State v. Coffee

Decision Date09 December 1992
Citation843 P.2d 505,117 Or.App. 9
PartiesSTATE of Oregon, Respondent, v. David Roland COFFEE, Appellant. DA 421107; CA A70131.
CourtOregon Court of Appeals

Sally L. Avera, Public Defender, Salem, argued the cause and filed the brief for appellant.

Mary H. Williams, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salem, argued the cause for respondent. With her on the brief were Charles S. Crookham, Atty. Gen., and Virginia L. Linder, Sol. Gen., Salem.

Before JOSEPH, C.J., and ROSSMAN and DE MUNIZ, JJ.

JOSEPH, Chief Judge.

Defendant appeals his conviction for criminal trespass in the second degree. ORS 164.245. He assigns error to the trial court's denial of his motion for a judgment of acquittal. We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the state to determine whether the evidence is sufficient to permit a jury to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, State v. King, 307 Or. 332, 339, 768 P.2d 391 (1989), and reverse.

On May 16, 1990, Lloyd Center Security Director Dodge received a complaint that someone was picketing and causing a disturbance in the shopping mall. When he arrived in the walkway area between a bank and a store, he saw defendant carrying a sign, speaking in a loud voice and disrupting the normal flow of pedestrian traffic. Dodge asked him to leave. Defendant walked down the sidewalk, turned the corner and entered a different bank through a street door. Dodge and another security person followed him. When defendant saw them, he began yelling, "Uniformed bastards." When Dodge told him that he would have to leave, defendant moved to a closed teller area in the bank and yelled that the "uniformed bastards" had to get away from him. Dodge and other security officers placed him in custody and took him to the Lloyd Center Security Office to await the Portland police. Officer Moreschi advised defendant of his Miranda rights and then discussed the situation with him. Defendant admitted that, several years earlier, he had been told not to come back to Lloyd Center, but said that he thought he could return because of a recent court decision in another case.

The complaint charges criminal trespass in the second degree on the ground that defendant "unlawfully and knowingly enter[ed] upon the premises located at 2201 N.E. Lloyd Center, Portland, Oregon." He argues that there is no evidence in the record that he entered that location and no evidence that Dodge had any authority to act on the property that he entered. The state argues that a reasonable factfinder could infer that the walkway and the bank that defendant entered were within the shopping mall and that Dodge therefore had the authority to direct defendant to leave.

ORS 164.245(1) provides:

"A person commits the crime of criminal trespass in the second degree if the person enters or remains unlawfully in or upon premises."

"Enter or remain unlawfully" means:

"(a) To enter or remain in or upon premises when the premises, at the time of such entry or remaining, are not open to the public or when the entrant is not otherwise licensed or privileged to do so; or

"(b) To fail to leave premises that are open to the public after being lawfully directed to do so by the person in charge." ORS 164.205(3).

The record contains evidence sufficient to show that defendant was not licensed or privileged to enter Lloyd Center. However, there is no evidence that defendant entered or remained in Lloyd Center. The state's evidence is that...

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3 cases
  • State v. Cervantes
    • United States
    • Oregon Court of Appeals
    • May 26, 1993
    ...569, 578, 201 P. 184 (1921). However, jurors may not use their personal knowledge as a substitute for evidence. State v. Coffee, 117 Or.App. 9, 12 n. 1, 843 P.2d 505 (1992). The state may not establish venue on the basis of "common knowledge" that a city is located in a particular county. S......
  • State v. Clelland
    • United States
    • Oregon Court of Appeals
    • July 11, 2007
    ...of fact may not use his or her personal knowledge of facts as a substitute for evidence not put on by the state. State v. Coffee, 117 Or.App. 9, 12 n. 1, 843 P.2d 505 (1992). However, a fact in issue may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence, and triers of fact are entitled to draw......
  • State v. Davison
    • United States
    • Oregon Court of Appeals
    • July 16, 2003
    ...entered, let alone remained in, apartment A10 and, thus, the state did not prove an essential element of its case. See State v. Coffee, 117 Or.App. 9, 843 P.2d 505 (1992). At oral argument the state conceded error, and we find that concession to be well Conviction for second-degree criminal......

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