State v. Cloud, 19884

• Decision Date: 23 May 1986
• Docket Number: No. 19884,19884
• Citation: 722 P.2d 750
• Court: Utah Supreme Court
• Parties: The STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. John Charles CLOUD, Defendant and Appellant.

Page 750

722 P.2d 750

The STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. John Charles CLOUD, Defendant and Appellant.

No. 19884.

Supreme Court of Utah.

May 23, 1986.

Rehearing Denied July 29, 1986.

F. John Hill, Salt Lake City, for defendant and appellant.

David L. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., J. Stephen Mikita, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and respondent.

ZIMMERMAN, Justice:

Defendant John Cloud appeals from a jury verdict convicting him of second degree murder. Cloud asserts that the trial court erred in admitting photographs of the victim and in refusing his proffered jury instructions. He also claims that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction. We agree that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the photographs and reverse and remand for a new trial.

On the morning of May 23, 1983, the body of Nyla Johnson was found in her apartment. Johnson had died of multiple stab wounds inflicted several hours earlier by her fiance, defendant John Cloud. The homicide apparently occurred after a lengthy argument between Johnson and Cloud, in which Johnson told Cloud that she intended to break their engagement. Cloud was in the apartment when the body was discovered. He initially maintained that Johnson had been attacked by an unknown assailant, but later admitted killing her.

Cloud was charged with second degree murder under U.C.A., 1953, § 76-5-203(a) and (b) (Repl.Vol. 8B, 1978, Supp. 1985). At trial, the State introduced several photographs of the victim that showed the following: (i) Johnson as she was discovered by the police, fully clothed, lying face down on the floor in a pool of coagulated blood with the middle finger of her left hand extended in what the State claimed was an obscene gesture; (ii) the body after it had been turned over, lying face up in the pool of blood; and (iii) close-ups of three defensive wounds suffered by Johnson, one in the armpit and two on her hands. The State used these photographs to argue that, given the nature of the attack and the number of wounds inflicted, Cloud acted with the intent necessary to sustain a conviction of second degree murder. In his defense, Cloud asserted that his alcoholism, coupled with his distress over a prior divorce and the traumatic prospect of another failed relationship, had created an extreme emotional disturbance so that his actions amounted at most to manslaughter. U.C.A., 1953, § 76-5-205(b) (Repl. Vol. 8B, 1978, Supp.1985). At the close of the evidence, the trial court instructed the jury on second degree murder and manslaughter. The trial court refused to give three of defendant's instructions relative to manslaughter. The jury thereafter found Cloud guilty of second degree murder.

On appeal, Cloud argues that the trial court erred in admitting the photographs and in refusing to give certain requested jury instructions. He also contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction of second degree murder. We first address Cloud's contention that the admission of the photographs constituted reversible error.

The admission of photographic evidence depicting crime scenes and victims' injuries is governed by Utah Rule of Evidence 45, which provides that a "judge may in his discretion exclude evidence if he finds that its probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk that its admission will ... (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice...." ¹ This Court has considered the admissibility of such photographs in a number of cases. See, e.g., State v. Garcia, Utah, 663 P.2d 60 (1983); State v. Wells, Utah, 603 P.2d 810 (1979); State v. Ross, 28 Utah 2d 279, 501 P.2d 632 (1972); State v. Poe, 21 Utah 2d 113, 441 P.2d 512 (1968) (Poe I ); cf. State v. Poe, 24 Utah 2d 355, 471 P.2d 870 (1970) (Poe II ). State v. Garcia best summarizes the applicable law. Garcia indicated that under Rule 45 and our prior cases, when the prosecution proposes to introduce gruesome photographs of a homicide victim, the trial court

should determine whether the viewing of the photographs by the jury would create a substantial danger of undue prejudice against the defendant, and if so, whether that danger substantially outweighs the photographs' essential evidentiary value. The more inflammatory the photograph, the greater the need to establish its essential evidentiary value....

