State v. Coday
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
| Writing for the Court | James Edward Welsh, Presiding Judge |
| Citation | State v. Coday, 496 S.W.3d 572 (Mo. App. 2016) |
| Decision Date | 19 April 2016 |
| Docket Number | WD 77619 |
| Parties | State of Missouri, Respondent, v. Keith A. Coday, Appellant. |
Laura Martin, Kansas City, MO, Counsel for Appellant.
Richard Starnes, Jefferson, City, MO, Counsel for Respondent.
Before Division Three: James Edward Welsh, P.J., Alok Ahuja, C.J., and Thomas H. Newton, J.
Keith A. Coday appeals the circuit court's judgment sentencing him as a persistent offender after the court found him guilty of driving while intoxicated following a bench trial. In his sole point on appeal, Coday contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the circuit court's finding that he was a persistent DWI offender. We reverse the circuit court's judgment finding Coday to be a persistent offender and remand for resentencing.
The State charged Coday with driving while intoxicated as a persistent offender. Coday does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for driving while intoxicated. The evidence established that, on November 11, 2012, Coday operated a car while in an intoxicated condition.
Before evidence was presented in the bench-tried case, the circuit court held a hearing on Coday's "Motion to Exclude Prior Kansas Convictions as Evidence of Defendant's Status as a 'Persistent Offender' under Section 577.023, RSMo." Coday asserted that his two prior Wyandotte County, Kansas convictions did not qualify as intoxication-related traffic offenses for the purposes of determining that that he was a persistent offender under section 577.023, RSMoCum. Supp. 2013. The circuit court denied Coday's motion, and, over Coday's objection, allowed the State to enter into evidence certified records concerning Coday's two prior convictions for "driving under influence of alcohol and/or drugs" from Wyandotte County, Kansas. The records were "traffic appearance dockets" from a "Crystal Report" that noted that Coday had pled guilty to "driving under influence of alcohol and/or drugs" on February 15, 1991, and November 1, 1991, in violation of Kan. Stat. Ann. § 8–1567. Based on these records, the circuit court found beyond a reasonable doubt that Coday was a persistent offender.
Having found him guilty of driving while intoxicated as a persistent offender, the circuit court sentenced Coday to four years' imprisonment but suspended execution of the sentence and placed Coday on five years' probation with special conditions that included 30 days of shock incarceration in the county jail. Coday appeals.
In his only issue on appeal, Coday contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the circuit court's finding that he was a persistent DWI offender. In particular, he claims that the State failed to produce sufficient evidence to allow the circuit court to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the acts underlying Coday's two Kansas convictions were acts specifically prohibited under Missouri's driving while intoxicated statute, section 577.010, RSMoCum. Supp. 2013. We agree.
We review the sufficiency of the evidence in a court-tried criminal case under the same standard used in a jury-tried case. State v. Miller, 153 S.W.3d 333, 336 (Mo.App.2005). The State has the burden to prove prior intoxication-related traffic offenses beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Craig, 287 S.W.3d 676, 681 (Mo. banc 2009). "Under section 577.023, the State need only present sufficient facts to support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant either pled guilty or was found guilty of two prior [intoxication related traffic] offenses." State v. Russell, 336 S.W.3d 504, 507 (Mo.App.2011). In making that determination, we accept as true all evidence to prove the prior offenses together with all reasonable inferences that support the circuit court's finding. Craig, 287 S.W.3d at 681.
A persistent DWI offender, is "[a] person who has pleaded guilty to or has been found guilty of two or more intoxication-related traffic offenses [.]" § 577.023.1(5)(a). "An 'intoxication-related traffic offense' includes 'driving while intoxicated with excessive blood alcohol content, ...' or driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs in violation of state law or a county or municipal ordinance[.]" § 577.023.1(4). Further, section 577.023.16 provides in part:
A plea of guilty or a finding of guilt followed by incarceration, a fine, a suspended imposition of sentence, suspended execution of sentence, probation or parole or any combination thereof in any intoxication-related traffic offense in a state, county or municipal court or any combination thereof shall be treated as a prior plea of guilty or finding of guilt for purposes of this section.
