State v. Chingren

• Decision Date: 08 April 1898
• Citation: 105 Iowa 169,74 N.W. 946
• Parties: STATE v. CHINGREN.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

105 Iowa 169

74 N.W. 946

STATE

v.CHINGREN.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

April 8, 1898.

Appeal from district court, Webster county; P. B. Birdsall, Judge.

The defendant was convicted of the crime of cheating by false pretenses, and from judgment sentencing him to imprisonment in the penitentiary for three years he appeals. Affirmed.Wright & Nugent, for appellant.

Milton Remley, Atty. Gen., and Jessie A. Miller, for the State.

LADD, J.

On or about August 28, 1895, T. J. Conners was the owner of a stock of merchandise kept in a building of his father at Barnum, Webster county, and the wife of the defendant was the owner of the W. 1/2 of the N. W. 1/4 of section 8, in township 90 N., of range 34 W. of fifth P. M., in Pocahontas county, subject to a mortgage of $1,000. The defendant, acting for his wife, exchanged this land at a valuation of $2,000 to Conners for the merchandise at the valuation of $1,200, and the building and lot were kept at $1,000. A release of the $1,000 mortgage was procured by executing mortgages for the same amount on the merchandise and store building, and defendant and wife executed to Conners a note and mortgage for the difference of $200. It is charged in the indictment that, to induce Conners to make this trade, and part with his stock of goods, the defendant knowingly and with the intention of defrauding pointed out to him the E. 1/2 of the N. W. 1/4 of the N. W. 1/4, and the W. 1/2 of the N. E. 1/4 of the N. W. 1/4, of section 8, and 40 acres just north of the same, being high, rolling prairie, worth about $2,000, and represented it to be the W. 1/2 of the N. W. 1/4 of said section, which was variously estimated to be worth from $300 to $1,200. The land exchanged was swampy, and covered with cane brake, and contained not to exceed 15 or 16 acres arable in character.

1. The defendant sought to prove that when real estate is being traded for goods it is the custom to mark up the price of land. The evidence was properly excluded. It is a matter of common knowledge that in making exchanges of any property the prices are not fixed at cash values. The law permits those selling or exchanging to brag on their property, and to obtain the highest price possible to secure fairly and honestly. This is generally known, and there was no occasion to prove that men sometimes ask more for a thing than it is worth.

2. P. T. Anderson was permitted to testify that he was out to look at the land with defendant, and that the latter pointed out to him a certain southeast corner and told him about 20 acres of it was slough. The evidence of this witness is rather vague, but tended to show that the same land was pointed out alleged in the indictment to have been shown Conners as the W. 1/2 of the N. W. 1/4 of section 8. The defendant, in his testimony, claimed that he did not know the corners and lines of his wife's 80, and this evidence was admissible on the question of knowledge. It tended to show that he knew the corners and lines, and was claiming the land shown Conners as his own. For what purpose Anderson looked at the land does not appear, and for this reason the authorities cited by both parties concerning proof of similar offenses are not applicable.

3. This is a part of defendant's cross-examination: “Q. What was your business in connection with country fairs at different places? A. I never was outside from home. Q. Well, at the Fonda Fair. What business did you have with the fair there? A. I ran a bowery at one time. Q. Did you run anything else? A. I ran a jewelry spindle at one time.” He was then asked whether that was a gambling institution, but this was withdrawn upon objection, and the question, “What is the spindle you speak of?” not permitted to be answered. It has often been held that on cross-examination inquiry may be made concerning a defendant's different occupations and places of residence. State v. Pugsley, 75 Iowa, 743, 38 N. W. 498;State v. Row, 81 Iowa, 138, 46 N. W. 872;State v. Watson (Iowa) 72 N. W. 283. The extent to which such inquiry may be carried must necessarily rest in the sound discretion of the trial court. The question eliciting the answer concerning the jewelry spindle was not improper. If handling it constituted the crime of gambling, the answer might have been stricken on motion. What it really was does not appear, as evidence of its character was excluded on objection by the defendant. The question as to its being a gambling institution was promptly withdrawn. There was no erroneous ruling, and we do not think the defendant was prejudiced by the question, improper as it was, in view of its immediate withdrawal by the county attorney.

4. The defendant was also asked: “Q. There was no money passed from you or your wife to Mr. Hughes for that eighty acres? A. No money passed from me. Q. Or from your wife? A. Not that I know of. * * * Q. That mortgage was a sham mortgage, was it not? A. No, sir.” It is insisted this was not cross-examination. The defendant had testified that his wife owned the land, and became such owner in July or August, 1895; that he had no interest in it; that Hughes held a mortgage of $1,000 on it, and that the latter went with him to Barnum to examine the building and stock with a view of changing the security from the land. How his wife became ownerwas...