State v. Church
| Decision Date | 30 January 1989 |
| Docket Number | No. 88-KK-1735,88-KK-1735 |
| Citation | 538 So.2d 993 |
| Parties | STATE of Louisiana v. Victor CHURCH. |
| Court | Louisiana Supreme Court |
Bobby Sutton, Jr., Burnett, Sutton & Walker, Shreveport, for applicant.
Paul Carmouche, Dist. Atty., Lydia M. Rhodes, Sp. Asst. Dist. Atty., for respondent.
After being stopped at a DWI roadblock in Shreveport, Louisiana, Victor Church was charged with driving without a license and first offense DWI. His motion to suppress the evidence of intoxication obtained at the roadblock was granted by the trial court, but the court of appeal reversed the judgment. 1 A writ was granted to consider whether the roadblock violated Church's rights guaranteed by the Louisiana Constitution of 1974. 2
On May 30, 1987, between 12:00 A.M. and 3:00 A.M., the Shreveport Police Department set up a DWI roadblock ("sobriety checkpoint") at the intersection of Martin Luther King Drive and North Market Street (Louisiana Highway 1) in the City of Shreveport. Flares were set on each side of the road, one hundred feet apart, to alert northbound drivers that they were approaching a roadblock and directing them from two lanes into one lane of traffic. As the vehicles were stopped, an officer identified himself and informed motorists that it was a DWI checkpoint. This officer asked to see a driver's license and checked for signs of intoxication. An auxiliary officer was stationed at the rear to check for expired license plates. Drivers suspected of being intoxicated were taken to a side area where an officer with DWI experience advised them of their Miranda rights and conducted field sobriety tests. Drivers failing that test were transported by police officers to another location where a chemical test was administered. All cars were stopped. There were no side streets available for drivers to escape the roadblock. Drivers who took the I-220 exit eastbound or westbound were stopped by "catch cars".
At approximately 2:20 A.M., Victor Church was stopped and asked for his driver's license by Corporal W.E. Smith. Since Church was driving without his license, Smith asked Church to leave his vehicle so that a ticket could be written for that violation. When Church got out of the car, he leaned against it, holding onto the vehicle with his left hand. Church was given his Miranda rights and a field sobriety test, which he failed. Church was charged with violation of LSA-R.S. 32:411, 3 driving without a license, and LSA-R.S. 14:98, 4 driving while intoxicated, first offense. After consenting to a chemical test for intoxication, he registered .13%.
Church's motion to suppress the evidence of intoxication obtained at the roadblock argued that the initial investigatory stop of his vehicle violated LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 215.1, Article I, Section 5 of the 1974 Louisiana Constitution; and the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, because it was made without probable cause or reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing. Church, the City of Shreveport, and the State of Louisiana entered into joint stipulations that: (1) the primary purpose of this roadblock was the apprehension and deterrence of DWI offenders and accidents; (2) the sole reason for the initial contact with Church was the fact that he was operating his vehicle in that area; (3) the average time in which a noncited motorist passed through the roadblock was four minutes, including waiting time; (4) the average contact with a Shreveport Police officer for a noncited motorist was between 18 and 25 seconds; (5) the DWI checkpoint procedures were drafted to follow guidelines established in Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979) and other state and federal court cases; and (6) that roadblocks are in general some deterrent to DWI offenses.
After a hearing at which law enforcement officials testified regarding the roadblock's procedures, the trial judge granted the motion to suppress, finding the roadblock was part of a criminal investigation and that the stop of Church's vehicle was a seizure under both the Louisiana and United States Constitutions. The initial contact was also a forcible investigatory stop under LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 215.1. The trial court noted that a warrantless, forcible stop by a police officer for criminal investigation is lawful only when based on individualized reasonable suspicion aroused prior to the stop.
The court of appeal reversed the trial court judgment, finding that the roadblock was constitutional under both the state and federal constitutions. The court of appeal noted a significant difference between this roadblock and the one found constitutionally unacceptable in State v. Parms, 523 So.2d 1293 (La.1988): citizens were protected against unbridled discretion by the field officers conducting the stop.
