State v. Clay

• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: BRANCH; SHARP
• Citation: State v. Clay, 256 S.E.2d 176, 297 N.C. 555 (N.C. 1979)
• Decision Date: 12 July 1979
• Docket Number: No. 40,40
• Parties: STATE of North Carolina v. Maude Mae CLAY.

Page 176

256 S.E.2d 176

297 N.C. 555

STATE of North Carolina v. Maude Mae CLAY.

No. 40.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

July 12, 1979.

Angela R. Bryant, Graham, for defendant-appellee.

Rufus L. Edmisten, Atty. Gen. by James Wallace, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Raleigh, for the State.

BRANCH, Justice.

The State contends that the Court of Appeals incorrectly decided that the trial judge erred in admitting defendant's inculpatory statement into evidence.

Pursuant to defendant's motion to suppress this statement, the trial judge correctly conducted a voir dire hearing. After hearing testimony from Officer Barrow and defendant, the trial judge, Inter alia, made the following findings of fact:

(That) (a)gain at approximately 3:10 a. m. Officer Barrow and Officer Perry returned to the Clay residence, having been to the Alamance County Hospital to determine the status of the victim, and upon returning to the Clay residence had in their possession a tape recorder; that during the period of time in which they were absent from the Clay residence the defendant was not in custody or detained in any manner and felt that she could have left the house at any time; that the officers thereafter asked the defendant questions and interrogated the defendant and that she voluntarily answered the questions; that such interrogation was conducted in connection with an on-the-scene investigation of a crime and not as a result of any custodial interrogation and that at the time of the second interrogation and answers given by the defendant, the defendant had not been placed under arrest and had not been told that she could not leave the residence and was in no manner detained even though officers had remained present there at the residence during the entire period of absence of Officers Perry and Barrows and that prior to asking Mrs. Clay any questions at the time of the second interrogation Mrs. Clay was reminded of the rights which she had previously been given at approximately 1:10 a. m.

Based on these findings of fact, Judge Martin concluded that the inculpatory statement was the result of an on-the-scene investigation and was given "voluntarily, freely, and understandingly without duress, coercion, or inducement."

In deciding that the trial judge erred in allowing defendant's statement into evidence, the Court of Appeals stated:

In our opinion, in the present case the evidence adduced on Voir dire and the findings of fact made by the trial judge do not support the conclusion that the defendant's inculpatory statements "were the result of an on-the-scene investigation rather than a custodial interrogation." In our opinion, the evidence in the present case demonstrates a "coercive environment" rendering the 3:10 a. m. statements of the defendant inadmissible in the absence of any evidence showing that she affirmatively waived her right to counsel.

The Miranda warnings and waiver of counsel are required only when an individual is being subjected to custodial interrogation. State v. Sykes, 285 N.C. 202, 203 S.E.2d 849 (1974); State v. Blackmon, 284 N.C. 1, 199 S.E.2d 431 (1973). "Custodial interrogation" means questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Neither Miranda warnings nor waiver of counsel is required when police activity is limited to a general on-the-scene investigation. State v. Sykes, supra ; State v. Meadows, 272 N.C. 327, 158 S.E.2d 638 (1968). The ultimate test of the admissibility of a confession is whether the statement was in fact voluntarily and understandingly made. State v. White, 291 N.C. 118, 229 S.E.2d 152 (1976); State v. Pruitt, 286 N.C. 442, 212 S.E.2d 92 (1975). It is well settled that the trial judge's findings of fact after a voir dire hearing concerning the admissibility of a confession are conclusive and binding on the appellate courts when supported by competent evidence. State v. Jenkins, 292 N.C. 179, 232 S.E.2d 648 (1977); State v. White, supra. Likewise, the finding of the trial court that the defendant was not in custody at the time he made the statement in question is conclusive if supported by record evidence elicited on a properly conducted voir dire. State v. Dollar, 292 N.C. 344, 233 S.E.2d 521 (1977).

