State v. Ciresi

Citation45 A.3d 1201
Decision Date05 July 2012
Docket NumberNos. 2010–253–C.A., 2010–254–C.A.,s. 2010–253–C.A., 2010–254–C.A.
PartiesSTATE v. Michael CIRESI.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Rhode Island

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Lauren S. Zurier, Department of Attorney General, Providence, for State.

George J. West, Esq., Providence, for Defendant.

Present: SUTTELL, C.J., GOLDBERG, FLAHERTY, ROBINSON, and INDEGLIA, JJ.

OPINION

Justice INDEGLIA, for the Court.

“It takes many good deeds to build a good reputation, and only one bad one to lose it.” 1 Strangely enough, the case before this Court involves a cast of characters called upon to recount their many bad deeds to build “good” reputations—or, at the very least, credible ones. In early 2008, over the course of a lengthy jury trial, the state presented approximately thirty witnesses, including known criminals, against the defendant, Michael Ciresi (defendant or Ciresi), a decorated North Providence police officer, who was charged with multiple counts ranging from the receipt of stolen goods to burglary. Ultimately convicted on all but one of the counts with which he was charged, Ciresi now appeals his convictions to this Court. On appeal, Ciresi contends that the trial justice abused his discretion by admitting numerous instances of Ciresi's uncharged misconduct under Rule 404(b) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence. Ciresi also challenges the trial justice's decision to allow the joinder of two separate indictments against him, as well as the trial justice's subsequent denial of Ciresi's motion to sever the indictments for trial. On April 11, 2012, this case came before the Supreme Court, sitting at Tolman High School in Pawtucket, Rhode Island. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the judgments of the Superior Court.

IFacts and Travel

The defendant in this case, Ciresi, was a career police officer with the North Providence Police Department, who began his tenure as a patrolman and swiftly advanced through the ranks of the department. He served as a narcotics detective, an assistant SWAT (special weapons and tactics) commander, a firearms instructor, and he was later promoted to the rank of sergeant. Described during trial as “a very aggressive police officer” who performed [e]xemplary” work and produced a “prolific” arrest record, Ciresi was provided “a little more leeway than the average officer” in conducting his police work. Notwithstanding his good reputation, Ciresi was also known for being a “mischievous type of officer” who had “minor infractions [and would] bend the rules.”

An investigation into the alleged disreputable and illegal endeavors by Ciresi underpinning the indictments at issue, discussed infra, was conducted following the police interview of an individual arrested during the course of an attempted burglary in the City of Pawtucket in December 2004. As the Pawtucket Police Department's investigation into the burglary progressed, information surfaced linking Ciresi to the burglary, as well as to further criminal activity in both Pawtucket and North Providence apparently effectuated through his use of criminal informants. As a result of this in-depth investigation, Ciresi was charged by indictment in March 2006 with two counts of receiving stolen goods (a generator 2 and a bracelet) valued at over $500, in violation of G.L.1956 §§ 11–41–2 and 11–41–5 (counts 1–2); one count of receiving stolen goods (two watches) valued at under $500, in violation of §§ 11–41–2 and 11–41–5 (count 3); one count of attempted larceny of currency from an ATM machine, in violation of §§ 11–41–1 and 11–41–6 (count 4); one count of harboring a criminal in violation of G.L.1956 § 11–1–4 (count 5); and one count of obstructing two police officers while they were in the execution of their office and duty in violation of G.L.1956 § 11–32–1 (count 6).3 More than one year later, a Providence County Superior Court grand jury indicted Ciresi on five additional counts—two counts of burglary in violation of G.L.1956 § 11–8–1 (counts 1 and 4); two counts of conspiracy to commit burglary in violation of § 11–1–6 (counts 2 and 5); and one count of using a firearm while committing a crime of violence in violation of G.L.1956 § 11–47–3.2(a) (count 3).

On December 5, 2007, a Superior Court justice heard the state's motion to consolidate the two indictments against Ciresi. The state premised its motion on the theory that Ciresi's actions alleged in the ten counts of the two indictments demonstrated a common plan or scheme “to benefit himself financially through illegal means.” The trial justice granted the state's motion over defendant's objection, stating that “the common thread * * * that pervade[d] all of the charges [was] basically the cultivation and corruption of informants to [Ciresi's] personal benefit * * *.” The trial justice further explicated that in his view, “the charges * * * in the two indictments[did], indeed, fit within the rubric of a common scheme and plan, and that joinder should be had.”

