State v. Clark

• Decision Date: 03 May 1978
• Citation: 386 A.2d 317
• Parties: STATE of Maine v. Steven R. CLARK.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

Page 317

386 A.2d 317

STATE of Maine v. Steven R. CLARK.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

May 3, 1978.

Charles K. Leadbetter (orally), Asst. Atty. Gen., Augusta, for plaintiff.

Bennett, Kelly & Zimmerman, P. A. by Peter H. Jacobs (orally), John N. Kelly, Peter J. DeTroy, III, Portland, for defendant.

Before McKUSICK, C. J., and POMEROY, WERNICK, ARCHIBALD, DELAHANTY and GODFREY, JJ.

WERNICK, Justice.

An indictment returned September 3, 1975 in the Superior Court (Knox County) charged that on or about July 14, 1975 defendant Steven R. Clark killed Jared D. Wright in manner rendering the killing an unlawful homicide punishable as murder (17 M.R.S.A. § 2651). Tried before a jury, defendant was found guilty as charged.

We deny defendant's appeal from the judgment of conviction.

In April 1975, defendant began living with Judith Wright and her two children, Jared and Cammie. On July 14, 1975 in the morning, defendant drove Judith Wright to her place of employment and then returned home to serve breakfast to the two children. While the children were eating, defendant began to clean the house. Cammie finished eating and went outdoors. Defendant noticed that Jared, twenty-three months of age, was playing with his food. Defendant instructed Jared to eat his food. Jared did nothing but look at defendant. Shortly thereafter, defendant again walked by the table and saw that Jared was still not eating. Defendant lost his temper and hit Jared on the side of the head. ¹ Defendant then continued to clean the house but soon noticed that Jared was still playing with his food. Defendant thereupon hit Jared with his fist two times, and fairly hard, in the stomach. ² Defendant then carried Jared outside and left him standing near Cammie. A little later, Cammie came in and told defendant that Jared was "sleeping on the ground." Defendant ran outside and found Jared lying limp on the ground with his eyes half closed. Defendant took Jared inside and succeeded in reviving him with a wet washcloth.

That evening, and for the next two days, Jared displayed various symptoms of illness, including a fever and periodic nausea. During the late morning of July 16 when Jared's condition noticeably worsened, defendant called Mrs. Wright at work. She in turn called the emergency room at Knox County General Hospital. Jared was then taken to the hospital. He died within a few minutes after arrival at the emergency room. The cause of death was multiple trauma, or the combined effects of internal head injuries and of intraabdominal injuries which had produced an accumulation of blood in the abdominal cavity. It was only after Jared had died that defendant provided the information that he had struck the child on the head and in the stomach.

Defendant contends on appeal that the evidence is inadequate to support defendant's conviction of felonious homicide punishable as murder and the jury was influenced to return such unsupportable verdict by a combination of prejudicial factors including pre-trial publicity and venue, the emotional nature of the case and the confusing nature of the jury charge. ³

At the outset, we disagree with a contention which defendant makes the foundation of his argument: that the emotional nature of this case placed a greater burden on the trial Judge to make sure that justice was done and therefore mandates a closer appellate scrutiny of the issues raised by this appeal. The emotional nature of a case does not alter the obligation of the presiding Justice to provide an adequate explanation of the pertinent legal principles to the jury. The need for clarity in the jury charge is present in every case and the difficulty in charging the jury varies only with the legal complexity of the case. Accordingly, we test the adequacy of the jury charge by the ordinary standard of appellate scrutiny. Similarly, in reviewing the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal, we must determine only whether, in view of all the evidence presented at trial, the jury was warranted in believing beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty. ⁴ See, e. g., State v. McFarland, Me., 369 A.2d 227 (1977). Lastly, although some consideration of the emotional nature of the case may be relevant to an evaluation of the merits of defendant's motion for change of venue, the presence of this factor does not create a special standard of appellate review or cast doubt on the judgment of the presiding Justice who denied the motion for change of venue.

