State v. Coates

• Decision Date: 02 April 1987
• Docket Number: No. 51401-1,51401-1
• Parties: , 55 USLW 2598 STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Steven Kenneth COATES, Appellant.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

Page 882

107 Wn.2d 882

735 P.2d 64, 55 USLW 2598

STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Steven Kenneth COATES, Appellant.

No. 51401-1.

Supreme Court of Washington,

En Banc.

April 2, 1987.

[735 P.2d 65] Katherine Steele Knox, Richland, for appellant.

Curtis Ludwig, Benton Co. Pros. Atty., Andrew K. Miller, Deputy Pros. Atty., Kennewick, for respondent.

DORE, Justice.

Steven Kenneth Coates appeals his conviction of assault in the third degree. We hold that (1) the trial court properly denied defendant's motion to suppress evidence of a search on the basis the warrant affidavit set forth sufficient facts, independent of an illegally obtained statement, to afford the issuing magistrate probable cause, (2) the State does not have the burden of disproving a defendant's voluntary intoxication, and (3), evidence of voluntary intoxication cannot be used to negate the mental state of criminal negligence.

The conviction is affirmed.

FACTS

At approximately 11:30 p.m. on September 15, 1984, as Matt Long drove home from his job as a Hanford patrolman, he observed a blue Thunderbird strike another automobile. This second car pulled to the side of the road, but the Thunderbird continued; the officer followed the Thunderbird. Approximately a half mile farther, the Thunderbird's engine died, and it also pulled off to the side of the road. The officer stopped his vehicle behind the car. The defendant exited the driver's side and walked toward the officer's vehicle.

At this juncture, Long identified himself as a police officer and told defendant that he should return to the accident scene. Defendant replied that he was a Navy corpsman and could help if anyone were injured. Defendant returned to his car, spoke briefly with his passenger Dana Soderquist, and then agreed to walk back to the scene of the accident.

As they approached the scene, the officer and defendant observed a police vehicle with emergency lights flashing. Defendant stared at the lights for a few moments, then said that he would not return to the scene. By this time Officer Long had come to question defendant's mental stability, so The state trooper, who responded to the accident, found Officer Long. Long identified the defendant as the person who had stabbed him. Subsequently defendant and Soderquist were arrested and searched. Although a knife was discovered on the person of Soderquist, the officers did not find the knife used by defendant in the assault. Detective John Hodge of the Benton County Sheriff's Department sealed defendant's car with evidence tape, and the car was towed to the sheriff's office where it was impounded.

                he agreed that defendant could return to his own car.   As they neared the officer's truck, the defendant stabbed Officer Long twice in the back, and then returned to his car
                

Detective Hodge returned to the jail and, after advising defendant of his rights, questioned him about the assault. Defendant, who was obviously intoxicated, said he could not believe anyone could have been stabbed. Replying to the detective's question as to what had happened, the defendant said that he and the officer fell.

Detective Hodge asked the defendant to take a Breathalyzer; defendant refused stating he wanted to speak to an attorney first. After speaking to his attorney, defendant refused to answer any further questions. The defendant was then returned to his cell.

Shortly thereafter, the state trooper pursuant to his investigation of the accident and DWI charge contacted defendant. The state trooper also requested defendant to take a Breathalyzer test. At first Coates refused, but later agreed. The Breathalyzer test, administered over 4 hours after the accident and assault, showed defendant as having a blood alcohol level of .16 percent.

Benton County Deputy Sheriff Mark Mann was present during the trooper's administration of the test. Apparently unaware defendant had invoked his right to an attorney, Deputy Mann questioned him about the assault. Defendant stated that the knife used in the assault was underneath the front seat of the car.

Deputy Mann then advised Detective Hodge that defendant had revealed the location of the weapon used in As a result of [the described traffic] accident, an off-duty Kennewick Reserve Officer stopped to contact the above suspect vehicle. In this contact the ... Officer was in contact with the driver, one Steven K. COATES. As a result of that contact the ... Officer was stabbed twice in the back. Based on a statement given by the suspect, COATES, to Deputy Mann ... the knife used in assault has been placed under the seat of the 1981 blue Thunderbird.

                the assault.   Detective Hodge prepared an affidavit for a search warrant, which read in pertinent part
                

Based on a statement ... by the passenger/witness, one Dana R. SODERQUIST, that after the contact between suspect COATES and the victim ... COATES re-entered the vehicle and ... remained in the vehicle ... until arrested by officers. In a search incident to arrest, suspect COATES was not found in possession of any knives.

