State v. Clifton
| Decision Date | 24 March 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. S-15-1167.,S-15-1167. |
| Citation | 892 N.W.2d 112,296 Neb. 135 |
| Parties | STATE of Nebraska, appellee, v. Jaquez B. CLIFTON, appellant. |
| Court | Nebraska Supreme Court |
Thomas C. Riley, Douglas County Public Defender, Cindy A. Tate, and Mikki C. Jerabek, for appellant.
Douglas J. Peterson, Attorney General, and Nathan A. Liss, Lincoln, for appellee.
Heavican, C.J., Wright, Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Kelch, and Funke, JJ.
Jaquez B. Clifton appeals his convictions for first degree murder and use of a firearm to commit a felony in relation to the death of Frank Sanders on July 20, 2014. Clifton asserts that the prosecution impermissibly struck prospective jurors on the basis of race and that he should be accorded a new trial under Batson v. Kentucky.1 He further asserts that his statements to law enforcement should have been suppressed as obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona ,2 because the Miranda warning was not given until after the interrogation had begun and because he asserted his right to cut off questioning by saying, "I can't." Lastly, Clifton asserts that the court should have granted a mistrial. He claims the court allowed witness testimony concerning events that the witness had not revealed in prior statements to the police and which were allegedly revealed to the prosecution before trial, but had not been disclosed to the defense as required by Brady v. Maryland.3
At the close of jury selection, defense counsel raised a Batson challenge. Although the race or heritage of the venire was not stipulated or otherwise formally put into evidence, defense counsel pointed out during argument before the district court that three of the four African-American jurors in the venire pool were struck by the State's peremptory challenges: prospective jurors Nos. 8, 13, and 14. The prosecution proffered nondiscriminatory reasons for the strikes.
Juror No. 13 was the prosecution's third strike. The prosecutor explained that he did not believe juror No. 13 could be "ultimately independent" and disregard her past experience with drug addiction and alcoholism, including drug transactions that were similar to those that occurred as part of the charges against Clifton.
During voir dire, juror No. 13 stated that she worked full time both as a program specialist with the elderly and as a cook. In her work at an adult daycare, she worked with people with mental health issues. She taught them qualitative living skills. Her second job was a cook for a homeless shelter and the "Hero program." In the late 1980's, she took a class in business law, with the thought of pursuing a career as a legal secretary. She found that legal coursework was not for her. Juror No. 13 was recovering from 25 years of alcoholism and 23 years of crack addiction. She had been sober for 6 years and agreed that many crimes are "fueled by the addiction."
Juror No. 8 was the State's seventh strike. The prosecution was concerned about her experience with the juvenile court and as a therapist who might have sympathy for young offenders like Clifton. The prosecutor noted that juror No. 8 would be aware of the possible penalties at issue in the trial and might resist the punishment demanded by statute, believing that Clifton should be reformed instead.
Juror No. 8 was a mental health therapist, and in that capacity, she was in juvenile court "quite often." She worked with the county attorney's office and the public defender's office in her advocacy of the juveniles or their families. She was subpoenaed "quite often," and she often has to call police officers when she has an unruly or noncompliant child.
Juror No. 8 was friends with two other members of the venire, jurors Nos. 3 and 14. Juror No. 3 ultimately was on the jury panel. With regard to juror No. 3, juror No. 8 said that they "disagree all the time." She knew one of the potential witnesses, whom she described as a friend of her ex-husband and a former coworker.
Juror No. 14 was the prosecution's last strike. The prosecutor explained that he preferred the two other remaining jurors in the venire to juror No. 14, because juror No. 14 did not appear to be forthcoming in volunteering information. Based on a comparison of the answers of juror No. 14 to the answers of the other two remaining jurors, and the fact that the other two remaining jurors appeared younger, the prosecutor had the impression that "if [the other two remaining jurors] were to hear the votes of other people, they wouldn't raise a big ruckus or problem and they would kind of go along to get along." Juror No. 14 worked in sales and was originally from Chicago, Illinois.
Defense counsel generally asserted that Caucasian jurors that were selected had "answers [that] were no more damaging than ... any of the other potential jurors that were in the pool."
The district court found that Clifton had made a prima facie showing that the prosecutor had exercised peremptory challenges on the basis of race, but found that Clifton had failed to sustain his burden to show that the State's proffered reasons for striking the jurors were a pretext for racial discrimination. Accordingly, the court denied the challenge.
Before trial, Clifton moved to suppress all of his statements to law enforcement. Clifton was questioned in custody for approximately 2½ hours. Det. Ryan Davis began the questioning with introductions. At this point, Clifton had not been given Miranda warnings.
