State v. Coccomo, No. 28819.
| Court | Appellate Court of Connecticut |
| Writing for the Court | Bishop |
| Citation | 972 A.2d 757,115 Conn.App. 384 |
| Parties | STATE of Connecticut v. Tricia Lynne COCCOMO. |
| Decision Date | 30 June 2009 |
| Docket Number | No. 28819. |
v.
Tricia Lynne COCCOMO.
[972 A.2d 760]
Robert S. Bello, with whom, on the brief, were Patrick D. McCabe, Lawrence M. Lapine and Thomas M. Cassone, Stamford, for the appellant (defendant).
Robin S. Schwartz, assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were David I. Cohen, state's attorney, Joseph C. Valdes, assistant state's attorney, and Dina Urso, deputy assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).
BISHOP, GRUENDEL and BERDON, Js.
BISHOP, J.
The defendant, Tricia Lynne Coccomo, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after
a jury trial, of three counts of manslaughter in the second degree with a motor vehicle in violation of General Statutes § 53a-56b (a), three counts of misconduct with a motor vehicle in violation of General Statutes § 53a-57 and one count of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs in violation of General Statutes § 14-227a (a)(2). On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) the trial court improperly admitted evidence of her blood alcohol content, (2) there was insufficient evidence to sustain her conviction and (3) the court improperly admitted consciousness of guilt evidence. We agree with the defendant's third claim and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the trial court.
The following evidence was adduced at trial and is relevant to the resolution of the defendant's claims on appeal. At approximately 7 p.m. on July 26, 2005, the defendant attended a work-related dinner at a colleague's home where jambalaya and sangria were served. The hostess explained that she served two pitchers of sangria to her eight guests, each pitcher containing no more than a magnum of wine. One pitcher had white wine, the other red. Both were mixed with fruit,
honey and sparkling water. There was no other alcohol served at the party. At the end of the dinner party, the pitcher of red sangria appeared untouched and the pitcher of white sangria was three-quarters consumed. The defendant testified that she drank between one and two glasses of sangria during dinner. The other guests testified that they, too, consumed some of the sangria. There was no evidence that the defendant consumed any other alcohol before or after dinner. All of the people at the dinner testified that the defendant did not display any signs of intoxication and that she seemed normal throughout the dinner party.
Sometime between 9 p.m. and 9:30 p.m., the defendant left the dinner to go home. At approximately 9:28
p.m., the defendant, who was driving northbound at approximately forty-five miles per hour, the posted speed limit, around a curve on Long Ridge Road in Stamford, collided with another vehicle traveling southbound at approximately the same speed. The defendant's vehicle was three feet over the center line of the roadway at the time of the collision. The three occupants of the other vehicle died from the injuries that they sustained as a result of the collision. The defendant sustained a broken ankle and minor lacerations.
Officer Frank Laccona of the Stamford police department was one of the first police officers on the scene. He helped the defendant out of her vehicle. Shortly thereafter, technicians from Stamford Emergency Medical Services, Inc. (emergency medical services), arrived. Robert Voss of the emergency medical services testified that the defendant was stable and ambulatory and that she was alert and oriented. Jennifer Mardi, also of the emergency medical services, testified that the defendant had the odor of alcohol on her breath. She asked the defendant if she was okay and if she had been drinking. In response, the defendant stated that she had had a few drinks. After checking the defendant's vital signs, Mardi transferred her care to paramedic Kirsten Engstrand who, along with fellow emergency medical technician, Yannick Passemart, accompanied the defendant to Stamford Hospital. Engstrand testified that although she did not write it in her report, the defendant did have the odor of alcohol on her breath. Engstrand stated that the defendant was conscious, alert, oriented and ambulatory. Passemart also testified that he detected a slight odor of alcohol on the defendant. Both Engstrand and Passemart indicated that the defendant's speech was slightly slurred, but Engstrand acknowledged that such slurring was consistent with having
just been in a serious accident and with having been upset and crying.
The defendant's blood was drawn in the ambulance on the way to the hospital. Although the emergency medical technicians' report indicates that the defendant's blood was drawn by Passemart, who was not legally qualified to do so, the testimony at trial was that her blood was drawn by Engstrand. Engstrand indicated that she had a distinct recollection of her treatment of the defendant due to the serious nature of the collision. Engstrand testified that she used five tubes to collect the defendant's blood, one 10 milliliter tube with a pink top, and four 5 milliliter tubes: one with a blue top, one green, one lavender and one yellow. Engstrand testified that she never used tubes of any other description and that she did not have access to any other tubes. After she filled the tubes, she placed them in a biohazard bag, rolled the bag up and taped it to the defendant's intravenous bag. Engstrand did not label the tubes as containing the defendant's blood, as it was not procedure to do so, nor did she label the biohazard bag.
The ambulance arrived at Stamford Hospital between 10:10 and 10:18 p.m. Engstrand indicated that upon arrival at the hospital, she placed the intravenous bag and the biohazard bag containing the tubes of the defendant's blood on or between the defendant's legs. The defendant was met at the hospital by Officer Robert Bulman of the Stamford police department who asked her a series of questions. Bulman indicated that he had no problem understanding the defendant's responses and that her speech was not slurred. Bulman testified that in his experience, intoxicated individuals are unable to answer the questions he posed to the defendant. Bulman did, however, note an odor of alcohol on the defendant's breath.
Emergency room nurse Toren Utke assumed the defendant's care from Engstrand. Utke testified that the
defendant appeared alert and oriented, and was not confused or slurring her words and that he never smelled the odor of alcohol on her breath. He indicated that the defendant attained a perfect score on the Glasgow coma scale.1 Utke testified that Engstrand identified a biohazard bag of blood as the defendant's and that he left the blood with the defendant while he printed labels for the tubes. Utke indicated that he individually labeled the tubes of blood, placed them back in the biohazard bag and sent them to the laboratory.
