State v. City of Oak Creek

• Citation: 223 Wis.2d 219,588 N.W.2d 380
• Decision Date: 29 September 1998
• Docket Number: No. 97-2188,97-2188
• Parties: STATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Respondent, d v. CITY OF OAK CREEK, Defendant-Appellant. . Oral Argument
• Court: Wisconsin Court of Appeals

Page 380

588 N.W.2d 380

223 Wis.2d 219

STATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Respondent, ^d v. CITY OF OAK CREEK, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 97-2188.

Court of Appeals of Wisconsin.

Oral Argument Sept. 29, 1998.

Opinion Released Nov. 24, 1998.

Opinion Filed Nov. 24, 1998.

On behalf of the defendant-appellant, the cause was submitted on the briefs of Lawrie J. Kobza, Jennifer S. Mirus and M. Tess OBrien-Heinzen of Boardman, Suhr, Curry & Field, of Madison, and Lawrence J. Haskin, city attorney, of Oak Creek. There was oral argument by Lawrence J. Haskin.

On behalf of the plaintiff-respondent, the cause was submitted on the brief of James E. Doyle, attorney general, and Joanne F. Kloppenburg, assistant attorney general. There was oral argument by Joanne F. Kloppenburg.

Before FINE, SCHUDSON and CURLEY, JJ.

FINE, J.

In 1994, we upheld a determination by the circuit court that Crawfish Creek in the City of Oak Creek was a "navigable waterway," that Oak Creek's channelization of Crawfish Creek violated § 30.12, STATS., that § 30.055, STATS., 1993-94, a statute enacted by the legislature purporting to exempt Crawfish Creek from the requirements of § 30.12, was unconstitutional, and that the creek had to be restored to its pre-channelization condition. See City of Oak Creek v. Department of Natural Resources, 185 Wis.2d 424, 518 N.W.2d 276 (Ct.App.1994). ¹ After our decision the legislature re-enacted the exemption. See § 30.056, STATS., 1995-96; 1995 Wis. Act 455, § 1g (effective July 11, 1996). ²

This action was brought by the attorney general in the name of the State of Wisconsin, seeking a declaration that § 30.056, STATS., 1995-96, is unconstitutional. He claims that it violates the "public trust" doctrine set out in Article IX, § 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution, violates the guarantees of "equal protection" found in both the United States Constitution and the Wisconsin Constitution, and is a private bill in violation of Article IV, § 18 of the Wisconsin Constitution. The attorney general also sought to have Oak Creek's channelization of Crawfish Creek declared to be a nuisance, both under § 30.294, STATS., and the common law, and an order requiring Oak Creek to restore Crawfish Creek to its pre-channelization condition.

Section 30.294, STATS., declares: "Every violation of this chapter is declared to be a public nuisance and may be prohibited by injunction and may be abated by legal action brought by any person." The circuit court concluded that § 30.056 was unconstitutional, and, on summary judgment, granted the relief requested by the attorney general. Oak Creek appeals, contending, among other things, that the attorney general may not challenge the constitutionality of the statute.

The parties do not dispute but that the attorney general qualifies as "any person," cf. Gillen v. City of Neenah, 219 Wis.2d 807, 829-830, 580 N.W.2d 628, 636 (1998) (per curiam ) (reading § 30.294 expansively); the only issue is whether he may challenge the constitutionality of § 30.056, STATS., 1995-96. We conclude that he may not. Accordingly, we do not discuss the other issues. ³

Article VI, § 3 of the Wisconsin Constitution sets the scope of the attorney general's authority: "The powers, duties and compensation of the treasurer and attorney general shall be prescribed by law." This clause means that the attorney general in Wisconsin has no powers other than those specified by the legislature. See State v. Milwaukee Electric Ry. & Light Co., 136 Wis. 179, 190, 116 N.W. 900, 905 (1908); State v. Snyder, 172 Wis. 415, 417, 179 N.W. 579, 580 (1920) (The attorney general's "duties spring from the statute, and he must find authority in the statute when he sues in the circuit court in the name of the state or in his official capacity."). Other than the narrow exception that permits challenges to legislative apportionments, see State ex rel. Reynolds v. Zimmerman, 22 Wis.2d 544, 552, 126 N.W.2d 551, 556 (1964), "it is the attorney general's duty to defend the constitutionality of state statutes," Public Intervenor v. Department of Natural Resources, 115 Wis.2d 28, 37, 339 N.W.2d 324, 327 (1983).