Clifton spelled his name and gave his address and telephone number. Davis and Clifton discussed Clifton's job status and education. Davis asked Clifton if he knew why he was being questioned. Clifton stated that he did not. Davis explained that he was doing some followup regarding an incident that occurred on "Sunday," giving the general location of Sanders' residence. Davis asked Clifton if he had any idea what he was talking about. Clifton said he did not, and stated that his mother had passed away some 3 weeks prior and that he was on probation. Further discussion ensued about Davis' probation status and his mother's passing away. When Clifton mentioned he had a son "on the way," Davis inquired about the due date.
Davis proceeded to question Clifton in more detail about his education. When Clifton explained that he did not finish 12th grade because he was "running from different places" and was in the foster care system, Davis asked Clifton further questions about that history. During this time, Clifton did not make any statements regarding the night of July 20, 2014.
After about 5 minutes, Davis read Clifton his Miranda rights. After reading Clifton his Miranda rights, Davis began asking Clifton questions directly related to the events of July 20, 2014. At first, Clifton denied having left his house that evening. After further questioning, Clifton acknowledged that he was at the address in question on the night in question, but denied pulling the trigger. Clifton said "[s]ome dude ... wanted to buy some weed"; Clifton claimed he did not know the names of the people he was with and had never seen them before.
Davis asked Clifton to walk him through what happened that night—to tell Clifton's side of the story. Clifton responded that he wanted to talk to his son. Davis stated that he could not facilitate that "right at that second" and continued,
Clifton responded, "It do, but I can't tell you." Davis asked why, and Clifton said, "I can't, I just can't." Davis asked, "Did you guys go there to rob him?" Clifton said he did not. Clifton continued to answer a few more questions about the night in question, and then admitted that "[t]hey" went to Sanders' residence to rob him.
When Davis asked Clifton to tell him who "they" were, Clifton said, "I can't because I don't want anybody telling on me." Davis stated that it was Clifton's future and that it was his opportunity to walk him through this. Clifton responded, "I can't." Davis responded, "Yes, you can." Davis encouraged Clifton to at least tell him who he was with on the night of the shooting. Clifton exclaimed, "Ugh," and when asked if he had wanted "that man to die," Clifton said, "I didn't want that man to die."
Davis explained there was no reason for Clifton to cover for anybody. Clifton stated that while at Sanders' residence, he was told to hold the door open. Clifton said he was holding the front door while another person went to a back room to buy marijuana. He then heard a gunshot and "ran all the way back home."
Clifton continued to refuse to name the other parties. He stated that he was When Davis stated that he understood and that they were almost done, Clifton responded, After some back and forth, Davis' continued attempts to get Clifton to reveal who was with him the night of the murder, Clifton said he was "ready to leave now" and "I wanna be done." When Davis pressed Clifton again to tell him who was with him, Clifton said he could not talk anymore and stated,
The court found through the statements, beginning with Clifton had invoked his right to remain silent. It found that any statements following these invocations were inadmissible.
At trial, the jury heard Clifton's admission that he had gone to Sanders' house with two other unknown individuals on the night in question. The jury heard Clifton's statements that he was holding the door when he heard a gunshot and he "didn't want that man to...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Short
...104 S. Ct. 2528, 81 L. Ed. 2d 413 (1984) (internal quotation marks omitted).36 Id.37 Id.38 See id. See, also, e.g., State v. Clifton , 296 Neb. 135, 892 N.W.2d 112 (2017).39 See, Strickler v. Greene , 527 U.S. 263, 119 S. Ct. 1936, 144 L. Ed. 2d 286 (1999) ; Kyles v. Whitley , 514 U.S. 419,......
-
State v. Hirsh
...not suppressed within meaning of Brady , quoting State v. Walker , 214 Conn. 122, 126, 571 A.2d 686 [1990] ); State v. Clifton , 296 Neb. 135, 163-64, 892 N.W.2d 112 (2017) (information known to State week before trial; no Brady violation, in part, because defense had opportunity to cross-e......
-
State v. Ewinger, A-18-470.
...[because] if disclosed and used effectively, it may make the difference between conviction and acquittal.'"State v. Clifton, 296 Neb. 135, 162-63, 892 N.W.2d 112, 134 (2017). Here, the record reflects that, at a pretrial hearing held in December 2017, defense counsel acknowledged that the v......
-
State v. Briggs
...Determining whether a prosecutor impermissibly struck a prospective juror based on race is a three-step process. State v. Clifton , 296 Neb. 135, 892 N.W.2d 112 (2017). In this three-step process, the ultimate burden of persuasion regarding racial motivation rests with, and never shifts fro......