State v. Civil Service Board
| Decision Date | 14 May 1948 |
| Docket Number | No. 34619.,34619. |
| Citation | 32 N.W.2d 583,226 Minn. 253 |
| Parties | STATE ex rel. SPURCK v. CIVIL SERVICE BOARD et al. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Appeal from District Court, Ramsey County; Gustavus Loevinger, Judge.
Mandamus proceeding by the State on the relation of Richard F. Spurck against Civil Service Board of Minnesota, Department of Civil Service, and others to compel relator's reinstatement to a civil servive position, wherein the writ was denied. From an order denying motion for a new trial, relator appeals.
Reversed with directions.
See also 32 N.W.2d 574.
Briggs, Gilbert, Morton, Kyle & Macartney, of St. Paul, for appellant.
J. A. A. Burnquist, Atty. Gen., and Wm. C. Green, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondents.
Mandamus to compel relator's reinstatement to a civil service position.
Respondents King, Schmahl, and Driscoll are executive officers of the state. They had no part in classifying relator's position or allocating him to any position and are not concerned in any of the questions here raised. Apparently, they were joined as parties to make the judgment binding on them, because they have fiscal duties to perform in connection with the payment of salaries of public employes. The issues here arise out of the controversy between relator and the civil service authorities, and the case will be treated accordingly.
The questions for decision are:
(1) Whether, in a pending certiorari proceeding, where it is judicially established that a civil service employe is entitled to a certain position, mandamus will lie to compel the state civil service board to allocate him to such position; and,
(2) Whether a determination by the state civil service board, in the exercise of its power under M.S.A. § 43.24, to "reinstate" a discharged civil service employe, bars a proceeding in mandamus by a discharged civil service employe to compel the state civil service board to allocate him to the position shown on certiorari to be the one he is entitled to, where the determination ordered the discharged employe to be reemployed in a position different from the one to which he was legally entitled, and, in addition, that he be placed on a waiting list for possible future employment contingent upon the creation of the position in which he was ordered reemployed and funds being made available therefor.
In 1934, relator, an honorably discharged soldier and veteran of World War I, was hired as an attorney by the state relief agency, which was under the jurisdiction of the state executive council. The employment continued until April 22, 1939, when the functions of the agency were transferred by M.S.A. § 256.01, subd. 3, to the department of social security, division of social welfare, where relator's employment continued. He claims that he was blanketed into the classified civil service with the status he had on April 22, 1939, the effective date of the state civil service act, by the provision of M.S.A. § 43.34: "* * * honorably discharged veterans of past wars and other persons enumerated in section 43.30 holding offices or employments within the classified service on the effective date of this chapter are hereby given a permanent classified civil service status as of the effective date of this chapter, and shall thereafter be subject to and protected by the provisions of this chapter * * *."
In June 1939, the division hired one Metcalf as an attorney with the same duties and responsibilities as relator. Soon thereafter relator commenced to have difficulties concerning his employment status with both the division and the director of civil service. The proceedings to which relator resorted in attempts to vindicate his rights have been referred to in the certiorari case between the same parties, decided today. Although the director of civil service allocated Metcalf to class attorney IV, he refused to classify relator's position and to allocate him thereto. In October 1941, relator commenced a proceeding for a writ of mandamus to compel the director of civil service to classify his position and allocate him to it. The district court ordered the writ to issue. On April 22, 1943, we affirmed in State ex rel. Spurck v. Pennebaker, 215 Minn. 79, 9 N.W.2d 259.
Meanwhile, relator's position had been classified by the ex parte action of the civil service director as class attorney I, and he was allocated thereto. The classification of the position relator held on April 22, 1939, should have been as class attorney IV, not class attorney I, as we decided as a matter of law in the certiorari case today. On April 27, 1942, while the appeal was pending in this court in the mandamus proceedings to compel the director of civil service to classify relator's position and allocate him thereto, the division of social welfare discharged relator. Thereupon, he demanded under M.S.A. § 43.24 a hearing before the civil service board. The board approved the discharge. On April 19, 1944, in certiorari proceedings, the district court reversed the proceedings discharging relator.
Subsequent to the decision of the district court reversing relator's discharge, the board on its own motion instituted a hearing to determine the "conditions" upon which relator should be "reinstated." Relator appeared and objected to the jurisdiction of the board to take any action except that of reinstating him to the position which he held on April 22, 1939 "in conformity with the Civil Service Act of Minnesota, together with all perquisites, salary and privileges pertaining to said duties." Under the circumstances, this amounted to a demand for reinstatement with classification of his position as class attorney IV and for allocation thereto. The board overruled relator's objection.
On July 6, 1944, the board made findings that at the time of relator's discharge he was employed as class attorney I and that the position had been abolished. There was no evidence to support the findings. The only evidence with respect to the matter was that of the state director of personnel, who testified that he did not know of his own knowledge that the position had been abolished, but:
The board ordered that relator be forthwith "reinstated to class attorney I, without loss of seniority," and that he be placed on the departmental reemployment register for employment as such an attorney when and if such a position should be created and funds made available therefor. This determination has not been reviewed in any judicial proceeding, much less reversed or set aside. In the certiorari case between the same parties decided today we held that relator's position as of April 22, 1939, should have been classified as class attorney IV and that he should have been allocated thereto.
After a formal demand for reinstatement, relator brought this proceeding for a writ of mandamus to compel such action. The only defense considered below was the one that relator was barred from any relief by the board's determination of July 6, 1944, to the effect that relator be "reinstated" in the nonexistent position of class attorney I, with right of employment therein when and if such a position should be created and funds provided therefor. Upon the trial relator made the following offers of proof, which were ruled out:
Thereupon, the trial court sustained the defense that relator was barred by the prior determination and denied the writ. Relator appeals from the order denying his motion for a new trial.
Relator contends that the board's determination of July 6, 1944, of the conditions of his reinstatement was no defense, for the reason that the determination was void for lack of jurisdiction, because (a) it was no reinstatement at all, and (b) it was based upon findings for which there was no evidentiary support. The board contends (1) that mandamus is not the proper remedy to enforce relator's civil service status rights, if any; (2) that it had, as an incident to determining the conditions of reinstatement, under the provisions of M.S.A. § 43.24 to "reinstate the employee under such conditions as it deems proper" (italics supplied), the power to determine whether relator should be ordered reemployed in a different position from the one to which he was entitled under the civil service law, even though such position was nonexistent and the reinstatement amounted to no more than putting relator on a waiting list for employment in the position when and if it should be created and funds made available therefor; and (3) that the determination made on July 6, 1944, was immune from collateral attack and conclusive as to all matters thereby determined.
1. Mandamus is the proper remedy to enforce performance by the state civil service board of duties which the law clearly and positively requires. State ex rel. Spurck v. Pennebaker, 215 Minn. 79, 9 N.W.2d 259. Under the rule, mandamus will issue to compel an employe's reinstatement to a position in the civil service. Horrigan v. Mayor of Pittsfield, 298 Mass. 492, 11...
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