Utke and other emergency room staff testified that the emergency room was very hectic and "crazy" that night due to the trauma patients from the defendant's collision. The hospital records indicate that the blood sample attributed to the defendant was one of three blood samples collected in the emergency room at precisely 10:30 p.m.2 The laboratory staff printed and affixed new labels to each tube, placing the new label over the old one. The laboratory director, William Wilson, explained that this procedure of labeling and then relabeling the tubes was later changed in October, 2005, due, in part, to the risk of error inherent in relabeling. Under the new system, the laboratory does not relabel the tubes. Rather, the tubes retain their original labels for their life use.
Wilson also produced documents that he referred to as an "audit trail," consisting of a series of screenshots from the laboratory's computers revealing certain information about the blood tubes tested by the laboratory. The documents indicate that the laboratory labeled and
tested blood that was collected from the defendant at 10:30 p.m. in the emergency room and deposited in a 10 milliliter "red-gray top" tube. Despite the contents of the "audit trail" documents, the evidence at trial revealed, unequivocally, that the defendant's blood was drawn in the ambulance, and not at the hospital, and that she arrived at the hospital at 10:15 p.m. The evidence is also clear that when the blood was taken from the defendant in the ambulance, none of it was deposited into a tube with a "red-gray top." The blood in the red-gray tube, which was attributed to the defendant, reportedly contained a blood alcohol content of 0.241. Those results were admitted into evidence over the defendant's objection.
Both toxicologists, Robert Powers for the state and Richard Stripp for the defendant, testified as to the probable effect a
0.241 blood alcohol content would have on an individual. Both toxicologists testified that a reading of 0.241 at 9:52 p.m. would equate to a reading of roughly 0.25 at 9:28 p.m., the time of the accident, assuming no further alcohol was ingested. Powers opined that to produce such a reading, the defendant would have had to have consumed ten or eleven servings of alcohol in one hour, and Stripp indicated that the defendant would have had to have consumed three-quarters of a pitcher of sangria to reach that level. Powers stated that such a high level of intoxication would result in cognitive impairment noticeable to others. Powers expressed that if his blood alcohol content were that high, he probably would not "be sitting up." Stripp opined that a blood alcohol content of 0.241 or 0.25 would render an average person overtly intoxicated, staggering, demonstrating motor impairment, cognitive dysfunction and slurring words, and that a...
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State v. Coccomo, No. 18443.
...court improperly had admitted the evidence relating to the property transfer as proof of consciousness of guilt. State v. Coccomo, 115 Conn.App. 384, 402, 972 A.2d 757 (2009). We then granted the state's petition for certification to appeal, limited to the following issue: “Did the Appellat......
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State v. Legrand, AC 30577
...See State v. Belanger, 148 Conn. 57, 167 A.2d 245 (1961); State v. Kamel, 115 Conn. App. 338, 972 A.2d 780 (2009); State v. Coccomo, 115 Conn. App. 384, 972 A.2d 757, cert. granted on other grounds, 293 Conn. 909, 978 A.2d 1111 (2009); State v. Liebowitz, 7 Conn. App. 403, 509 A.2d 43 (1986......
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State v. Legrand, No. 30577.
...See State v. Belanger, 148 Conn. 57, 167 A.2d 245 (1961); State v. Kamel, 115 Conn.App. 338, 972 A.2d 780 (2009); State v. Coccomo, 115 Conn.App. 384, 972 A.2d 757, cert. granted on other grounds, 293 Conn. 909, 978 A.2d 1111 (2009); State v. Liebowitz, 7 Conn.App. 403, 509 A.2d 43 (1986); ......
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State v. Coccomo—Dissent, SC18443
...2005, the defendant attended a work-related dinner at a colleague's home where jambalaya and sangria were served.'' State v. Coccomo, 115 Conn. App. 384, 386, 972 A.2d 757 (2009). All of the attendees at the party, including the hostess, were colleagues of the defendant. ''The hostess expla......
-
State v. Coccomo, No. 18443.
...court improperly had admitted the evidence relating to the property transfer as proof of consciousness of guilt. State v. Coccomo, 115 Conn.App. 384, 402, 972 A.2d 757 (2009). We then granted the state's petition for certification to appeal, limited to the following issue: “Did the Appellat......
-
State v. Legrand, AC 30577
...See State v. Belanger, 148 Conn. 57, 167 A.2d 245 (1961); State v. Kamel, 115 Conn. App. 338, 972 A.2d 780 (2009); State v. Coccomo, 115 Conn. App. 384, 972 A.2d 757, cert. granted on other grounds, 293 Conn. 909, 978 A.2d 1111 (2009); State v. Liebowitz, 7 Conn. App. 403, 509 A.2d 43 (1986......
-
State v. Legrand, No. 30577.
...See State v. Belanger, 148 Conn. 57, 167 A.2d 245 (1961); State v. Kamel, 115 Conn.App. 338, 972 A.2d 780 (2009); State v. Coccomo, 115 Conn.App. 384, 972 A.2d 757, cert. granted on other grounds, 293 Conn. 909, 978 A.2d 1111 (2009); State v. Liebowitz, 7 Conn.App. 403, 509 A.2d 43 (1986); ......
-
State v. Coccomo—Dissent, SC18443
...2005, the defendant attended a work-related dinner at a colleague's home where jambalaya and sangria were served.'' State v. Coccomo, 115 Conn. App. 384, 386, 972 A.2d 757 (2009). All of the attendees at the party, including the hostess, were colleagues of the defendant. ''The hostess expla......