State v. Clayton
Decision Date | 18 November 1912 |
Citation | 85 A. 173,83 N.J.L. 673 |
Parties | STATE v. CLAYTON. |
Court | New Jersey Supreme Court |
Error to Court of Oyer and Terminer, Monmouth County.
Charles D. Clayton was convicted of murder in the first degree, and brings error. Reversed, and venire de novo ordered.
R. Ten Broeck Stout, of Lakewood, for plaintiff in error. John S. Applegate, Jr., of Red Bank, for the State.
The plaintiff in error was tried for the shooting and killing of a police officer who was in the act of placing a hand upon his shoulder either to arrest him or to detain him, or to expostulate with him. The shot may have been fired on a sudden impulse or after premeditation and with a deliberate intent to kill. The jury found the latter.
Upon the question of murder in the first degree, the following instruction to the jury is brought before us upon error assigned on a bill of exceptions:
Of the error of this instruction there can be no doubt. In so far as it instructed the jury that the formation and execution of an intention to kill was what was meant by deliberation in the law it was directly opposed to what we decided in State v. Deliso, 75 N. J. Law, 808, 69 Atl. 218; and in so far as it instructed them that the interval of time, however short, required to form the intention to kill included sufficient time for premeditation and deliberation, it was opposed to what we decided in State v. Mangano, 77 N. J. Law, 544, 72 Atl. 366, as well as to the plainest dictates of reason, for, however brief may be the interval of time required for the performance of any one of the three mental acts involved in murder in the first degree, viz., premeditation, willfulness (i. e., intention), and deliberation, the fact remains that they are not only distinct mental acts, but also that one succeeds another as was pointed out in State v. Deliso. They cannot therefore be synchronous as is implied in this instruction.
As was said by Chancellor Magie in State v. Zdanowicz, 69 N. J. Law, 627, 55 Atl. 743, each requires "some appreciable time," if, therefore the briefest period of time appreciable be assigned for the performance of each of these mental acts they could not all be performed in the time thus required for the performance of one of them. Such a construction necessarily emasculates the statute in which the Legislature has defined the degrees of murder, and, in interpreting this statute, we are dealing with the most solemn subject to which language can be applied—the extinction of a human life by judicial decree. This extreme penalty the Legislature has declared in unmistakable language shall not be visited upon one who has committed the crime of murder unless it be...
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