State v. Clark
| Decision Date | 09 September 2020 |
| Docket Number | DOCKET NO. A-0324-18T2 |
| Parties | STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. RAQUIL K. CLARK, a/k/a RAPHEAL BLAKENEY, RAPHAEL BLAKENEY, JOEY BLAKENEY, JOEY RALPH, RAFAEL BLAKENEY, RAPLAEL BLAKENEY, and RANDY CLARK, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division |
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
Before Judges Ostrer and Vernoia.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Cumberland County, Indictment No. 17-09-0862.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Marcia H. Blum, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the briefs).
Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Regina M. Oberholzer, Deputy Attorney General, of counsel and on the brief).
The Department of Corrections imposed disciplinary sanctions on defendant Raquil K. Clark after finding he assaulted two corrections officers, and disrupted or interfered with prison security and order. The State thereafter obtained a criminal indictment, charging Clark with two counts of aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(5)(h). Clark unsuccessfully argued the indictment should be dismissed because the Double Jeopardy Clause barred his prosecution. He then pleaded guilty to one count, conditioned on his right to renew his contention on appeal. We now reject his argument. The Double Jeopardy Clause "protects only against the imposition of multiple criminal punishments for the same offense," Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 99 (1997). We hold that Clark's prison discipline is not "criminal punishment." Therefore, the Clause did not bar the State's prosecution.
On a motion to dismiss an indictment, we normally assume the facts alleged in the indictment. State v. Cobbs, 451 N.J. Super. 1, 5 (App. Div. 2017). The two-count indictment charged that Clark "purposely did attempt to causeand/or purposely or knowingly or recklessly caused bodily injury" to two corrections officers while they were performing their duties "while in uniform, or exhibiting evidence of [their] authority." Two other inmates were also indicted in connection with the incident. In his plea, Clark admitted he swung a balled fist at one officer with the purpose to cause bodily injury. That constituted a purposeful attempt to cause bodily injury. See N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(5), incorporating N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(a)(1).
To understand the prison disciplinary proceedings, we rely, as does Clark, on a Corrections Department Criminal Investigation Report and Clark's inmate progress notes report.1 According to those documents, Clark joined two fellow inmates in assaulting two officers. The records state that the other inmatespunched the two officers, and kicked one in the face while one officer was on the ground. A video-recording depicted Clark running toward the officers and assaulting both. This was not Clark's first violent incident while incarcerated. The previous year, Clark had been sanctioned with 10 days of detention, 270 days of administrative segregation, and 270 days of loss of commutation time, for fighting with another person, N.J.A.C. 10A:4-4.1(a) *.004.2
After a hearing, Clark was found to have committed a single charge of assault of another person, N.J.A.C. 10A:4-4.1(a) *.002, and engaging in conduct that disrupts or interferes with prison security or order, N.J.A.C. 10A:4-4.1(a) *306.3 On each prohibited act, he received 300 days of administrative segregation, and 300 days loss of commutation time. The hearing officer's determination and sanction were upheld on administrative appeal.
Almost two years after the assault, Clark was indicted. At the oral argument on the motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds, Clark's counselhighlighted the severity of his disciplinary sanction. Clark himself confirmed that administrative segregation strictly limited his recreational and other privileges. But he admitted it did not involve solitary confinement, as he shared his cell with another inmate.
The trial court denied defendant's motion. Relying on a federal appellate court decision it found persuasive, the court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar a criminal prosecution for criminal conduct that was the subject of prison disciplinary sanctions. The judge reasoned that "[t]he sanctions were remedial and meant to address the goal of maintaining institutional order and security" and did not "constitute additional punishment."
Thereafter, Clark entered his conditional plea and was sentenced. The sentence presents a separate issue on appeal, which we discuss after addressing the double jeopardy argument.
We review de novo the trial court's decision denying the dismissal motion, as it turns on a purely legal question. See State v. Shaw, 455 N.J. Super. 471, 481 (App. Div. 2018) (), aff'd, 241 N.J. 223 (2020). The dispositive question for double jeopardy analysis is whether prison disciplinary sanctions constitute criminal punishment, since the Double Jeopardy Clause only bars successive " criminal punishments for the same offense." Hudson, 522 U.S. at 99. Following the two-stage analysis that Hudson prescribes, we conclude (1) the Legislature intended prison disciplinary sanctions to be civil; and (2) in light of a non-exhaustive list of "useful" factors and other considerations, the disciplinary scheme is not "so punitive either in purpose or effect as 'to transform what was clearly intended as a civil remedy into a criminal penalty.'" Ibid. (quoting Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148, 154 (156)).
The Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause, and our State Constitution's protection against double jeopardy, N.J. Const., Art. I, ¶11, are coextensive. State v. Schubert, 212 N.J. 295, 304 (2012). They bar a second prosecution for the same offense after an acquittal or after a conviction, and "'multiple punishments for the same offense.'" Id. at 304-05 (quoting Jones v. Thomas, 491 U.S. 376, 381 (1989)).
Clark seeks the latter form of protection. He has satisfied the requirement that the multiple criminal punishment must occur "in successive proceedings."Hudson, 522 U.S. at 99. And we assume for purposes of his appeal that the subsequent prosecution was for the "same offense" that triggered prison discipline. As Clark notes, the incident preceded our Supreme Court's decision in State v. Miles, 229 N.J. 83 (2017); so, he could establish "same offense" by showing the "same-evidence" or the "same-elements" were implicated. Id. at 99. We therefore focus on the character of prison discipline. Everyday notions of punishment are not dispositive. "[T]he Double Jeopardy Clause does not prohibit the imposition of all additional sanctions that could, 'in common parlance,' be described as punishment." Hudson, 522 U.S. at 98-99 (quoting United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 549 (1943)).
"Whether a particular punishment is criminal or civil is, at least initially, a matter of statutory construction." Id. at 99. Therefore, we must first look for an express or implied legislative intent to characterize the sanction as civil or criminal. Ibid. However, the Legislature's intent is not the final word. As a second stage of analysis, a court will deem a punishment to be criminal if it is "so punitive either in purpose or effect." Ibid. (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1980)). A court will override legislative intent based only on "the clearest proof" pertaining to the disciplinary statute "on its face."Id. at 100 ().
In analyzing a disciplinary scheme's "purpose or effect," the Supreme Court found as "useful guideposts" seven factors:
However, the Kennedy factors are "neither exhaustive nor dispositive," Ward, 448 U.S. at 249, nor are they necessarily entitled to equal weight, Riley v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 219 N.J. 270, 286 n.6 (2014) (). As then-Judge Sotomayor observed, "It is particularly appropriate to apply the factors flexibly in the context of prison discipline cases . . . ." Porter v. Coughlin, 421 F.3d 141, 147 (2d Cir. 2005). That is so, "'because in the prison context, virtually any form of sanction seems'criminal' and 'punitive' as we commonly understand those terms.'" Ibid. (quoting United States v. Mayes, 158 F.3d 1215, 1223 (11th Cir. 1998)).
We do not write on a clean slate. In two cases, State v. Hatterer, 75 N.J. Super. 400 (App. Div. 1962) and Russo v. New Jersey Department of Corrections, 324 N.J. Super. 576 (App. Div. 1999), we held that prison discipline was not criminal punishment under the Double Jeopardy Clause. Their reasoning supports our conclusion here,...
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