State v. City of Seattle

• Decision Date: 28 June 1913
• Citation: 74 Wash. 199,133 P. 11
• Parties: STATE ex rel. VORIS v. CITY OF SEATTLE et al.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

133 P. 11

74 Wash. 199

STATE ex rel. VORIS v. CITY OF SEATTLE et al.

Supreme Court of Washington

June 28, 1913

Department 1. Appeal from Superior Court, King County; Everett Smith Judge.

Mandamus by the State, on relation of Edwin A. Voris, against the City of Seattle and others. Judgment for relator, and respondents appeal. Reversed and remanded.

Jas. E Bradford and Wm. B. Allison, both of Seattle, for appellants.

Preston & Thorgrimson and Sanford C. Rose, both of Seattle, for respondent.

CHADWICK J.

The trial judge filed a memorandum decision in this case. He found the facts to be as follows: 'In May, 1911, there occurred a vacancy in the office of the city comptroller for the place of real estate clerk, a position recognized by classification under the civil service system. An emergency having arisen, relator Voris was appointed by the comptroller pending civil service regulations. In June upon investigation by the secretary of the commission of the duties required for the position of real estate clerk, it was classified as that of abstracter and real estate clerk, and the comptroller notified that an original examination must be held for the position. Relator in November, having successfully passed the examination received the regular appointment of file and real estate clerk, which seems to be another designation of abstracter and real estate clerk. On April 30, 1912, the city council, by ordinance 29343 ordained that the position of file and real estate clerk in the department of city comptroller be abolished, and on the same day the comptroller reported to the commission the separation of Voris from his department, alleging the cause to be on account of the reduction of force. On May 6, 1912, the council, by ordinance 29380, established the salary of detail clerk in charge of index and real estate record work at $100 per month. Thereupon the commission notified the comptroller that, inasmuch as a separate classification had been provided for this position, the work should be done by none except those regularly qualified for the same. The comptroller, ignoring the communication, notified the commission June 7th that he had given the increase of salary made by ordinance 29380 to R. F. Farran as detail clerk. On June 29th Voris appealed for investigation by the commission of the reasons for his dismissal. Such investigation was had, and on September 26, 1912, the commission found Voris entitled to the office held by Farran and recommended that he be returned to the position as the employé rightfully entitled to the same. The comptroller having refused to comply with the recommendation of the commission, relator Voris has brought this action.' It may be inferred from this statement that the position occupied by the relator was the only position abolished by the council. This is not true. The ordinance of which he complains abolished several positions, and the new ordinance seems to have been designed to combine their several duties with that of others. From these facts the court concluded that the office in which the relator had been employed had been abolished in name only, and that the relator was entitled to reinstatement, with his salary from the time of his separation from the office.

The question put by the trial judge is, Was the office abolished? It is not denied that the city council has the power to abolish a position, but it was the opinion of the court below and is the opinion of counsel for the relator that the council could not declare an office abolished unless 'in fact the duties themselves were abolished.' 'The testimony before the court clearly established the existence of the duties as formerly, but their transference to another clerk. Owing to varying changes of conditions the duties at times have been more or less numerous than formerly, but there is no dispute of the fact that the same duties of the alleged abolished position remain to be performed and still continue to occupy another clerk from one-half to two-thirds of all his time.' We think the court has gone further than the law warrants. The council has the right to create offices and it may abolish them, or it may, in the interest of economy and efficiency, combine the work of several employés so that their duties will be thereafter performed by a lesser number of men. In this case the city council has done no more than this. It abolished the position of 'file and real estate clerk' and by another ordinance provided that the work formerly done by that employé should be done by 'a detail clerk in charge of index and real estate record work in clerk's division.' The testimony, and most of it, is in our opinion irrelevant, shows that Farran, the present employé and a civil service man, is doing a part of his old work as well as the work formerly done by Voris. Relator undertook to show that he was not keeping up with his work. That is a matter with which courts have nothing to do. So long as he is performing either in whole or in part the work that he formerly did, his right to remain in the office of the comptroller is greater than is the right of the relator to be reinstated. An employé cannot be removed to make way for one who is in the same legal position. In other words, the work formerly done by Voris being combined with that formerly done by Farran, neither the civil service commission nor the courts have power to say that a present employé shall give way to one who insists upon the right to perform a part only of the present duties of the existing position. In the instant case the object of the ordinance was to work a reduction of the force. We are informed by counsel on oral argument that there was an actual reduction, under the ordinance complained of, of five men. We may assume that this could only be done by combining the work previously done by the greater number, and this the council had a lawful right to do under its general powers, as defined in sections 18, 19, and 41, art. 4, of the charter. Much of the brief of the respondent is taken up with a discussion that goes to the good faith of the city council in abolishing this office. Courts will not inquire into the motives of the legislative body. If the ordinance or law is fair upon its face and does no violence to any provision of the city charter or the Constitution, it will be upheld. This ordinance is fair upon its face. It suggests nothing unless it be a purpose to work economy. If the rule were otherwise, it would be impossible for the governing body of a city to change, rearrange, or redefine the duties of its employés so long as any one of them had been classified by the civil service commission and had a scintilla of work to perform.

The case of Fitzsimmons v. O'Neill, 214 Ill. 494, 73 N.E. 797, is a valuable authority in that it deals with a case similar to the one at bar and reviews many authorities. A foreman in the city repair shop was laid off for the reason that no appropriation had been made to meet his salary. He demanded reinstatement, contending that the duties of his position had not been abolished, and could not be abolished, as it was essential to the proper management of the repair department that there should be a superintendent. It was further made to appear that the duties which had been performed by him were performed by others; that those who had been doing the work were not superintendents; that one of them was a wagonmaker and the other a laborer. Relator insists that the work of real estate clerk must be done by an abstracter, and that Farran was never qualified as such. The case is a stronger one than is this for the reason that it is alleged 'that neither of these men, while performing duties formerly performed by the petitioner, performed the duties pertaining to their former position, but devoted their entire time to the duties formerly done by petitioner.' In all things the right to reinstatement is based on the same grounds as the relator sets up in his petition. It was held that the plaintiff in that case could not reinstate himself. It was contended there, as here, that the removal was illegal, but the court held that the civil service rules do not apply to a case where the incumbent is dismissed for want of funds or in order to reduce expenses.

In Phillips v. Mayor, etc., City of New York, 88 N.Y 245, a clerk of the fire department of the city was discharged, not for any personal reason, but because it was necessary for the department to conform its expenses to a smaller appropriation, thus necessitating a reduction of the clerical force. It was held that...