State v. Cimino

• Decision Date: 07 August 1984
• Citation: 478 A.2d 1005,194 Conn. 210
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. John J. CIMINO, Jr.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

Page 1005

478 A.2d 1005

194 Conn. 210

STATE of Connecticut v. John J. CIMINO, Jr.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued June 13, 1984.

Decided Aug. 7, 1984.

Joseph Dimyan, Danbury, for appellant (defendant).

Richard D. Arconti, Asst. State's Atty., for appellee (state).

Before SPEZIALE, C.J., and ARTHUR H. HEALEY, PARSKEY, SHEA and GRILLO, JJ.

SPEZIALE, Chief Justice.

After a jury trial, the defendant, John J. Cimino, Jr., was convicted of the crimes of arson in the third degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-113 ¹ and burglary in the third degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-103. ² The defendant now appeals from the judgment, claiming that the trial court erred in denying his motions for judgment of acquittal ³ because of insufficient evidence. We find no error.

The sole issue on appeal is whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to justify the verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence this court must construe the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict; State v. Ferrell, 191 Conn. 37, 46, 463 A.2d 573 (1983); and then determine whether the jury "could have reasonably concluded, upon the facts established and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, that the cumulative effect of the evidence was sufficient to justify the verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Jackson, 176 Conn. 257, 262, 407 A.2d 948 (1978); see State v. Stepney, 191 Conn. 233, 255, 464 A.2d 758 (1983), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 104 S.Ct. 1455, 79 L.Ed.2d 772 (1984). The defendant contends and the state admits that much of the evidence presented at trial was circumstantial. As we have stated on numerous occasions, "there is no legal distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence so far as probative force is concerned." State v. Haddad, 189 Conn. 383, 390, 456 A.2d 316 (1983); State v. Perez, 183 Conn. 225, 227, 439 A.2d 305 (1981); State v. Wilson, 178 Conn. 427, 434, 423 A.2d 72 (1979). "It is not one fact, but the cumulative impact of a multitude of facts which establishes guilt in a case involving substantial circumstantial evidence." State v. Perez, supra, 183 Conn. at 227, 439 A.2d 305.

The jury could reasonably have found the following facts: At approximately 12:30 a.m. on August 18, 1981, the defendant, driving a borrowed orange Volkswagen, bought two one-gallon containers of gasoline at a gas station in Danbury. At about 1:25 a.m., two Western Connecticut State College security officers saw an orange Volkswagen being driven into a parking lot on White Street in Danbury. As the officers watched from roughtly 350 feet away, the driver of the Volkswagen got out of the car and crossed White Street carrying something that looked like a tool box. This person entered the Empire Auto Sales car lot located at the corner of White Street and Moss Avenue. The officers drove to the lot to investigate, but found no one there. They also drove up Moss Avenue without seeing anyone and returned to a lot across the street from the Empire Auto Sales lot.

A few minutes after the officers returned, which was approximately fifteen minutes after the driver of the Volkswagen crossed White Street, they noticed smoke coming from Osborne Street, a street parallel to White Street approximately two-tenths of a mile to the north. An individual later identified as the defendant then appeared in the well lighted Empire lot. The officers drove to within ten or fifteen feet of the person and got out of their car. The defendant fled, carrying two dark plastic containers the size of milk cartons. Two brown plastic one-gallon containers which had held gasoline and which were identified as those sold to the defendant earlier that morning were found shortly afterwards near the path of the defendant's flight. The defendant returned to the Volkswagen fifteen minutes later and was arrested. The car smelled of gasoline, but no gasoline was found on the defendant's clothes.

A fire in a wooden house at 38 Osborne Street was reported to the Danbury fire department at 1:36 a.m. on August 18, 1981. The fire had been set from within using gasoline ⁴ and was fast spreading. The Danbury fire marshal estimated that the fire had probably been set ten or fifteen minutes before smoke would have become visible but that it was impossible to fix exactly the time of ignition.

Thus although there was no direct evidence that the defendant entered the house and set it on fire, there was...