State v. Clark

• Decision Date: 19 August 1993
• Docket Number: No. 20047,20047
• Citation: 859 P.2d 344,124 Idaho 308
• Parties: STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Heather CLARK and Kimberly Schierman, Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: Idaho Court of Appeals

Page 344

859 P.2d 344

124 Idaho 308

STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Heather CLARK and Kimberly Schierman, Defendants-Appellants.

No. 20047.

Court of Appeals of Idaho.

Aug. 19, 1993.

Gregory A. Jones, Kootenai County Public Defender; Penny E. Friedlander and Joel K. Ryan, Deputy Public Defenders, Coeur d'Alene, for defendants-appellants.

Larry EchoHawk, Atty. Gen., Thomas P. Watkins, Deputy Atty. Gen., Boise, for plaintiff-respondent.

LANSING, Judge.

In this case we are asked to reverse a district court's order affirming a magistrate's denial of the motions of defendants Heather Clark and Kimberly Schierman to suppress evidence of controlled substances and drug paraphernalia which they contend were found through an illegal search. The magistrate determined that no illegal search occurred. The magistrate's order denying suppression was affirmed by the district court. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

The facts in this case were presented at the hearing on the defendants' suppression motions through the testimony of Deputy Soumas of the Kootenai County Sheriff's office. On February 21, 1990, Soumas and three other officers were dispatched to the town of Harrison to answer a complaint about a loud party possibly involving drugs and alcohol. The officers left for the area in two cars at 8:40 p.m., arriving at approximately 10:00 p.m. The officers parked about 80 yards from the defendants' residence, a mobile home. They heard loud voices and a stereo playing. Several vehicles were parked in the driveway of the residence. The officers walked down the driveway toward the home to investigate.

As Deputy Soumas approached the northeast corner of the mobile home by way of the horseshoe-shaped driveway, he saw windows at the corner of the dwelling. Soumas testified that he looked in one of the windows to assess the situation and to see how many occupants the officers would have to deal with, for the nearest law enforcement back-up was in Coeur d'Alene. From a distance of approximately one to three feet Soumas looked through the sheer draperies covering the window and observed a number of males seated around a table. One of the males bent over, his face close to the table, then sat up and said, "That's good speed," or words to that effect. Soumas immediately concluded that controlled substances were being used. Two officers were then sent to the other side of the mobile home to cover the back door. Soumas and the remaining officer continued up the driveway toward the front door, shining flashlights in the vehicles as they passed to insure that there were no occupants. In a vehicle parked directly next to the front door of the residence, later found to be registered in Schierman's name, Soumas observed a deer-horn pipe of a type that he believed was used to smoke marijuana.

Soumas and the other officer then approached the front door of the residence, which was a sliding glass door. Opaque curtains covering the door were partially shut, but there remained a gap about six to twelve inches wide where the glass door was left uncovered. Through this uncovered portion of the door Soumas could see the same table he observed through the corner window and could see straws and a white powder lying on the table.

Soumas then knocked on the glass door. The defendant Clark answered, then turned and informed the other occupants that the police were present. Soumas observed one of the male occupants attempting to sweep the white powder off the table onto the floor. Soumas and the other officer then entered the residence.

During a cursory search of the residence the following items were found and seized: marijuana on a tray in the bathroom, a "bong pipe" with marijuana residue, white capsules on the floor of a bedroom, white powder on the kitchen counter and living room table, and straws and knives with white powder residue.

The two residents of the trailer, Clark and Schierman, were arrested and charged with possession of less than three ounces of marijuana, possession of drug paraphernalia, and frequenting a place of drug use. Clark and Schierman filed motions to suppress all evidence gathered following Deputy Soumas' initial observation at the corner window, including all statements made by the defendants, observations made by the officers before, during and after the arrests and any evidence seized in connection with the arrests. As grounds for the motions, Clark and Schierman contended that Deputy Soumas had intruded upon the private curtilage of the mobile home when he looked through the window, and that his observation thus constituted an illegal search in violation of the United States and Idaho Constitutions. Following an evidentiary hearing, the magistrate denied Clark's and Schierman's motions.

