State v. City of Sheridan

• Decision Date: 21 January 1918
• Docket Number: 849
• Citation: 25 Wyo. 347,170 P. 1
• Parties: STATE v. CITY OF SHERIDAN
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

170 P. 1

25 Wyo. 347

STATE v. CITY OF SHERIDAN

No. 849

Supreme Court of Wyoming

January 21, 1918

ERROR to District Court, Sheridan County; HON. C. H. PARMELEE Judge.

Mandamus in the name of the State of Wyoming on the relation of C. W Sampson against the City of Sheridan, a municipal corporation, and its officers, mayor and commissioners to compel the issuance to relator of a cement contractor's license.

From a judgment dismissing the petition and an order overruling motion for a new trial, relator brings error.

Affirmed.

H Glenn Kinsley, for plaintiff in error.

The court erred in holding the ordinance void. Section 1681, Comp. Stats. 1910, authorizes the City of Sheridan to require a license from those engaged in the business of cement contracting. The City of Sheridan has powers conferred upon it to regulate any business or calling in the interests of the welfare of the city. (Section 1707, Comp. Stats. 1910.) But such regulations must be reasonable. (1 Dillon Mun. Corp. (4th Ed.), Sec. 328; Champer v. City of Greencastle (Ind.), 35 N.E. 14.) The power cannot be used to suppress useful occupations. (Vol. III, McQuillin Mun. Corps., Sec. 990, p. 2202; In re. Quong Woo, 13 F. 229; State v. Mott, 61 Md. 297; Balimon v. Rakecke, 49 Md. 217; Lyons v. Copper, 39 Kan. 324, 18 P. 296; Cowell v. Lincoln, 19 Neb. 569, 27 N.W. 647; Americus v. Burner, 131 Ga. 802, 63 S.E. 347; Walnut v. Barnett, 141 Ill. Appeals, 367; Owen County Friscal Ct. v. F. & A. Cox Co. (Ky. 1909), 117 S.W. 296.) Powers granted to municipal corporations are strictly construed, and doubts are resolved against the corporation. (Friend v. City of Chicago, 261 Ill. 16, 103 N.E. 609, 49 L. R. A. N. S. 438; Chicago v. M. & M. Hotel Co., 248 Ill. 264, 93; Chicago v. Ross, 257 Ill. 76, 43 L. R. A. N. S. 205, 100 N.E. 159.) Gray v. Omaha (Neb.), 114 N.W. 600, 14 L. R. A. N. S. 1033, turned upon the reasonableness of the ordinance and not upon the power of the city to enact it. Where a portion of an ordinance or statute may be upheld and is severable from the rest, it is deemed invalid. The valid portion may stand, but otherwise the entire statute falls. (Hamilton Band v. Dudley, 2 Pet. 492, 7 U.S. (L. Ed.) 496; Keokuk Northern Line Packer Co. v. Keokuk, 95 U.S. 80, 24 U.S. (L. Ed.) 377; Allen v. Louisiana, 103 U.S. 80, 26 U.S. 318; Penniman's Case, 103 U.S. 714, 26 U.S. (L. Ed.) 602; Albany County v. Stanley, 105 U.S. 305, 26 U.S. (L. Ed.) 1044; Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 6 S.Ct. 580, 29 U.S. (L. Ed.) 615; Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 12 S.Ct. 495, 36 U.S. (L. Ed.) 294; Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U.S. 540, 22 S.Ct. 431, 46 U.S. (L. Ed.) 679; Cella Commissions Co. v. Bohlinger, 147 F. 419, 78 C. C. A. 476, 8 L. R. A. N. S. 537; Chicago M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Westby, 178 F. 619, 102 C. C. A. 65, 47 L. R. A. N. S. 97; Hoxie v. New York, N. H. & H. Ry. Co., 82 Conn. 352, 73 A. 754, 17 Ann. Cas. 324; Ballentine v. Willey, 3 Idaho, 496, 31 P. 994, 95 A. S. R. 17, and note; Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Jones, 149 Ill. 361, 37 N.E. 247, 41 A. S. R. 278, 24 L. R. A. 141; Taggart v. Claypool, 145 Ind. 590, 44 N.E. 18, 32 L. R. A. 586; Hammer v. State, 173 Ind. 199, 89 N.E. 850, 140 A. S. R. 248, 21 Ann. Cas. 1034, 24 L. R. A. N. S. 795; State v. Smiley, 65 Kan. 