 1277,112 Idaho 823
• Parties: STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Robert A. CHILTON, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

Page 1277

736 P.2d 1277

112 Idaho 823

STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Robert A. CHILTON, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16220.

Supreme Court of Idaho.

Feb. 5, 1987.

Rehearing Denied May 19, 1987.

[112 Idaho 824] Charles Johnson III, Pocatello, for defendant-appellant.

Jim Jones, Atty. Gen., Lynn E. Thomas, Sol. Gen., and Myrna A.I. Stahman, Deputy Atty. Gen. (argued), Boise, for plaintiff-respondent.

HUNTLEY, Justice.

Robert Chilton appeals the trial court's order denying him a discharge or conditional release from a mental hospital. Chilton alleges the trial court applied an improper legal standard by placing the burden of proof on him to prove: (1) he could be released without danger to himself or others, and (2) that he was no longer mentally ill. Chilton also argues the trial court improperly concentrated on Chilton's alleged past criminal record, alleged refusal to accept that he was mentally ill, and alleged refusal to accept treatment in reaching its decision.

At a trial in September 1981, Chilton was found not guilty by reason of mental disease and defect of forcible rape, two counts of the infamous crime against nature, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony and first degree kidnapping. Upon his acquittal, Chilton was committed to State Hospital South in Blackfoot, Idaho, and assigned to "Hoover Four," the intermediate security facility which provides the maximum security available at the hospital. For a number of years, Chilton refused to acknowledge his mental illness and actively refused anti-psychotic medication. Around the beginning of 1984, Chilton agreed to start taking anti-psychotic medication and was moved off "Hoover Four" to a minimum security section of State Hospital South. Chilton has apparently made steady progress as a result of the medication, and most of the psychiatrists, clinical psychologists and others working with Chilton now advocate his conditional release to a less structured environment, such as a shelter home, provided he remains on medication.

Despite those recommendations, the trial court ruled that Chilton had failed to show that he could be released under either of two statutory standards: first, it could not be shown that Chilton could be released without danger to himself or others (the standard required under I.C. § 18-214(2) (repealed), which statute Chilton was committed under) and second, Chilton did not show that he was no longer mentally ill nor likely to injure himself or others (a standard required under I.C. § 66-337(b), enacted after the repeal of I.C. § 18-214). The trial court based its decision, in large part, upon reports it ordered pursuant to I.C. §§ 66-337 and 18-214 (repealed), by doctors Lamarr Heyrend and Michael Estess. Dr. Heyrend expressly stated that, in his "The hearing was relatively brief. The defendant [Chilton] appeared indifferent at first, but quickly became impatient as the hearing continued. He became quite agitated at the slightest negative testimony, interrupting several times with outbursts of disagreement with statements offered. Finally, in a bizarre incident, he waved a white handkerchief as though in surrender, during the prosecutor's closing. The court is satisfied that the clearly expressed reservation of Dr. Heyrend and the implied reservation of Dr . Estess are well founded. The defendant demonstrated no appreciation for the necessity of his treatment, the existence of his medical condition, nor a willingness to abide by any terms of a conditional release. It appears to the court that the defendant might view a relaxation of the conditions of his commitment as a license to abandon further treatment, including the necessary medication. Since, without medication, it has been demonstrated that the defendant's mental disease quickly reverts to a psychotic condition, and since in that condition the defendant poses a significant danger to himself and others, the court is not satisfied that the defendant is eligible for conditional release at this time." (Emphasis added).