Also, said affiant was told by witness, SODERQUIST, that ... he (SODERQUIST) saw suspect (COATES) in possession of a switchblade/spring operated Stelletto [sic ] type knife [that day].

(Italics ours.) Exhibit 2.

The following morning Detective Hodge obtained a search warrant for defendant's impounded vehicle. A knife with bloodstains matching Long's blood type was found in the vehicle.

Defendant was then charged with one count of second degree assault, and the prosecutor sought to enhance defendant's sentence under the new deadly weapon statute, RCW 9.94A.125. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence of the knife on the ground that it had been obtained as fruit of his illegally obtained statement. The trial court denied the motion in part because the court believed probable cause existed. The trial court also held that, in any event, the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule applied, rendering the knife admissible even if it was the product of an illegal search and seizure.

At trial Long testified to the circumstances of the assault. The subject knife was admitted into evidence. Defendant denied all wrongdoing, testifying that he could not remember Upon defense counsel's request, the trial judge instructed the jury on the "intoxication defense" and on the State's burden of proving that defendant's intoxication did not prevent the defendant from forming the particular requisite mental state. Over defense counsel's objection, however, the trial judge instructed the jury that this defense applies only where the mental state is intent, knowledge, or recklessness. The trial judge specifically precluded the jury from considering Coates' intoxication in determining whether he was guilty of the lesser-included offense of third degree (negligent) assault.

                the hit-and-run incident or the assault.   Defendant stressed that he had consumed a great deal of alcohol that evening
                

The jury found defendant not guilty of second degree assault, but guilty of assault in the third degree. Under the new sentencing act, a deadly weapon finding does not enhance a sentence for this latter offense (see RCW 9.94A.310), so the jury was not asked to answer the deadly weapon special verdict form.

Defendant appealed his conviction directly to this court.

VALIDITY OF SEARCH WARRANT

The search warrant for defendant's car was obtained on the basis of an affidavit which set forth information he provided after he invoked his right to remain silent. The State concedes this information was illegally obtained. See Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975). Defendant argues that because the information was illegally obtained, it should be suppressed. The issue presented is whether this court should adopt the "inevitable discovery" rule recently articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984). Defendant believes the search can be upheld only under the inevitable discovery rule, which he contends is inconsistent with this court's interpretation of Const. art. 1, § 7.

Defendant's reasoning is incorrect. The inevitable discovery The alleged illegality in this case occurred when officers questioned defendant after he invoked his right to remain silent. If the warrant had been obtained on that basis alone, it would have been completely defective. However, a search warrant is not rendered totally invalid if the affidavit contains sufficient facts to establish probable cause independent of the illegally obtained information. See United States v. Christine, 687 F.2d 749, 758 (3d Cir.1982) (involving reduction of the overly broad portions of a search warrant); United States v. Fitzgerald, 724 F.2d 633 (8th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 950, 104 S.Ct. 2151, 80 L.Ed.2d 538 (1984).

                rule enunciated in Nix is a means of determining whether illegally seized evidence should be admitted notwithstanding the exclusionary rule.   The first issue in this case, however, is whether defendant's knife was illegally seized.   If we conclude the knife was legally seized, we need not decide the propriety of the inevitable discovery rule
                

In State v. Cockrell, 102 Wash.2d 561, 689 P.2d 32 (1984), this court specifically relied upon Christine to uphold a challenged search warrant. Cockrell, at 570, 689 P.2d 32. In Cockrell, a warrant was issued for the search of the defendants' property, and all persons, vehicles and buildings in the area. The trial court found the warrant affidavit insufficient to establish probable cause to search the defendants' residence, outbuildings, and any persons on the property. Cockrell, at 569, 689 P.2d 32. On appeal, the defendants challenged the sufficiency of probable cause to search the real property itself, arguing that the valid portions of the warrant were not severable from the invalid portions. Cockrell, at 570, 689 P.2d 32. This...