State v. Clements

• Decision Date: 23 March 1990
• Docket Number: 16259,Nos. 15791,s. 15791
• Citation: 789 S.W.2d 101
• Parties: STATE of Missouri, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Ronald C. CLEMENTS, Defendant-Appellant. Ronald C. CLEMENTS, Movant-Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

Page 101

789 S.W.2d 101

STATE of Missouri, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Ronald C. CLEMENTS, Defendant-Appellant.

Ronald C. CLEMENTS, Movant-Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent.

Nos. 15791, 16259.

Missouri Court of Appeals,

Southern District,

Division Two.

March 23, 1990.

Motion for Rehearing or to Transfer to Supreme Court Denied

April 16, 1990.

Application to Transfer Denied June 19, 1990.

John A. Klosterman, Columbia, for defendant-appellant.

William L. Webster, Atty. Gen., Andrea K. Spillars, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for plaintiff-respondent.

FLANIGAN, Presiding Judge.

A jury found defendant Ronald Clements guilty of murder in the first degree, § 565.020, ¹ a class A felony, and he was sentenced to imprisonment for life without eligibility for probation or parole. Defendant appeals, and that appeal is Case No. 15791.

After the jury trial, defendant filed a motion under Rule 29.15, seeking relief from the conviction. The motion was denied without evidentiary hearing. Defendant appeals from that denial, and that appeal is Case No. 16259. The appeals have been consolidated and will be dealt with separately in this opinion.

No. 15791

Defendant's first point is that the trial court erred in denying his pretrial motion to suppress two statements made by defendant to law officers and in admitting those statements into evidence at the jury trial. He asserts the statements were "involuntary and the result of mental or physical coercion and duress in violation of defendant's constitutional protection against self-incrimination, as guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 19 of the Missouri Constitution, in that, although the law enforcement authorities who took defendant's statements had advised him of his right to remain silent as required by Miranda v. Arizona and had obtained defendant's waiver of that right, the totality of the circumstances rendered defendant's statements involuntary and the result of coercion, duress, promises or false pretenses, due to the inherently coercive environment of defendant's interrogation and defendant's youth."

Defendant entered pleas of not guilty and not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect excluding responsibility. Defendant offered evidence at the jury trial in support of the latter defense, which the jury rejected.

Although defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction, a review of the tragic events preceding the giving of the two challenged statements is in order.

The victim of the homicide was Steven Newberry, 19, who died on December 6, 1987. The state's evidence showed that Steven was beaten to death with ball bats wielded by three young men, Jim Hardy, Pete Rowland, and defendant, all classmates of Steven at Carl Junction High School.

Late in the afternoon of December 6, 1987, Jim Hardy came to the home of the victim near Carl Junction. Hardy was accompanied by Pete Rowland and defendant. The four young men had previously "run around" together and were presumably friends.

Hardy stayed a few minutes in the Newberry house, and then Steven and Hardy joined the other two young men who were waiting outside in a car. The four young men proceeded to a rural area near Carl Junction. They got out of the car and walked toward a set of abandoned railroad tracks. Each carried a baseball bat. Steven had been told that the purpose of the trip was to catch and kill small domestic animals. Hardy asked Steven if he would like to kill a kitten they had brought along. Steven responded that he wanted to kill an animal and all four of them beat the kitten to death with the bats.

After the kitten was killed, somebody said, "Let's do something before it gets too dark." Hardy swung his bat and hit Steven in the face. Steven attempted to run away. Steven was chased by the other three young men until he stumbled and fell. Rowland, Hardy, and defendant proceeded to beat Steven to death with the bats. During the beating, Steven was lying on his side, curled into a fetal position. Each of the three young men struck Steven at least 20 times.

When Steven appeared to be dead, the felonious trio dragged his body to a nearby cistern. Hardy tied Steven's arms and legs with twine and tied a rock to Steven's waist. The trio then pushed Steven into the cistern, which was filled with water to a point six inches below ground level. Defendant threw Steven's jacket into the cistern. In returning to the car, the trio discarded the bats at various places in the vicinity and then went to Hardy's house. While there, they agreed to tell anyone who asked that they had dropped Steven off at Barney's, a local convenience store.

