State v. Cloud
| Decision Date | 20 May 1912 |
| Docket Number | 19,395 |
| Citation | 130 La. 955,58 So. 827 |
| Court | Louisiana Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE v. CLOUD et al |
Appeal from Third Judicial District Court, Parish of Bienville; B P. Edwards, Judge.
William Cloud and another were convicted of murder, and appeal. Affirmed.
Wimberly & Reeves and Richardson & Richardson, for appellants.
Walter Guion, Atty. Gen., Wm. C. Barnette, and G. A. Gondran (E. H McClendon, of counsel), for the State.
Defendants are charged with murder; and they appeal from a verdict of guilty without capital punishment, and a sentence condemning them to hard labor in the penitentiary for life.
A bill of exceptions is taken to the ruling of the court in refusing a continuance, based on the ground of the absence of counsel. They allege in their motion that they had employed Mr. Wilkinson, who had suddenly withdrawn from the case, on account of sickness, and after having prepared it. The reasons of the court, contained in the bill of exceptions, for overruling or denying the motion for such continuance, is that defendants were represented in court by their leading counsel, two members of the bar, and a third member, who had recently been employed. We are of the opinion that the trial judge did not abuse the discretion vested in him in refusing a continuance. The accused were represented by counsel of their choice. The employment of Mr. Wilkinson was subsequent to the employment of the counsel who actually represented defendants on the trial of the cause, and other able counsel were employed by them to take the place of Mr. Wilkinson.
The next bill of exceptions is to a remark made by counsel assisting the district attorney, in his argument before the jury, to the effect that it was reasonable to presume that the information concerning the murder had reached Alberta, a town in the neighborhood, in the same manner that one of the defendants had reached town; that is, in other words, the information had reached the town by a messenger. It is claimed that this statement was greatly to the injury and hurt of defendants; but there is no request in the record to the judge to charge the jury to disregard the presumption of counsel in argument. Counsel for defendants argue that the time of the killing and the time that defendant Zuma Cloud reached Alberta, and the time it would take a person to go from the place deceased was killed at, are pertinent and material questions involving the guilt or innocence of the accused. The statement of counsel for the state was only a presumption or deduction expressed by him in the course of his argument, which was permissible. It was not stated as a fact; it was simply argued by counsel that such might be presumed to be the case. We fail to see how the jury might have been influenced by the remark.
To justify this court in setting aside the verdict of the jury, approved by the trial judge, on the ground of improper remarks made by a district attorney, it would have to be very thoroughly convinced that the jury was influenced by such remark and that it contributed to the verdict. The district judge in this case saw the jury, heard what the assistant to the district attorney said, and listened to all of the evidence adduced. If he thought that the verdict was not just, but was based upon prejudice, resulting from anything said by the district attorney, we would be slow to believe that he would have overruled a motion for a new trial, or let the verdict stand.
The next bills of exceptions are taken to the refusal of the court to grant a new trial. Defendants, in their motion allege that one of the jurors, Duncan Johnson, was examined on his voir dire, and that he stated he knew nothing about the case and had no opinion thereon; that he was not prejudiced for or against the defendants; and that he could and would give them a fair and impartial trial. They further alleged that said juror was prejudiced; that since the trial he (the juror) had expressed himself to the effect that he (Duncan Johnson) "knew that old man Cloud was looking for Matthews; and that he (Johnson) was at Norreds, and Cloud was there looking for Matthews," the murdered man. The juror, Duncan Johnson, was put on the stand by the district attorney, and he testified again that he had been without any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the accused when he went into the jury box, and that he was not prejudiced for or against the defendants, and that he could have and had given them a fair and impartial trial. He was then asked by counsel for the defendants as to the declaration recited above, to the effect that he knew that old man Cloud was looking for Matthews, the murdered man, etc. Objection was made to the question, and the objection was sustained by the...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Cascio, 40199
...to have influenced the jury that a verdict will be set aside by reason of improper remarks by the district attorney. State v. Cloud, 130 La. 955, 58 So. 827; State v. Atkins, 136 La. 844, 67 So. 926; State v. Shoemake, 143 La. 65, 78 So. 240; State v. Cole, 161 La. 827, 109 So. 505, and aut......
-
Warger v. Shauers
...Adm'x, 252 S.W.2d 30, 34 (Ky.1952) ; Hinkel v. Oregon Chair Co ., 80 Ore. 404, 406, 156 P. 438, 439 (1916) ; State v. Cloud, 130 La. 955, 958–960, 58 So. 827, 828–829 (1912) ; Payne v. Burke, 236 App.Div. 527, 528–530, 260 N.Y.S. 259, 260–262 (1932).This Court occasionally employed language......
- Warger v. Shauers
-
State v. Mackie
...date of trial based on the illness of a defense attorney when the defendant is represented by other competent counsel. State v. Cloud, 130 La. 955, 58 So. 827 (1912); State v. Golden, 113 La. 791, 37 So. 757 (1905); State v. Murray, 111 La. 688, 35 So. 814 Similarly, in State v. Sinclair, 2......