Subsequently, a plea agreement was reached by which the charges of possession of marijuana were dismissed and Clark and Schierman entered conditional pleas of guilty to the remaining charges, reserving the right to appeal the denial of the suppression motions pursuant to I.C.R. 11(a)(2).

In a consolidated appeal from the magistrate's order denying the suppression motions, the district court affirmed. This appeal from the district court's disposition followed. Upon an appeal from a magistrate's decision we give due regard to the district court's determination, but we do not focus upon the analysis by the district court in its appellate capacity. Rather, we review the record before the magistrate independently of the district court's determination. State v. Swartz, 109 Idaho 1033, 712 P.2d 734 (Ct.App.1985). We defer to factual findings of the magistrate unless they are clearly erroneous, but exercise free review of a trial court's determination as to whether constitutional requirements have been satisfied in light of the facts found. State v. Weber, 116 Idaho 449, 776 P.2d 458 (1989); State v. Aitken, 121 Idaho 783, 828 P.2d 346 (Ct.App.1992).

The state contends that it was lawful for Deputy Soumas to look in the corner window, and alternatively, even if that observation constituted an unlawful search, the subsequent separate observation through the glass door was legal and justified the interior search and the seizure of evidence.

On this appeal the defendants contend only that Deputy Soumas' initial observation of the mobile home through the corner window was an unconstitutional search. They do not separately challenge the propriety of his later observation through the gap in the curtains on the front door, nor do they dispute that the attempted destruction of evidence observed by Deputy Soumas through the front door created an exigent circumstance that justified entry and seizure of the evidence. Although not well-articulated in their brief on appeal, it appears that they contend the seized evidence should be suppressed because the observation through the front door and all subsequent observations and seizures were the "fruit of the poisonous tree" ¹--products of the initial allegedly illegal search through the corner window. By limiting their argument in this way, the defendants acknowledge that the evidence ought to have been suppressed only if Deputy Soumas conducted an unlawful search when he looked through the corner window.

Searches conducted without warrants are presumptively unreasonable and violative of the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article I, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution. Therefore, because Deputy Soumas had no warrant, his view through the corner window was lawful only if it either did not constitute a "search" or fell within a recognized exception to the warrant requirement.

Both parties here urge application of a "plain view" analysis. Under the plain view doctrine enunciated by the United States Supreme Court, warrantless seizures are permitted if two requirements are satisfied: (1) the officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or otherwise properly be in a position to observe a particular area, and (2) it must be immediately apparent that the items observed are evidence of a crime or otherwise subject to seizure. Horton v. California 496 U.S. 128, 110 S.Ct. 2301, 110 L.Ed.2d 112 (1990). ² However we conclude that the plain view doctrine is not the proper framework for analysis of Deputy Soumas' observation through the corner window, for the plain view doctrine addresses the validity of warrantless seizures, not searches.

In Horton v. California, supra, the United States Supreme Court clarified that the plain view doctrine is a constitutionally recognized justification only for warrantless seizures, not warrantless searches:

The right to security in person and property protected by the Fourth Amendment may be invaded in quite different ways by searches and seizures. A search compromises the individual interest in privacy; a seizure deprives the individual of dominion over his or her person or property. The "plain view" doctrine is often considered an exception to the general rule that warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable, but this characterization overlooks the important difference between searches and seizures. If an article is already in plain view, neither its observation nor its seizure would involve any invasion of privacy. A seizure of the article, however, would obviously invade the owner's possessory interest. If "plain view" justifies an exception from an otherwise applicable warrant requirement, therefore, it must be an exception that is addressed to the concerns that are implicated by seizures rather than by searches. (Citations omitted.)

496 U.S. at 133-34, 110 S.Ct. at 2306. This clarification is consistent with Justice Rehnquist's analysis in Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 738 n. 4, 103 S.Ct. 1535, 1541 n. 4, 75 L.Ed.2d 502 (1983):

It is important to distinguish "plain view," as used in Coolidge to justify seizure of an object, from an officer's mere observation of an item left in plain view. Whereas the latter generally...