The next morning, December 7, Steven's mother called the police and informed them that Steven had not returned home. Investigator Mike Randolph, of the sheriff's department, went to the high school and questioned defendant and other students concerning Steven's whereabouts. Defendant informed Randolph that they had dropped Steven off at Barney's.

Early in the evening of December 7, defendant was taken into custody and was interviewed at the Carl Junction Police Station.

Defendant was given the Miranda warnings and he signed a written waiver of his rights. The interview was conducted by Officer Mike Randolph. Also present during the interview was investigator Ray Youngblood. Captain Jim Wiseman of the Carl Junction Police Department was present during a portion of the interview. Defendant, born July 31, 1970, was over 17 years old and thus not a "child," § 211.021(2), for purposes of treatment as a juvenile offender.

Defendant's mother was present but, at defendant's request, left the room while the interview was conducted. The interview, which was tape recorded, consisted of questions propounded by Officer Randolph to defendant and his responses. The interview commenced at 8:33 p.m. and apparently lasted only a few minutes because the full transcription of it occupies only four pages of the record. That transcription was read to the jury as state's Exhibit 6 and is the first of the two challenged confessions.

Upon completion of the first interview, defendant accompanied the officers to the scene of the crime at approximately 11 p.m. He led them to the cistern where the body was found. About midnight defendant was taken to the county jail.

The next morning, December 8, at 8:23 a.m., Officer Youngblood again gave defendant the Miranda warnings and obtained a signed waiver of his rights. Officer Randolph again interviewed him in the same manner. State's Exhibit 9, a nine-page transcription of the interview, was read to the jury and is the second challenged confession.

Defendant filed a motion to suppress Exhibit 6 and Exhibit 9. An evidentiary hearing was held on that motion on April 12, 1988, three weeks prior to the jury trial. At that hearing, the state adduced the testimony of Officers Randolph, Youngblood, and Wiseman concerning the two interviews. Defendant presented no evidence.

Randolph testified that when Exhibit 6 was obtained defendant was "okay physically ... emotionally he was aware and attentive ... seemed to be a little upset." Randolph said that later defendant seemed to be very nervous and scared and about to cry. He was "very emotional and had uneasy breathing." Randolph testified that during that interview Youngblood told defendant that, if defendant cooperated, Youngblood would tell the prosecutor that defendant had cooperated. "That's the extent of any promises or inducement."

Officer Youngblood testified that during the first interview no officer made any promises to defendant, nor was defendant threatened or coerced. "The only thing we told him was we would tell the prosecutor that he cooperated. No one made any promises that the prosecutor would do anything." He said defendant "appeared to understand what he was doing." On cross-examination, Youngblood stated that the purpose in telling defendant that "we would tell the prosecutor that he cooperated" was to induce him to go ahead and talk.

Officer Wiseman testified that at the first interview defendant was told that if he cooperated "this would be made known to the court and that generally it would go easier on those that cooperated. I think I made that statement." Wiseman also said that Youngblood told the defendant, "If you stand up and take your licks you would feel better about it." Wiseman testified that at the first interview, which began before Wiseman came into the room, defendant's "general condition was he was very quiet, he was nervous."

At the conclusion of the hearing on the motion to suppress, the trial court found that, prior to both interviews, the defendant was given the Miranda warnings and executed waivers. The trial court also stated:

"The evidence shows that while the defendant was nervous, it does not appear that he was in such condition that he would have been unable to understand his constitutional rights and make an intelligent waiver of those rights. The promises made concerning his cooperation and the fact this would be relayed on to the prosecuting attorney or judicial authorities and that it might be helpful I don't think rise to the level of the type of promise that would prevent the statements from being voluntary. So as far as those two statements made, both the one at the Carl Junction Police Department and at the sheriff's department, the Court would find that these were made by the defendant voluntarily and intelligently and after he had been advised of his constitutional rights as set out in the Miranda decision, and therefore the motion to suppress those two statements is overruled."

Defendant argues that the trial court erred in not sustaining his motion to suppress the two statements because they were involuntary and "the result of mental or physical coercion and duress under the totality of the circumstances, including defenda...