On January 22, 2008, the trial justice addressed several preliminary motions made by the parties, including a renewed request by Ciresi to sever the indictments. In denying the motion to sever, the trial justice emphasized that the state's allegations indicated that Ciresi had “a continuing plan and mod [u]s operandi, to ‘do business' with those who [were] bent on criminal activity, be they informants or those whom he simply knew as criminals.” He likewise noted that [a]ll of these cases [were] intertwined, as [were] the relationships among and between the defendant and [the criminal witnesses].”

At that time, the trial justice also considered the state's motion in limine to admit certain evidence under Rule 404(b).4 Specifically, the motion outlined thirty-nine evidentiary items to which six witnesses—five of whom were known criminals—were expected to testify during the course of Ciresi's trial. Noting that his review was “preliminary” in nature, the trial justice surmised that all of the proposed evidence constituted “typical [ Rule] 404(b) material;” and he recognized that, [a]lthough not alleged as offenses, they [were], nonetheless, actions that besp[oke] a common plan, [and] reflect[ed] the intent of the defendant, particularly as it relate[d] to using others, especially criminals, for his own benefit.” Reviewing the proposed testimony of each of the five “criminal” witnesses specified in the motion, the trial justice explained that he would permit such testimony of Ciresi's prior uncharged misconduct on a preliminary basis, with the exception of the proposed testimony of a fellow police officer, about which testimony the trial justice felt “on the fence.”

To support its case against Ciresi, the state called more than two dozen witnesses over the course of nine days. One of the state's primary witnesses, Mark Pine (Pine), was a career criminal who testified about his dealings with Ciresi over the years, and who also was the individual arrested for the December 2004 burglary in Pawtucket that instigated the investigation into Ciresi's activities. According to Pine, he originally encountered Ciresi after he was arrested and charged with obstruction of justice following a traffic stop in North Providence in March 2000. Upon his release the next day after having entered a plea to the charge, Pine accompanied Ciresi to the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) headquarters in Warwick in an attempt by authorities to extract information from Pine concerning any knowledge of potential drug dealing.5 Pine recalled providing no such information; consequently, Ciresi took Pine home. Upon dropping Pine off, Ciresi handed him a card and suggested that Pine give him a call. According to Pine, this overture initiated a four-year affiliation between the two men.

Although Pine characterized the beginning of this relationship as friendly in nature, he described the progression of his association with Ciresi as reflective of more criminal features. Pine recalled his delivery of stolen transmission fluid, tires, and rims to Ciresi in 2002; and he further detailed how Ciresi, who had returned to the uniformed patrol by this time, acted as a lookout during four or five of Pine's thefts at a North Providence car dealership. Apparently, these dealings escalated to a higher level of criminal activity, involving: Ciresi's acceptance from Pine of an admittedly stolen gun; Ciresi's aid in Pine's escape from a police chase in Pawtucket after stealing a car; and Ciresi and Pine's conspiracy to burglarize an apartment on Charles Street in North Providence in September 2002.

In regard to the Charles Street burglary, Pine testified in great detail as to Ciresi's statements and actions in preparing for the planned break-in. According to Pine, Ciresi suspected that the apartment was home to a drug dealer who harbored a considerable quantity of money and drugs. Ciresi urged Pine to break a window, thereby giving Ciresi a pretense to be the first officer to respond. Pursuant to their agreement, Ciresi would burglarize the apartment and keep any money; Pine would receive the drugs. After twice canvassing the location together, they eventually put Ciresi's plan into action. Ciresi provided Pine with a small explosive device to place on the apartment's window while he proceeded to a pharmacy parking lot across the street to lie in wait. After placing the device, Pine left the scene, only to later discover that Ciresi had not recovered any drugs or money from the apartment after the explosion.

Soon after the Charles Street burglary, Pine was incarcerated on and off for two years for unrelated charges and parole violations. While out on parole, Pine continued his nefarious discussions with Ciresi, in which the two talked of setting up and robbing drug dealers, as well as a local jewelry store. None of these plans, however, came to fruition. Shortly after the completion of Pine's sentence in December 2004, the Pawtucket Police Department issued an arrest warrant for Pine's brother....

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