Having decided that there is no special brand of appellate scrutiny required for this case, we turn to consideration of defendant's argument concerning pre-trial publicity. Pursuant to Rule 21(a) M.R.Crim.P., defendant moved on September 22, 1975 for a change of venue to a county other than Knox County, citing the allegedly prejudicial nature of the pre-trial newspaper coverage of the case in Knox County. At a hearing on this motion on October 6, 1975, defendant presented evidence in regard to the extent and nature of the pre-trial publicity and its general effect on the community. At the conclusion of the hearing the presiding Justice denied the motion for change of venue, but he stated that he would consider a further motion at a later time if actual prejudice on the part of the venire persons became apparent from the jury voir dire. At the conclusion of the voir dire in October 1975, defendant renewed his motion for change of venue. The presiding Justice again denied the motion.

As in State v. Littlefield, Me., 374 A.2d 590 (1977), we view defendant's claim of error in the denial of his motion for change of venue as directed to both alleged violation of the constitutional guarantees of due process of law and abuse of the discretion allowed the presiding Justice under State law.

In relation to the due process aspect of defendant's position we consider, first, defendant's suggestion that the nature of the pre-trial publicity was such that it must be taken, per se, to have precluded a fair and impartial jury in Knox County, and therefore no showing of actual prejudice to defendant should be required.

The pre-trial publicity in this case consisted of approximately two dozen articles from three newspapers covering the two month period from defendant's arrest on July 17, 1975 through his arraignment on September 11, 1975. With the possible exception of articles dated August 19, 1975, all of the articles " 'met every reasonable standard of fair reporting' ", State v. Pritchett, Me., 302 A.2d 101, 104 (1973), State v. Berube, Me., 297 A.2d 884, 886 (1972), and they were " 'straight news stories rather than invidious articles which would tend to arouse ill will and vindictiveness.' " State v. Coty, Me., 229 A.2d 205, 212 (1967), quoting from Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541, 556, 82 S.Ct. 955, 8 L.Ed.2d 98 (1962).

Dealing separately with the articles of August 19, 1975, we discern that compared with the other published articles they presented a somewhat greater threat to the prospect of securing a fair and impartial jury in Knox County. The August 19th articles summarized the evidence presented by the State at the probable cause hearing, including references to a confession by the defendant and to various statements by several doctors ruling out the possibility of an accidental death and claiming that it looked as if the child was "hit with bricks or something." (As to this last statement about "bricks", the newspaper which had printed it published, on September 11, 1975, an article correcting the story, explaining as the true situation that Mrs. Wright had made a statement that in her conversation with the doctors "it hit her like a ton of bricks.")

While acknowledging that the August 19th articles exceeded the ordinary scope of news coverage and could be taken as "prejudicial" to the defendant, the presiding Justice nevertheless saw fit to deny the motion for change of venue. ⁵

Reviewing the presiding Justice's ruling in the framework which we are now postulating that the nature of the articles was such as per se to preclude securing an impartial jury in Knox County, without need for a showing that defendant suffered actual prejudice we note at the outset that there was no saturation of prejudicial news coverage in Knox County. Even as to the articles published by the newspapers on August 19, 1975, in each newspaper there was only a single article which attempted to summarize the testimony presented at the probable cause hearing. These articles were before the public more than two months before the inception of the trial. In addition, the articles contained no requests or demands for action against the defendant or sensational expression of opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant. The publicity was all of a pre-trial nature. No prejudicial incidents occurred during the course of trial such as in other cases have served as presumptive evidence of an unfair trial. ⁶ See, e. g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 86 S.Ct. 1507, 16 L.Ed.2d 600 (1966) (carnival atmosphere resulting from press disruption during trial and lack of jury sequestration); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 85 S.Ct. 1628, 14 L.Ed.2d 543 (1965) (televised trial); Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 85 S.Ct. 546, 13 L.Ed.2d 424 (1965) (jurors in custody of deputies who were the chief prosecution witnesses). Even the August 19th articles were largely factual and as a whole were not invidious or inflammatory in effect. See Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541, 82 S.Ct. 955, 8 L.Ed.2d 98 (1962). Although in some cases the nature of the pre-trial publicity itself may be so prejudicial and extraordinary as to mandate a change of venue, see Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 83 S.Ct. 1417, 10 L.Ed.2d 663 (1963) (public exposed three times to televised spectacle of defendant personally confessing in detail to the crimes charged), we conclude that the nature of the publicity here was not so inherently and pervasively...