State v. Coblentz

• Decision Date: 12 July 1935
• Docket Number: No. 42.,42.
• Citation: 180 A. 266
• Parties: STATE v. COBLENTZ.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

180 A. 266

STATE

v. COBLENTZ.^*

No. 42.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

July 12, 1935.

BOND, C. J., and JOHNSON, J., dissenting.

Appeal from Criminal Court of Baltimore City; George A. Solter, Judge.

Emory L. Coblentz was indicted as an officer and agent of the Central Trust Company of Maryland for fraudulently signing or assenting to statement or publication containing untruthful representations of its affairs, assets, or liabilities with view to enhance market value of its shares. From judgment for defendant on demurrer to plea of res judicata, the State appeals.

Reversed and remanded.

Argued before BOND, C. J., and OFFUTT, SLOAN, MITCHELL, and JOHNSON, JJ.

Herbert R. O'Conor, Atty. Gen., and Charles T. LeViness, 3d, Asst. Atty. Gen. (James Clark, Asst. Counsel, of Ellicott City, on the brief), for the State.

Leo Weinberg, of Frederick, for appellee.

SLOAN, Judge.

This is the second time this case has been here on demurrer. 167 Md. 523, 175 A. 340. In the former appeal it was held that the indictment was legally sufficient, the judgment on demurrer reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings. A plea of res judicata had been filed by the defendant, but on appeal it was not considered by this court because it was not ruled on by the trial court. Code, art. 5, § 10. When the case went back to the criminal court of Baltimore city, the defendant filed an amended plea of res judicata, to which the state demurred, and from a judgment on demurrer for the defendant the state appeals.

The indictment found by a grand jury of Howard county, and the case removed for trial to Baltimore city, charged the defendant, Emory L. Coblentz, as an officer and agent of the Central Trust Company of Maryland, with the violation of the provisions of section 170 of article 27 of the Code in fraudulently signing or assenting to a statement or publication "containing untruthful representations of its affairs, assets or liabilities with a view to enhance the market value of its shares, for the purpose of accomplishing the fraud set out in the indictment." The publications were two statements purporting to show the bank's condition on December 31, 1930, and June 30, 1931. The bank was closed and placed in the hands of the bank commissioner as receiver on September 2, 1931. It is not necessary to give the details of the indictment, as they are sufficiently set out in the opinion in the last appeal, 167 Md. 523, 175 A. 340.

The plea of res judicata alleges that the defendant, as president of the Central Trust Company, was indicted and tried in Frederick county for accepting a deposit from one John F. Oland, in the sum of $125, on September 2, 1931, at Frederick county, "when said banking institution was known by him, the said Emory L. Coblentz, to be insolvent," in violation of the provisions of section 58, art. 11, of the Code; "that the acceptance of the deposit was an undisputed fact in the case and that the only issues that the court, sitting as a jury, was called upon to try and determine were (1) The insolvency of the Bank, and, (2), the defendant's knowledge of the same"; that the state offered in evidence the statement, condensed from the regular statement to the bank commissioner of December 31, 1930, showing the book value of loans and discounts to be $13,791, 199.41 and stocks and bonds $3,016,241.29; the statement of June 30, 1931, showing the aggregate of these items to be $738,473.97 less; that the state's witnesses showed the value of the loans and discounts to be $6,628,911 and of the stocks and bonds to be $776,330, or 54 per cent. less than the statement of June 30, 1931; that if concentrated its attack on the loans to three subsidiaries, carried on the books at $6,138,420.88, offering evidence of the true value to be $544,162, or a reduction in those items alone of $5,594,258.88; that there was evidence tending to prove that there was no substantial difference in the bank's condition on June 30, 1931, and September 2, 1931; that there was a complete investigation of the. bank's affairs from September 2, 1929, and evidence to show the defendant's knowledge of the depreciation in the value of its assets during that period; "that the defendant offered evidence to refute and contradict the evidence of the State's witnesses and * * * of his good faith as president of the institution and of his honest belief in its solvency and of the value of its assets as reflected on the books and published statements of the bank aforesaid"; that it is charged that the defendant, as president of the Central Trust Company of Maryland, "unlawfully and fraudulently signed or assented to a statement and publication for the public and shareholders of said corporation purporting to show the true financial condition of the Central Trust Company of Maryland," which "contained untruthful representations of its affairs, Assets and Liabilities," in that it "did not have the Resources, Loans and Discounts, Stocks and Bonds, as shown on its statements but that they were materially less than that amount," all for the purpose of inducing and procuring the Washington Trust Company of Howard County to transfer its property and assets to the Central Trust Company. The plea further says: "That the defendant was acquitted of the charge aforesaid, in Frederick County, Maryland, by the verdict of 'Not Guilty' by the Court, sitting as a jury, rendered as aforesaid on June 27, 1933, and in order for the Court to arrive at such a verdict and judgment, which still remains unreversed on the records of the Circuit Court for Frederick County it became necessary for the Court to determine, as the basis for its verdict, either that the bank was not insolvent within the meaning of the law, that is to say that there was not the material depreciation in the value of the assets so as to render the bank insolvent within the meaning of the law, or that the defendant was without knowledge of said material depreciation in the value of the assets.