Although the facts here and there are not one-hundred percent congruent, Public Intervenor is dispositive. At the time the case was decided, the public intervenor was an assistant attorney general in the Wisconsin Department of Justice. See § 165.07, STATS., 1981-82. ⁴ As such, the public intervenor was given authority to intervene as a party in interest in proceedings under chapters 30, 31, 144, and 147 of the Wisconsin Statutes when requested to do so by the officers designated by § 165.07. See ibid. Following formal intervention as envisioned by the statute, the public intervenor had full right of participation in the proceedings, including the right to "appeal from administrative rulings to the courts." Ibid. The public intervenor in Public Intervenor attempted to challenge the constitutionality of a provision of the administrative code promulgated by the Department of Natural Resources pursuant to authority given to the department by statute. See Public Intervenor, 115 Wis.2d at 29, 339 N.W.2d at 324-325. The supreme court held that neither the public intervenor, an assistant attorney general, nor the attorney general, could, absent legislative authority, challenge the rule's constitutionality:

Nowhere is there a statutory provision giving the attorney general or his assistants the power to challenge the constitutionality of a law or rule of this state or one of its agencies. To the contrary, it is the attorney general's duty to defend the constitutionality of state statutes.

Id., 115 Wis.2d at 36-37, 339 N.W.2d at 327 (internal citation omitted). In essence, as an assistant attorney general, the public intervenor's authority to challenge the constitutionality of the code provision could rise no higher and be no broader than the authority of the attorney general. Ibid. ⁵ This is the supreme court's last word on the subject, and we won't quibble with the dissent as to whether or not the supreme court's declaration is dictum--the discussion of the attorney general's powers as they relate to the powers of an assistant attorney general in the department over which the attorney general presides was clearly germane to the holding of Public Intervenor and thus is binding law. ⁶ See Malone v. Fons, 217 Wis.2d 746, 754, 580 N.W.2d 697, 701 (Ct.App.1998) ("When an appellate court intentionally takes up, discusses and decides a question germane to a controversy, such a decision is not a dictum but is a judicial act of the court which it will thereafter recognize as a binding decision.") (citation, internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). Significantly, in Public Intervenor the assistant attorney general designated by the attorney general to be the public intervenor was a proper party under the applicable statute because he was empowered to "appeal from administrative rulings to the courts." Section 165.07, STATS., 1981-82. Here, the attorney general is a proper party because he is an "any person" under § 30.294, STATS. Nevertheless, the public intervenor there was, and the attorney general here is, to use the dissent's language, "precluded from offering a legal argument in support of [the official's] valid legal action." Dissent at 383. Even under the rationale of the dissenting justices in Public Intervenor, who argued that the public intervenor should be permitted to challenge the code provision because it was in the scope of his "official duty to do so," Public Intervenor, 115 Wis.2d at 45, 339 N.W.2d at 331 (Bablitch, J., dissenting), the attorney general would not be authorized to make the constitutional challenge at issue here. Challenging the constitutionality of § 30.056, STATS., 1995-96, is not an "official duty" of the attorney general. Rather, he is here as a member of the general public--an "any person," as that phrase is used in § 30.294.

Public Intervenor 's recognition that the attorney general in Wisconsin has limited powers and, accordingly, the "duty to defend"--not attack--"the constitutionality of state statutes," reflects the law in jurisdictions where the powers of the attorney general are similarly limited. See State ex rel. Attorney General v. Burning Tree Club, Inc., 301 Md. 9, 481 A.2d 785, 797, 799 (Md.1984) ("Attorney General of Maryland has only such powers as are vested in him by the Constitution of Maryland and the various enactments of the General Assembly of Maryland," and may not maintain an action that "seeks to have an act of the General Assembly declared unconstitutional."). Neither the dissent nor the attorney general has pointed to any statute authorizing the attorney general to challenge the constitutionality of statutes, and we have found none. Although § 30.294, STATS., permits the attorney general, as an "any person," to seek to abate what he considers to be a "nuisance" under chapter 30, he may not assert that § 30.056, STATS., which exempts Crawfish Creek in Oak Creek from the relevant provisions of chapter 30, is unconstitutional.

Judgment reversed.

SCHUDSON, J. (dissenting).

As the majority points out, "[t]he parties do not dispute but that the attorney general qualifies as 'any person' " under § 30.294, STATS., majority at 381, and, therefore, has statutory authority to seek an injunction to abate what, under City of Oak Creek v. Department of Natural Resources, 185 Wis.2d 424, 443-51, 518 N.W.2d 276, 282-85 (Ct.App.1994), has already been declared a public nuisance. Indeed, in its brief to this court, Oak Creek implicitly conceded the attorney general's standing to do so and, at oral argument, explicitly confirmed that concession.

The only remaining issue, therefore, is whether the attorney general can be denied the opportunity to offer an argument, in support of its action seeking the injunction, challenging the constitutionality of the statute enacted for the...