240, 69 P. 199, 67 L. R. A. 903; Fisher v. McGirr, 1 Gray, 1, 61 Am. Dec. 381; Hathorn v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 194 N.Y. 326, 87 N.E. 504, 128 A. S. R. 555, 16 Ann. Cas. 989, 23 L. R. A. N. S. 436; Rothermel v. Meryerle, 136 P. St. 250, 20 A. 583, 9 L. R. A. 366; Commonwealth v. Moir, 199 Pa. St. 534, 49 A. 351, 85 A. S. R. 801, 53 L. R. A. 837; Newport v. Horton, 22 R. I. 196, 47 A. 312, 50 L. R. A. 330; Goggans v. Turnipseed, 1 S.C. 80, 98 Am. Dec. 397, 7 Am. Rep. 23; Fite v. State, 114 Tenn. 646, 88 S.W. 941, 4 Ann. Cas. 1108, 1 L. R. A. N. S. 520; Bennett v. Vallier, 136 Wis. 193, 116 N.W. 885, 128 A. S. R. 1061, 17 L. R. A. N. S. 486, 66 A. S. R. 505.) The good and bad provisions may be included in one section and yet be separable. (Loeb v. Columbia Twp. Trustees, 179 U.S. 472, 21 S.Ct. 174, 45 U.S. (L. Ed.) 280; Berea College v. Com. of Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45, 29 S.Ct. 33, 52 U.S. (L. Ed.) 81; Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Jones, 149 Ill. 361, 37 N.E. 247, 41 A. S. R. 278, 24 L. R. A. 141; Soper v. Lawrence Bros. Co., 98 Me. 268, 56 A. 908, 99 A. S. R. 397; State v. Robb, 100 Me. 180, 60 A. 874, 4 Ann. Cas. 275; Redell v. Moores, 63 Neb. 219, 88 N.W. 243, 93 A. S. R. 431, 55 L. R. A. 740; Fayette County Treasurer v. Bank, 47 Ohio St. 503, 25 N.E. 697, 10 L. R. A. 196; Rothermel v. Meyerle, 136 Pa. St. 250, 20 A. 583, 9 L. R. A. 366; Steed v. Harvey, 18 Utah 367, 54 P. 1011, 72 A. S. R. 789; Nathan v. Spokane County, 35 Wash. 26, 76 P. 527, 102 A. S. R. 888, 65 L. R. A. 336.) The same rule applies to ordinances. (Fort Smith v. Scruggs, 70 Ark. 549, 69 S.W. 679, 91 A. S. R. 100, 58 L. R. A. 921; State v. Robb, 100 Me. 190, 60 A. 874, 4 Ann. Cas. 275, and note; Knoch v. North Ave. R. Co., 75 Md. 222, 23 A. 463, 15 L. R. A. 377; People v. Armstrong, 73 Mich. 288, 41 N.W. 275, 16 A. S. R. 578, 2 L. R. A. 721; St. Louis v. Liessing, 190 Mo. 464, 89 S.W. 611, 109 A. S. R. 774, Ann. Cas. 112, 1 L. R. A. N. S. 918; Eureka City v. Wilson, 15 Utah 67, 48 P. 150, 62 A. S. R. 904, and note; Little Chute v. Van Camp, 136 Wis. 526, 117 N.W. 128, A. S. R. 1100.) The purpose of this ordinance is to secure competent cement contractors in making public improvements and this feature of the ordinance should stand. (Santo v. State, 2 Ia. 165, 63 Am. Dec. 487; Somerset Comrs. v. Bridge Co., 109 Md. 1, 71 A. 462, 16 Ann. Cas. 874; Commonwealth v. Hana, 195 Mass. 262, 81 N.E. 149, 122 A. S. R. 251, 11 Ann. Cas. 514, 11 L. R. A. N. S. 799; Mutual Loan Co. v. Martell, 200 Mass. 482, 86 N.E. 916, 128 A. S. R. 446, 43 L. R. A. N. S. 746.) The right to follow a useful occupation is a constitutional right. (6 R. C. L. 251; also 244.) The attempt made in the ordinance to restrict the cement business to men of financial standing is unreasonable, oppressive and monopolistic. (Gray v. Omaha, supra.) The court erred in holding that plaintiff exhibited no clear right to mandamus. (Section 5054, Comp. Stats. 1910.) Plaintiff had no adequate remedy at law. Mandamus will lie to require the performance of municipal duties. (Kark v. State, 54 Ohio St. 383, 43 N.E. 920; Flournoy v. Jeffersonville, 17 Ind. 169, 79 Am. Dec. 468.) The court erred in rendering judgment against plaintiff for costs. Plaintiff endeavored to comply with the ordinance and should not be required to pay costs, by reason of the invalidity of the ordinance which was no fault of plaintiff. The court erred in overruling plaintiff's motion for a new trial, it appearing from the record that the judgment was not sustained by the evidence.

