State v. Clopton
| Decision Date | 16 March 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. A-1-CA-37170,A-1-CA-37170 |
| Parties | STATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DEBRA CLOPTON, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of New Mexico |
This decision of the New Mexico Court of Appeals was not selected for publication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Refer to Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished decisions. Electronic decisions may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations from the official version filed by the Court of Appeals.
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SANTA FE COUNTY
Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General
Eran Sharon, Assistant Attorney General
for Appellee
Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender
Gregory B. Dawkins, Assistant Appellate Defender
Santa Fe, NM
for Appellant
{1} Defendant Debra Clopton appeals her convictions for twenty-two misdemeanor counts of cruelty to animals, in violation of NMSA 1978, Section 30-18-1(B) (2007), and one misdemeanor count of practicing veterinary medicine without a license, in violation of NMSA 1978, Section 61-14-18 (1999, amended 2017).
{2} Defendant raises seven issues on appeal,1 arguing (1) the multiple cruelty to animals convictions subjected her to double jeopardy; (2) there was insufficient evidence to support those convictions; (3) the district court improperly refused her request for a jury instruction defining "negligently," as that word is used in the cruelty to animals statute; (4) the statute prohibiting the unlicensed practice of veterinary medicine is unconstitutionally vague; (5) the district court improperly limited her ability to testify and to cross-examine the expert witness at trial; (6) the district court improperly found her competent to stand trial; and (7) she was denied effective assistance of counsel at trial. Defendant further asserts that the cumulative error in her jury trial warrants reversal. Finding no error, we affirm.
{3} The charges against Defendant came about when her neighbors complained to the Santa Fe County Sheriff's Office Animal Control Division about excessive dog barking coming from her five-acre property. While responding to one of the complaints, an animal control officer saw approximately twenty-one dogs in Defendant's yard. Defendant, who was trained in veterinary medicine, told the officer that she was treating some of the dogs; he then informed her that since her license to practice veterinary medicine had been revoked, she could not engage in that treatment. He and the other officers with him left and prepared a warrant to search the property. They coordinated with the Doña Ana County Animal Cruelty Task Force to assist with a planned intervention at Defendant's property.
{4} A week later, a team of law enforcement and animal control officers returned to execute the warrant, further investigate the situation, and remove the dogs. When the officers arrived, they saw eight dogs in the yard acting aggressively and fighting one another, with the stronger dogs attacking the weaker ones. The officers captured those dogs and put them in kennels.
{5} Wearing protective gear and respirators, the officers then entered Defendant's double-wide mobile home, where they found dozens more dogs that were acting aggressively toward each other, as well as toward the officers. The officers observed medicine, including rabies vaccines, in the house, along with medical equipment commonly used by veterinarians. They saw trash and feces on the floors and detected strong odors of feces, urine, and ammonia. One officer described the feces as covering a majority of the floor and as having been stepped in and tracked throughout the house by the dogs; he also said that the odor in the house burned his eyes and, even with his respirator on, took his breath away. Some of the dogs inside were emaciated, some were unable to stand and walk, some were suffering from neurological conditions, and some were injured or otherwise disabled. There were dogs in kennels too small for them that had no food or water. One officer said he saw no bowls with dog food or water inside the house. At one point, some dogs were trampled by a group of other dogs moving toward the back door; the door eventually broke, and some dogs escaped.
{6} While the officers were inside, one of the members of the team, veterinarian Patricia Norris, was examining the captured dogs in a mobile forensic van parked on the property. After the dogs, forty-eight in all, were collected, they were taken to the animal shelter, where Dr. Norris periodically checked on them. Some were eventually euthanized and others were treated for illness and wounds.
{7} Defendant was arrested and charged with twenty-two counts of animal cruelty, one for each of twenty-two dogs, and one count of practicing veterinary medicine without a license. The jury returned guilty verdicts on all counts. For each of the animal cruelty counts, the jury was instructed that, to find guilt, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) "Defendant negligently mistreated, injured, killed without justification, or tormented [the particular dog associated with the count];" or that (2) "Defendant abandoned or failed to provide necessary sustenance to [that dog.]"
{8} Defendant first contends that the district court erred by not dismissing, under principles of double jeopardy, all but one of her twenty-two convictions for animal cruelty. She argues that she should not be "punished [twenty-two] times for the same behavior." The State disputes Defendant's ultimate conclusion, but does not dispute Defendant's characterization that the same behavior underlies the convictions. We therefore analyze this issue with an understanding that the convictions were based on a single course of conduct engaged in by Defendant.
{9} The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article II, Section 15 of the New Mexico Constitution protect defendants from "multiple punishments for the same offense." State v. Cooper, 1997-NMSC-058, ¶ 52, 124 N.M. 277, 949 P.2d 660 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Defendant's case constitutes one in the "unit of prosecution" line of double jeopardy-multiple punishment cases; in each such case, "the defendant has been charged with multiple violations of a single statute based on a single course of conduct." State v. Ramirez, 2018-NMSC-003, ¶ 45, 409 P.3d 902 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "The relevant inquiry" in a unit of prosecution case Id. (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citations omitted). "Our review of whether a double jeopardy violation occurred is a legal question subject to de novo review." State v. Lente, 2019-NMSC-020, ¶ 14, 453 P.3d 416.
{10} To determine whether Defendant's right to freedom from double jeopardy was infringed, we ask whether the Legislature intended for a person who engages in a single course of conduct proscribed by the animal cruelty statute to receive one conviction and sentence per animal affected by that conduct—or one conviction and sentence, no matter how many animals were affected. We resolve that question using a two-part test. First, we "analyze the statute at issue to determine whether the Legislature has defined the unit of prosecution." State v. Swick, 2012-NMSC-018, ¶ 33, 279 P.3d 747. "The plain language of the statute is the primary indicator of legislative intent." Ramirez, 2018-NMSC-003, ¶ 47 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In addition to the statute's wording, we may examine the statute's purpose. Swick, 2012-NMSC-018, ¶ 33. "If the unit of prosecution is clear from the language of the statute, the inquiry is complete." Id. If not, "we move to the second step, in which we determine whether [the] defendant's acts are separated by sufficient indicia of distinctness to justify multiple punishments under the same statute." Ramirez, 2018-NMSC-003, ¶ 47 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
{11} In relevant part, the animal cruelty statute provides that "[c]ruelty to animals consists of a person: (1) negligently mistreating, injuring, killing without lawful justification or tormenting an animal; or (2) abandoning or failing to provide necessary sustenance to an animal under that person's custody or control." Section 30-18-1(B). Notably, the statute lacks an express statement identifying the offense's unit of prosecution. See, e.g., State v. Alvarez-Lopez, 2004-NMSC-030, ¶ 41, 136 N.M. 309, 98 P.3d 699 ().
{12} Nevertheless, the statute implies that the Legislature intended punishment under it to correspond to the number of animals a person subjects to cruelty. The statute uses the singular term "an animal" in describing the crime, rather than the plural, "one or more animals." This choice indicates that the unit of prosecution corresponds to each animal subjected to cruelty, not to a single course of conduct that harms multiple animals. See Ramirez, 2018-NMSC-003, ¶ 53 (). The choice further expresses a desire to not assign only one unit of prosecution to a single course of conduct that results in harm to multiple animals. See id. As written, the statute is complete and makes sense, and so we will not read into it...
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