With these rules in mind, we turn to the record to ascertain whether the trial judge's findings, in instant case, are supported by evidence elicited on voir dire.

Officer Barrow testified that before he talked to defendant he did not have a suspect in mind. The first statement was taken at about 1:10 a. m., and defendant was not under arrest or in custody. She told the officers that Mr. Turner had shot Mr. Evans. Officers Barrow and Perry then went to the hospital and returned to defendant's residence at approximately 3:00 a. m. Before the officers went to the hospital, defendant was not under arrest and was not told not to leave her residence. She was not handcuffed and was not placed under arrest when Barrow and Perry returned from the hospital. Defendant gave the officers a statement at 3:10 a. m. indicating that she had shot Mr. Evans. She was never threatened or coerced into giving a statement or promised anything.

Defendant's voir dire testimony included the following statements which we find quite telling:

I feel I could have left the house before I made the statement if I had wanted to go, and I don't think they would have tried to stop me. . . .

I was not arrested at my house that night and I was not handcuffed or threatened in order to get me to answer questions. I knew at the time that I did not have to tell the police anything and that I could have stopped talking to them at any time I wanted to. I knew if I wanted a lawyer that I could have one there while they were talking to me. I did leave the house after talking to the police.

. . . I was upset, really mad, and was afraid because that big man had come in here jumping on me and beating on me. I was nervous. But not because all the policemen were in the house. Because then I felt safe . . . .

. . . I was arrested on this charge about 7:00 o'clock that morning.

It is obvious that the trial judge's findings are amply supported by the testimony presented on voir dire. Moreover, it appears that the evidence which lends the strongest support to his findings was elicited from the defendant. The Court of Appeals in support of its decision, relies on conclusions not warranted by the evidence. Judge Harry Martin, in his dissenting opinion, has ably pointed out the lack of basis for these conclusions.

There was plenary evidence to support the trial judge's findings of fact, which in turn support his conclusions of law and ruling. We, therefore, hold that the trial judge correctly denied defendant's motion to suppress her inculpatory statements.

Defendant argues that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury in that he failed to distinguish between the elements of self-defense when there is an intent to kill and the elements of self-defense where that intent is absent. Defendant's contention seems to be that if she did not act with intent to kill, her assault would be excused by the law of self-defense if it reasonably appeared to be necessary to protect herself from bodily injury or offensive physical contact. However, we think the inquiry relative to self-defense in such cases should focus not on the presence or absence of defendant's intent to kill but on the amount of force used by the defendant in repelling the attack and the nature of the attack with which the defendant was faced.

It is clear that where one has inflicted serious injury upon another with intent to kill, such assault would be justified as being in self-defense only if the defendant was in actual or apparent danger of death or great bodily harm at the hands of the other. State v. Anderson, 230 N.C. 54, 51 S.E.2d 895 (1949). Our cases also provide that a defendant can use force in self-defense even though the threat he attempts to repel is less than death or great bodily harm. State v. Fletcher, 268 N.C. 140, 150 S.E.2d 54 (1966); State v. Anderson, supra. However, some confusion arises with regard to the amount of force which may be used in self-defense to protect against bodily injury or offensive physical contact.

In State v. Anderson, supra, the defendant was charged with assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injuries. Defendant offered evidence tending to show self-defense, and the trial judge submitted to the jury the possible verdicts of guilty of felonious assault, the lesser included offense of nonfelonious assault with a deadly weapon, and not guilty. In its charge to the jury, the court, without qualification, instructed:

One is permitted to fight in self-defense or kill in self-defense when it is necessary for him to do so in order to avoid death or great bodily harm.

Finding this instruction to be erroneous, this Court, speaking through Justice Ervin, stated:

. . . In final result, it charged the jury that one is never privileged by law to employ force in self protection unless he is threatened with death or great bodily harm.

The law does not compel any man to submit in meekness to indignities or violence to his person merely because such indignities or violence stop short of threatening...