State v. Clemmer

Decision Date01 September 1999
Citation999 S.W.2d 903
Parties(Tex.App.-Amarillo 1999) THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellant v. MICHAEL ROBERT CLEMMER, Appellee NO. 07-97-0298-CR
CourtTexas Court of Appeals

FROM THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW OF GUADALUPE COUNTY; NO. CCL-96-1160; HON. LINDA Z. JONES, PRESIDING

Before QUINN and REAVIS and JOHNSON, JJ.

Brian Quinn, Justice

The State of Texas (appellant) appeals from an order granting Michael Robert Clemmer's (appellee) motion to suppress evidence in a prosecution for driving while intoxicated (DWI). It argues, via its sole ground, that the trial court erred in basing its decision on the doctrine of collateral estoppel. We reverse.

Background

Appellee was arrested for DWI and was requested to give a breath specimen to test for the presence of alcohol in his blood stream. Following his refusal to give such a specimen, the Department of Public Safety petitioned for the administrative suspension of his driver's license. TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. 524.001 et seq. (Vernon 1999). An evidentiary hearing was held after which the administrative law judge refused to suspend appellee's license, finding that there was no probable cause to arrest him for DWI. No appeal was taken from that decision.

In addition to facing license revocation, appellee was also charged with DWI in the County Court at Law of Guadalupe County. He filed two motions to suppress which were identical insofar as they alleged he was arrested without a warrant nor probable cause. So too did he specifically allege in the first motion that the ruling of the administrative law judge collaterally estopped the State from relitigating the issue of probable cause to arrest in the criminal prosecution. The first motion was initially denied. Following an evidentiary hearing held some two months later, the second motion, alleging only lack of probable cause, was also denied. Approximately three months after that, the trial court reconsidered, and granted, the first motion.

In granting the first motion from the bench, the trial court made clear that it was basing its decision on the theory of collateral estoppel. This rationale was reflected in the written order subsequently entered. However, on the day following entry of the order, the trial court signed a nunc pro tunc order which removed all references to collateral estoppel. The nunc pro tunc order simply referred to a June 18, 1997 hearing conducted on the first motion, "set aside" the order executed the previous day granting the motion, and stated that the motion would be "granted as of June 18, 1997.1 No one requested findings of fact and conclusions of law.

The State now questions the propriety of the trial court's action. Although the State briefed the question of whether collateral estoppel truly barred relitigation of the probable cause issue, it did so without ever presenting an issue or point of error as required by Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.1(e). Nonetheless, given that the State clearly expressed the error alleged, the authority relied upon, and the relief sought, we will address its contention.

Standard of Review

We review a decision on a motion to suppress under an abuse of discretion standard. LaSalle v. State, 923 S.W.2d 819, 823 (Tex. App.--Amarillo 1996, pet. ref'd). Though questions of law are subject to unfettered de novo review, the same is not necessarily true with regard to mixed questions of law and fact. That is, the application of law to fact is a mixed question of law and fact. Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). Furthermore, when the resolution of the ultimate question turns on an evaluation of the credibility and demeanor of the witnesses, then we afford almost total deference to the manner in which the trial court applied the law to facts before it.2 Id. In all other situations, we review de novo the manner in which the law is applied. Id.

Two other aspects of the standard of review warrant comment. The first pertains to the foundation of the decision rendered below and requires us to forego disturbing that decision if it can be upheld as correct under any applicable legal theory. Calloway v. State, 743 S.W.2d 645, 652 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988). That the theory may not have been previously asserted matters not as long as it justifies the determination. State v. Subke, 918 S.W.2d 11, 14 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1995, pet. ref'd). The second concerns the effect of the trial court's failure to support its decision via findings of fact and conclusions of law. If same are not executed and resolution of the ultimate question turns on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor, we presume "the trial court made findings necessary to support its ruling so long as those implied findings are supported by the record." Josey v. State, 981 S.W.2d 831, 837 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, pet. ref'd). Stated differently, we "view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial courts [sic] . . . ruling. . . ." Quinn v. State, 958 S.W.2d 395, 401-402 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).

Application of Standard

The State posits that the trial court erred in applying the doctrine of collateral estoppel, thereby precluding it from establishing probable...

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12 cases
  • Baines v. State
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • 30 Marzo 2011
    ...has no such provision. SeeTex.R.App. P. 25.2(a).McClinton, 38 S.W.3d at 750. The Fourteenth District cited State v. Clemmer, 999 S.W.2d 903, 905 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1999, pet. ref'd), as additional authority, noting the Amarillo Court of Appeals had “elected to address the state's complaint ......
  • Baines v. The State Of Tex.
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • 1 Septiembre 2010
    ...no such provision. See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(a). McClinton, 38 S.W.3d at 750. The Fourteenth District cited State v. Clemmer, 999 S.W.2d 903, 905 (Tex. App.”Amarillo 1999, pet. refd), as additional authority, noting the Amarillo Court of Appeals had "elected to address the state's complaint ......
  • Baines v. The State Of Tex.
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • 3 Noviembre 2010
    ...no such provision. See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(a). McClinton, 38 S.W.3d at 750. The Fourteenth District cited State v. Clemmer, 999 S.W.2d 903, 905 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1999, pet. refd), as additional authority, noting the Amarillo Court of Appeals had "elected to address the state's complaint ......
  • Cantrell v. State
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • 29 Octubre 2008
    ...standard of review is for abuse of discretion. See State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 855 (Tex.Crim.App.2000); State v. Clemmer, 999 S.W.2d 903, 905 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1999, pet. ref'd). Blood Appellant's contention regarding the invalidity of the blood test is anchored on his interpretation of ......
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