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures by government officials. 5 This right of personal security was made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961). When law enforcement officials stop a vehicle and detain its occupants, the action constitutes a "seizure" under the Fourth Amendment. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116 (1976). A warrantless search and seizure is per se unreasonable, unless justified by a specific exception to the warrant requirement. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 at 357, 88 S.Ct. 507 at 514, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 at 585 (1967); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 at 454-455, 91 S.Ct. 2022 at 2032, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 at 576 (1971). 6
Prouse, supra, held that random stops of motorists without articulable or reasonable suspicion of unlawful activity were unreasonable seizures under the Fourth Amendment, and signalled the need for "neutral criteria" to curb the unbridled discretion of police officers in making such stops. Prouse suggested roadblocks for all traffic as an alternative to random stops. The United States Supreme Court has not considered the use of roadblock stops as an investigative technique to detect intoxicated drivers. 7 However, where the governmental interest is compelling, the intrusion minimal, and adequate neutral criteria are present, roadblocks may meet Fourth Amendment standards. 8 Nevertheless, even if the Shreveport DWI roadblock meets federal constitutional standards, 9 it violates the Louisiana Constitution of 1974.
Article 1, Section 5, of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974 protects against unreasonable searches, seizures and invasions of privacy. 10 This declaration of rights does not duplicate the Fourth Amendment. It represents a conscious choice by the citizens of Louisiana to give a "higher standard of individual liberty than that afforded by the jurisprudence interpreting the federal constitution." State v. Hernandez, 410 So.2d 1381 at 1385 (La.1982).
State v. Parms, 523 So.2d 1293 (La.1988) considered the constitutionality of a DWI roadblock and held the absence of neutral criteria invalidated the stop under federal constitutional standards. Since the roadblock failed to meet federal standards, Parms' motion to suppress the evidence of his intoxication was granted. In dicta, Parms questioned whether a roadblock could pass state constitutional muster and concluded that such seizures without probable cause or reasonable suspicion were unconstitutional invasions of the privacy guaranteed by the Louisiana Constitution of 1974. 11 Rehearing was denied in Parms, with language leaving open the question of whether DWI roadblocks might be permissible under the Louisiana Constitution.
The "probable cause" requirement was extended to the protection against unreasonable invasions of privacy, searches and seizures in the Louisiana Constitution, 12 which guarantees "the right to be let alone." 13 LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 215.1 embodies the Terry v. Ohio requirement that law enforcement officials must have reasonable suspicion to stop citizens. This requirement applies equally whether the official stops a citizen walking down the street or one traveling in a vehicle. "Before a police officer may stop a person for investigatory purposes he must reasonably suspect that the person has committed or is about to commit a criminal offense." State v. Matthews, 366 So.2d 1348 at 1351 (La.1978). Evidence obtained in violation of this statutory and constitutional mandate may not be used in a criminal prosecution. 14 Smith testified that Church was not stopped based on any violation of the law, nor did the officers have a reasonable suspicion that he, or any of the other drivers stopped, had committed, were about to commit, or were engaged in a violation of the law. 15 The evidence of intoxication obtained must therefore be excluded and the motion to suppress was correctly granted by the trial court.
The drunken driver is a pervasive problem in our society. Thousands of lives are lost and extensive property damage results when intoxicated persons pilot their vehicles on our roadways. However, roadblocks not only impinge on constitutionally guaranteed rights, but they have, at best, a marginal effect on the problem of drunken driving.
From the 949 vehicles stopped at this roadblock, only 13 persons were arrested for DWI (1.36%). Other roadblocks conducted by the Shreveport police department have been even less successful. 16 Although the initial time for the stop of a noncited motorist was short, this does not take into account those drivers that were subjected to field sobriety tests and allowed to proceed, or those that failed field sobriety tests and were found to measure less than .10% by a chemical test. The testimony and statistics in evidence showed DWI arrests in Shreveport have decreased every year from 1981 or 1982, when records began to be kept. DWI roadblocks were not in...
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