663 P.2d at 64 (emphasis in original; citation omitted).

The Court then explained what it meant by balancing the "essential evidentiary value" of a photograph against its potential prejudicial impact:

The point of the reference to "essential evidentiary value" in the context of potentially prejudicial photographs of the victim's body is that such photographs would generally be inappropriate where the only relevant evidence they convey can be put before the jury readily and accurately by other means not accompanied by the potential prejudice.

663 P.2d at 64 (latter emphasis added). Clearly, it is not enough that a potentially prejudicial photograph convey relevant information; it must convey relevant information that cannot readily be provided to the jury by less potentially prejudicial means. See State v. Wells, Utah, 603 P.2d 810, 813 (1979). Moreover, even if the photograph is the best available means of conveying the relevant information, the essential evidentiary value of that information must still be balanced against the potential for unfair prejudice.

Of course, because the admission of such evidence under Rule 45 (and its successor, Rule 403) is a matter addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, a trial court's decision to admit photographic evidence will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Garcia, 663 P.2d at 64. Such an abuse of discretion occurred in Poe I, where the trial court admitted autopsy photographs of a homicide victim's dissected brain cavity to illustrate the path of the fatal bullets. There was no question in that case that the victim had died as the result of bullet wounds to the head. This Court held that it was reversible error to admit the photographs when "[a]ll the material facts which could conceivably have been adduced from a viewing of the slides had been established by uncontradicted lay and medical testimony" and the sole purpose for introducing the evidence was to "inflame and arouse the jury." 21 Utah 2d at 117, 441 P.2d at 515. In State v. Wells, the Court also found that photographs of a homicide victim had no essential evidentiary value because the evidence depicted was already before the jury through the testimony of the medical examiner and that evidence was not contested by the defendant; therefore, the photographs were "superfluous" and had no evidentiary value except the "hoped-for emotional impact on the jury." 603 P.2d at 813. The conviction was not reversed, however, because the error was found to be harmless. Id.

In the present case, Cloud argues that the introduction of the photographs constituted reversible error because they were unnecessarily gruesome and had no probative value as to any disputed issues in the case. The State, on the other hand, argues that the photographs were relevant to three critical issues: the autopsy photographs of the stab wounds illustrated the brutality of Cloud's attack; the photograph depicting coagulated blood on Johnson's body assisted in determining when the crime occurred; and the photograph with the allegedly obscene gesture was illustrative of Cloud's mental state.

Both before the trial court and here, the State misperceives the standard laid down in Garcia for judging the admissibility of gruesome color photographs. This is best illustrated by the record of the lengthy hearing held before the trial judge on defendant's motion to preclude admission of the photographs. During the hearing, all parties conceded that the photographs were very graphic and gruesome. Defense counsel argued that the photographs showed nothing that could not be established by other readily available evidence. The judge repeatedly quizzed the prosecutor as to what the photographs would prove that was not conceded by defendant or that could not be proven through other nonobjectionable evidence. The prosecutor did not suggest that the photographs had any "essential evidentiary value," as that term is explained in Garcia. Rather, he argued that they were admissible because they contained relevant evidence. After extensive argument, the trial court apparently accepted the prosecution's statement of the law and denied the motion to exclude. In so doing, the court erred.

Under Garcia, potentially prejudicial photographs are "generally inappropriate" and should not be admitted in evidence unless they have some essential evidentiary value that outweighs their unfairly prejudicial impact. 663 P.2d at 64. Only after a determination has been made that the photographs have such value need the weighing be made. The trial court misapprehended the law and for that reason admitted the photographs without first properly evaluating the evidence. The trial judge's observation that the issues for which the photographs were offered were conceded makes it fairly plain that the photographs were not admitted for their essential evidentiary value. Regardless of how the matter is viewed, the conclusion is inescapable that the photographs had no essential evidentiary value. All that they showed was "put before the jury readily and accurately by other means not accompanied by the potential prejudice." Id. Under these circumstances, we can only conclude that the photographs were proffered and used solely for the purpose condemned in Poe I and in Wells --to inflame the jury.

The State contends that four of the photographs--the picture of Johnson lying face up in a pool of coagulated blood and three pictures of specific stab wounds to the hands and armpits--show the number and location of the wounds, thus illustrating the brutality of the attack, and that the...