In this case, Coday had two Wyandotte County, Kansas convictions for "driving under influence of alcohol and/or drugs" in violation of Kan. Stat. Ann. § 8–1567. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 8–1567, titled "Driving under influence of alcohol or drugs; blood alcohol concentration; penalties," provides:
To prove Coday's two convictions, the State entered into evidence certified records from the District Court in Wyandotte County, Kansas. The records consisted of "Traffic Appearance Dockets" from "Crystal Report." The dockets noted:
and/or Drugs (Misdemeanor)
01/24/1992
Defendant Pleads Guilty Sentenced to 365 Days
Fined $1000.00 Judge Harris
08/20/1991
08-0262 Driving While Suspended (Misdemeanor)
01/24/1992
Dismissed by Court Judge Harris
08/20/1991
08-1336 Speed in Excess of Posted Maximum
77/55 (Infraction)
01/24/1992
Dismissed by Judge Harris
08/23/1991
Continued by Defendant Court Date Set for
10/04/1991 Judge Burdette
10/04/1991
Continued by Defendant Court Date Set for
11/01/1991
DEFT Pleads Guilty to CNT 1, DUI, and CNTS 2
and 3 Are Dismissed2
[Editor's Note: The preceding image contains the reference for footnote2 ]The evidence introduced by the State, therefore, established that Coday pled guilty to two offenses of "driving while under influence of alcohol and/or drugs" in violation of Kan. Stat. Ann. § 8–1567, which punishes persons operating or attempting to operate a vehicle while intoxicated.
In Missouri, convictions for "attempting to operate" a vehicle while intoxicated do not constitute intoxication-related traffic offenses for the purposes of section 577.023. See State v. Gibson, 122 S.W.3d 121, 130 (Mo.App.2003)(a conviction for being in actual physical control of a vehicle while intoxicated was not an intoxication-related traffic offense for the purposes of section 577.023). Under Missouri law, to be guilty of driving while intoxicated, the person must operate the motor vehicle while in an intoxicated or drugged condition, not merely attempt to operate the vehicle. § 577.010. Thus, the fact that the State's exhibits showed that Coday pled guilty to two offenses of "driving while under influence of alcohol and/or drugs" in violation of Kan. Stat. Ann. § 8–1567did not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Coday did in fact operate a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol and drugs. In such circumstances, when a foreign conviction encompasses acts outside of those prohibited by Missouri statutes, the test is whether the acts committed during the commission of the foreign crime would qualify as an intoxication-related traffic offense under section 577.023. State v. Hill, 839 S.W.2d 605, 608 (Mo.App.1992).
Indeed, in the Hill case, this court found that the circuit court erred in sentencing a defendant as a persistent sexual offender because the record only showed that the defendant pled guilty to the felony offense of assault with intent to commit rape but there was nothing in the record from which the circuit court could have determined that the acts committed by the defendant during the course of the offense were sufficient to have constituted a crime that would trigger a finding that he was a persistent sexual offender. Id. at 608; see also State v. Kelly, 728 S.W.2d 642, 648 (Mo.App.1987) . Thus, in determining whether a defendant is a persistent offender, we must determine whether the acts constituting the foreign conviction constitute the commission of crime...
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State v. Ellmaker
...reasonable doubt that the defendant either pled guilty or was found guilty of the requisite number of prior IRTOs. State v. Coday , 496 S.W.3d 572, 574 (Mo. App. W.D. 2016). In making this determination, "we accept as true all evidence to prove the prior offenses together with all reasonabl......
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State v. Rigsby
...to prove the prior offenses together with all reasonable inferences that support the circuit court’s finding. State v. Coday , 496 S.W.3d 572, 574 (Mo. App. W.D. 2016) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).Analysis Rigsby argues that the circuit court erred in convicting him of d......
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State v. Shepherd
...commission of [a listed] crime under Missouri law'") (bracketed alterations in original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting State v. Coday, 496 S.W.3d 572, 576 (Mo. App. W.D. 2016)). As of the time the events giving rise to Defendant's Missouri DWI charge in this case occurred in March 2017, Misso......
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Sayre v. State
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