State v. Citrus County

• Decision Date: 01 January 1935
• Citation: 117 Fla. 792,158 So. 705
• Parties: STATE et al. v. CITRUS COUNTY et al.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

158 So. 705

117 Fla. 792

STATE et al. v. CITRUS COUNTY et al.

Florida Supreme Court

January 1, 1935

Rehearing Denied Jan. 30, 1935.

En Banc.

Statutory proceeding by the County of Citrus, Fla., and others against the State of Florida and others, to validate refunding bonds. From a decree, defendant appeal.

Affirmed. Appeal from Circuit Court, Citrus County; Fred L. Stringer, judge.

COUNSEL

Lovick P. Williams, of Inverness, and Hampton, Bull & Crom, of Tampa, for appellants.

D. C Hull, Erskine W. Landis, and Hull, Landis & Whitehair, all of De Land, Ernest C. Johnston, of Inverness, and C. H Lockhart, of Brooksville, for appellees.

OPINION

DAVIS Chief Justice.

This is the second appeal from a decree of validation of certain refunding bonds preposed to be issued by Citrus county under chapter 15772, Acts 1931 (Ex. Sess.), Laws of Florida. On the first appeal (State v. Citrus County (Fla.) 157 So 4) it was held that certain portions of the proceedings for issuance of the proposed bonds were illegal, but that the invalid portions were severable and could be eliminated and a decree of validation entered in conformity with the opinion of this court on that appeal, provided the proceedings for the issuance and validation of the bonds in controversy should be subsequently so amended as to conform to the earlier opinion of this court, which having found certain severable features of the proposed bonds to be illegal, but that otherwise the proposed refunding bonds were in all respects valid and in conformity with the law, reversed and remanded the first decree of validation with directions to enter a decree of validation when and after all appropriate and necessary amendments had been made in the proceedings for issuance of said refunding bonds as to conform to the opinion of this court filed September 27, 1934, as amended and modified by an order of this court entered October 12, 1934.

A bond validation proceeding under sections 5106-5112, C. G. L., sections 3296-3302, R. G. S., is a statutory proceeding in chancery and is controlled and governed in all respects by the procedural requirements for the determination and appeal of chancery issues generally, except in those special details where the general chancery practice has been modified by the special procedural requirements of this statutory proceeding itself. By reason of its possession of all of the characteristics of a chancery proceeding, although the right to maintain it as such is purely statutory, an appeal from a decree of validation in a bond validation proceeding is a step in the cause, as is an appeal in other chancery causes under the laws of this state. See Rabinowitz v. Houk, 100 Fla. 44, 129 So. 501; Gover v. Mann, 114 Fla. 128, 153 So. 895; Palm Beach Estates v. Croker, 106 Fla. 617, 143 So. 792.

The first appeal in this case was decided here by an opinion filed on September 27, 1934. At that time all necessary and proper parties to the decree appealed from were before the Supreme Court, which acquired jurisdiction over them by virtue of the appeal. This is so because all of such necessary and proper parties were before the circuit court at the time the decree first appealed from was rendered. So the effect of the taking of an appeal from the original decree as a step in the final decision of the pending controversy simply transferred the cause from the circuit court to the Supreme Court, bringing up with it all of the parties who had been properly brought within the jurisdiction of the circuit court in the first instance and who remained under the jurisdiction of the circuit court at the time its first decree was entered. See Gover v. Mann, supra; Auburn Automobile Co. v. Namor Corp., 106 Fla. 594, 143 So. 604.

It therefore follows that if the appeal decided here on September 27, 1934, was but a step in the final decision of the cause originally instituted in the circuit court under the special provisions of the statutes authorizing the bringing and maintenance of same as a statutory equitable proceeding, all parties who had been brought into court by actual or constructive service in the circuit court, and who had become affected by the circuit court's decree first appealed from, became bound by the Supreme Court's opinion, decision, and mandate on the first appeal when this court's appellate judgment reversed the original decree of validation, but retained jurisdiction over the subject-matter and over the parties to the cause by remanding the reversed cause to the court below with specific directions to do certain things to bring about conformity with the Supreme Court's opinion and thereupon (such things having been done) to enter a new decree validating the issue of bonds whose validity had been initially brought in controversy by the appropriate institution of the statutory bond validation proceeding in the first instance accompanied by the required statutory service of process upon the parties respondent thereto.

So the situation we have presented in this case upon this second appeal is in principle no different from that class of cases repeatedly decided by this court wherein the Supreme Court, having found reversible error susceptible of rectification without ordering a general and unlimited reversal of the decree or judgment appealed from, thereby reopening the whole proceeding for a new course of litigation upon remand to the court below, has limited its judgment of reversal to a reversal with general or specific directions to enter a new judgment or decree in the court below upon due compliance with the Supreme Court's opinion, decision, and mandate in the premises. For an example, compare our recent case of McNally v. State, 112 Fla. 434, 150 So. 751 (first writ of error), with McNally v. State (Fla.) 157 So. 430.

The sole issue remaining to be determined in the court below after remand of this cause for further proceedings in conformity with this court's opinion of September 27 1934, was whether or not the opinion and mandate of the Supreme Court in the premises had been complied with according to the authority and direction contained in the opinion and mandate. Bloxham v. Florida Cent. & P. R. Co., 39 Fla. 243, 22 So. 697. The original petition for validation, and service of process had thereon, conferred jurisdiction on the circuit court not only to decide the case in the first instance, but thereafter to carry out any mandate the Supreme Court might send down to it on appeal, in order to arrive at a correct and proper decree. The fact that the first decree was reversed because the refunding bonds as originally proposed to be issued had been found by the Supreme Court to contain features and provisions which the appellate court declared ought to be excised from the proceedings before entry of a validation decree predicated upon the petition for validation and directions contained in the mandate of the appellate court in the premises, did not preclude the Supreme Court from giving directions to the lower court to permit the invalid features to be eliminated and thereupon to enter a...