H. N. Gottlieb, for defendants in error.

The City of Sheridan is a city of the first class with power to levy a license tax on any business or calling. (Section 1681, Comp. Stats. 1910.) And to levy and collect occupation taxes. (Section 1796, Comp. Stats. 1910.) Said sections confer broad powers to tax for revenue purposes and regulate under the police power. (Dillon M. C., 5th Ed., 1408; also 662, 665 and 666.) Powers indicate an intention to give authority to collect revenue. (25 Cyc. 601.) The authority of municipalities over public streets is broad. (Dillon M. C., 5th Ed., 1120, 1129 and 1149; 22 Ency. Law, 929.) A municipality having power to license may annex other conditions deemed proper. (25 Cyc. 622.) The requirement of a bond in connection with a license is usual, customary and reasonable. (Rumford v. Grocery Co., 88 A. 394.) An ordinance is not to be held unreasonable unless clearly so and every intendment will be indulged in its favor. (Harter v. Barkley, 112 P. 556.) The evidence showed that a concrete walk should last from twenty to fifty years; a maintenance bond for five years was not unreasonable. A municipality may tax some occupations and regulate some, and refuse to tax or regulate others. (Smith v. Wilkins, 80 S.E. 168.) All that is necessary is uniformity as to given trades or callings. (25 Cyc. 606.) Gray v. Omaha (Neb.), 114 N.W. 600, is not applicable to the laws of this state and it is not an authority. It is not shown that the City of Omaha had power to license occupations either for revenue or as a police regulation. Section 5068, Comp. Stats., applicable to mandamus, provides that if judgment be for defendants, costs shall be adjudged against relator.

BLYDENBURGH, JUSTICE. POTTER, C. J., and BEARD, J., concur.

OPINION

BLYDENBURGH, JUSTICE.

This was a suit in mandamus brought in the District Court of Sheridan County in the name of the State on the relation of one C. W. Sampson to compel the City of Sheridan and its officers, mayor and commissioners, to issue to the relator a cement contractor's license.

The City of Sheridan is a city of the first class that has adopted a commission form of government and acting, as is claimed, under the authority conferred by Section 1681, Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1910, had passed and adopted the following ordinance:

"Sec. 440. That no person, or persons, firm or corporation shall contract for or engage in the business of constructing any sidewalk, curb, crossing or other public improvement within the City of Sheridan, of concrete, cement or artificial stone until he, they or it has obtained a 'cement contractor's license therefor, and has given bond as provided herein. Such license shall be granted by the city council to those experienced in and competent to do such work and upon written application showing such facts and that the applicant is 21 years of age, and upon payment of $ 15.00. The application should state the full name of the applicant, and if a firm the names of all the members...