"That the State of Maryland is therefore estopped to again assert in another tribunal as against this defendant either that (1), there was a material depreciation in the value of the assets aforesaid, or, (2) that the defendant had knowledge of such fact.

"That the Circuit Court for Frederick County, sitting as a jury, did determine and adjudicate that the defendant did not know, as contended by the State, that the values of the loans and discounts, stocks and bonds, as. carried on the books and published statements of the bank were false and erroneous, in that said assets were worth materially less than said values.

"Wherefore the defendant asserts that the State of Maryland is now estopped to again litigate the same questions of fact as against his defendant, which have been conclusively adjudicated by the verdict and judgment of the Circuit Court of Frederick County aforesaid."

The defendant does not contend that a plea of former jeopardy could be interposed in this case, nor could it be, for the statutory offenses for which the defendant was indicted are so dissimilar as not to justify such a plea. What he does contend is that there was an adjudication of the same issues in Frederick county which the state must sustain by evidence established in the former case in order to demand a conviction in the Howard county case. This is the first time such a plea has ever been before this court, though we have had some cases in which the same contention, in effect, has been made under pleas of former jeopardy. Watson v. State, 105 Md. 650, 66 A. 635; Novak v. State, 139 Md. 538, 115 A. 853; Gilpin v. State, 142 Md. 464, 121 A. 354.

In Freeman on Judgments, § 648 (5th Ed.), the rule invoked by the defendant is: "There is no reason why a final judgment in a criminal case or proceeding should not, under proper circumstances, be given conclusive effect as an estoppel or bar. The same policy which dictates the rule in civil cases requires it in criminal cases. The principles applicable in judgments in criminal cases are, in general, identical so far as the question of estoppel is involved, with the principles recognized in civil cases." The author, however, recognizes its limitations, when he says: "But under such circumstances, the previous judgment is conclusive only as to those matters which were in fact in issue and actually or necessarily adjudicated." "If there is a contest between the State and a defendant over an issue I know of no reason why it is not res judicata in another criminal case," Van Fleet, Former Adjudication, though the same author says (section 594): "There is little similarity between the rules which govern the doctrine of res judicata in civil and criminal cases." In criminal cases the difference between a plea of former jeopardy and res judicata are so slight as to be hardly distinguishable, and in many criminal cases where the plea of former jeopardy was made the courts in discussing the question applied the principles of res judicata. That was the case in United States v. Adams, 281 U. S. 202, SO S. Ct. 269, 74 L. Ed. 807, in which the opinion was written by Mr. Justice Holmes. There were two indictments, one of which charged the defendant with a false entry on the books of a bank. He had been acquitted and was again indicted for another entry of the same amount, which was found to be the same item, and the plea of former acquittal was sustained. The second indictment, on the appeal was for the making of a false statement in a report of the bank's condition, and in that case the judgment of the district court sustaining the plea of former acquittal was reversed; the court saying: "It is obvious that technically the plea was bad because the offense alleged was a different offense," and then the opinion goes on to show that the acquittal on the first indictment would not be available as a defense if the evidence on the second indictment varied from the first in one essential particular. "18...