[112 Idaho 825] opinion, Chilton is not ready for conditional release as he persists in stating that he is not mentally ill and remains unwilling to recognize the necessity for treatment. Additionally, that report mentioned the uncooperative attitude with which Chilton currently receives his medication. While Dr. Estess is of the opinion that Chilton might succeed in a less structured environment, he emphasized that any success would depend entirely upon Chilton's continued receipt of medication and treatment and cooperation with an out-patient treatment program. All experts who testified at the hearing stated that Chilton still refuses to acknowledge the reason for his commitment, refuses to accept the diagnosis of his illness and continues to object to the necessity of taking medication. The court also emphasized its own observations of Chilton's demeanor and attitude during the hearing, stating:

The trial court concluded that Chilton had failed to meet his burden of proof of showing he could be released without danger to himself or others, the standard required by I.C. § 18-214 (repealed), and had also failed to show he was no longer mentally ill nor likely to injure himself or others, the standard required by I.C. § 66-337, and therefore should not be conditionally released. Chilton was involuntarily committed pursuant to I.C. § 18-214 (repealed), which in addition to providing for the commitment of criminal defendants acquitted on the ground of mental illness also specified hearing procedures for the conditional release of those so committed.

"18-214. Commitment of acquitted defendant--conditional release--revocation of release within five years.--

(1) When a defendant is acquitted on the ground of mental disease or defect excluding responsibility, the court shall order him to be committed to the custody of the director of the Department of Health and Welfare to be placed in an appropriate institution for custody, care and treatment.

....

(3) If the court is satisfied by the report filed pursuant to paragraph (2) of this section and such testimony of the reporting psychiatrist as the court deems necessary that the committed person may be discharged or released on condition without danger to himself or others, the court shall order his discharge or his release on such conditions as the court determines to be necessary. If the court is not so satisfied, it shall promptly order a hearing to determine whether such person may safely be discharged or released. Any such hearing shall be deemed a civil proceeding and the burden shall be upon the committed person to prove that he may safely be discharged or released. ..." (Emphasis added) (repealed).

By contrast, I.C. § 66-337, although it expressly pertains to patients admitted under § 18-214 (as well as other involuntary Chilton raises several contentions on appeal. First, that the trial court incorrectly relied on the report of Dr. Heyrend since it had not been formally admitted into evidence, thereby precluding Chilton's right to cross-examine. Second, that the trial court incorrectly placed on Chilton the burden of proving both that he could be released without danger to himself and to others, and that he was no longer mentally ill nor likely to injure himself or others. We address each issue in turn.

[112 Idaho 826] patients) does not specify on whom the burden of proof of showing fitness to release lies. The trial court's apparent confusion as to which code section to apply, and its resultant application of both legal standards for release found in the sections stems, no doubt, from the paucity of instruction regarding conditional release hearings found in I.C. § 66-337.

THE HEYREND REPORT

The reports of Dr. Lamarr Heyrend and Dr. Michael Estess were ordered pursuant to I.C. § 66-337(c) which provides in relevant part:

"[U]pon motion of an interested party or the court on its own motion, the court shall determine whether the conditions justifying such release exist. In making such determination, the court may order an independent examination of the patient...."

At the onset, it is simply inconsistent for Chilton to urge that it was improper for the trial court to consider the Heyrend report while at the same time moving this Court to consider the Estess report, which also was not formally introduced into evidence during the open hearing. Regardless, we hold that I.C. § 66-337 contemplates just such use of independent examination reports by the court as was done in this instance.

Neither report was formally admitted into evidence at the conditional release hearing. Chilton did not object before the trial court to the use of the reports, but now contends that the trial court's utilization of the Heyrend report violates his right to cross-examine Dr. Heyrend as guaranteed by the confrontation clause of the United States Constitution (U.S. CONST. 6th Amend.) and the Idaho Constitution (ID. CONST. art. 1, §§ 1, 13, 18). While ordinarily Chilton's position would be well taken, conditional release hearings pursuant to I.C. § 66-337 are unique. As mentioned, that statute specifically provides that the court may order an independent examination of the patient. The statute, therefore, clearly contemplates the judicial utilization of reports received as a result of such "independent examination."

Chilton also alleges that he was never aware that the trial court would consider the Heyrend report until after the hearing concluded. However, I.C. § 66-337(c) specifically allows that the court may release a patient, without a hearing, on the basis of such reports.

66-337. Review, termination of commitment and discharge of patients.--

....

(c) Upon notification of intention to release from an inpatient facility either a patient admitted under section 18-214, Idaho Code, acquitted of criminal charges filed prior to July 1, 1982, on grounds of mental disease or defect, or committed...