State v. Coffee

• Decision Date: 07 July 1888
• Citation: 16 A. 151,56 Conn. 399
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE v. COFFEE.

16 A. 151

56 Conn. 399

STATE

v. COFFEE.¹

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

July 7, 1888.

Appeal from superior court, New Haven county.

Indictment of Peter Coffee for the murder of William I. Way. The theory of the defense was that Way's death was accidental. The evidence connecting the prisoner with the killing was entirely circumstantial. The watch referred to in the opinion was Coffee's watch, which Mason, the conductor, testified he had taken from Coffee on the night of the homicide as security for his fare. The jury found the defendant guilty of murder in the second degree, and he appeals.

L. N. Blyndenburgh and S. C. Loomis, for appellant. T. E. Doolittle and E. H. Rogers, for the State.

CARPENTER, J. On the trial of this case the state offered three members of the grand jury that indicted the prisoner to testify to declarations made by him in their hearing in the grand jury room. To the admission of this evidence counsel for the prisoner objected, but the court admitted it. This is assigned as one of the reasons of appeal. The objection is, in effect, that everything which transpired in the jury room is privileged, and cannot be divulged. This claim is founded partly on the grand juror's oath, one clause of which is, "The secrets of the cause, your own and your fellows', you will duly observe and keep." Proceedings before and by the grand jury may be classified as follows: The taking of testimony, the deliberations, and the voting. In respect to the deliberations, we know of no reason why the obligation of secrecy should not be perpetual. It is due to the jurors themselves that their views and opinions should never be called in question or made public. In no other way can complete independence and freedom of action be secured. We are aware of no case in which it has been deemed necessary to require any juror to disclose his own or his fellows' action in this regard. The voting should be regarded as equally sacred, with one possible exception: If a mistake occurs, and a bill is returned as a true bill, when the requisite number did not so vote, on a motion to quash the indictment, perhaps in the interest of justice that fact might be shown. To that effect we believe there are some decisions. Some of the reasons given for keeping the testimony secret are temporary in their nature, and some do not exist, under our practice, where the prisoner is before the grand jury; nevertheless the oath and the policy of the law have ever regarded the testimony as among the secrets of the grand jury room. Not, however, inflexibly so. In State v. Fasset, 16 Conn. 457, the court notices two exceptions,—in prosecutions for perjury, and in case witnesses testify differently on the trial. Perhaps it would be proper to say that the oath has this implied qualification: that the testimony is to be kept secret unless a disclosure is required in some legal proceeding. It does not seem that the policy of the law should require it to be kept secret at the expense of justice, and so the weight of authority outside of this state seems to be that, where public justice or the rights of parties require it, the testimony before the grand jury may be shown. "When the purposes of the secrecy are accomplished, it is the better opinion, contrary, perhaps, to some cases, but maintained in most, that any revelations of the grand jury's doings may be made which justice demands." 1 Bish. Crim. Proc. (3d Ed.) § 857. "The answers and other testimony which are voluntarily given by a witness in any cause or proceeding, civil or criminal,—as before a commissioner in bankruptcy, a committee of the legislature, a committing magistrate, a grand jury, a coroner, a fire inquest, or any court in an ordinary lawsuit,—are, as admissions or confessions, competent evidence against him on any issue in a criminal cause to which they are pertinent." Id. § 1255. In State v. Wood, 53 N. H. 484, SARGENT, C. J., states the weight of authority now to be "that a grand juror may be compelled to testify, when necessary to promote the cause of justice, what the witnesses before the grand jury testify to, either to contradict such witnesses or otherwise." In State v. Benner, 64 Me 267, the court says: "But the oath of the grand juror does not prohibit his testifying what was sworn before the grand jury, when the evidence is required for the purposes of public justice or the establishment of private rights. * * * So in all cases when necessary for the protection of the rights of parties, whether civil or criminal, grand jurors may be witnesses. Such seems the result of the most carefully considered decisions in this country." In Burdict v. Hunt, 43 Ind. 381, it is said that "the oath of grand jurors does not prevent the public, or an individual, from proving by one of the jurors, in a court of justice, what passed before the grand jury." In Jones v. Turpin, 6 Heisk. 181, it is said that "when these ends have been accomplished the entire purpose of secrecy is effected, and if, at a subsequent period, it shall become necessary to the attainment of justice and the vindication of truth and right in a judicial tribunal that the conduct and testimony of prosecutors and witnesses shall be inquired into, there is no reason why it should not be done." In Gordon v. Com., 92 Pa. St. 216, it is said that "on no sound principle can it be said that a witness who has testified before a grand jury shall be permitted to claim that his evidence was a privileged communication, so that it shall not be shown, under the direction of the court, whenever it becomes material in the administration of justice. It is material when the evidence is necessary to protect public or private rights."

We make these quotations, not for the purpose of showing what the law is in this state, but for the purpose of showing the principles which prevail in other jurisdictions. The case of State v. Fasset, supra, may be regarded as somewhat inconsistent with the broad principles elsewhere enunciated. It is doubtful whether the court intended to go further than the two exceptions there noticed. If now, or if at any time hereafter, the court should adopt the same principles, it would open up a new and interesting field of inquiry,— whether in all cases, without reference to the parties, the amount involved, or the character of the case, the court will require the secrets of the jury room to be divulged. And, if not, where will the line be drawn? Obviously questions may arise of some nicety, and not a little difficulty. It would seem as though the sentiment of the state has hitherto limited the exceptions to prosecutions for perjury, and to contradicting witnesses. Whether it is wise to go further we will not now undertake to say. It is not probable that many, if any, cases not embraced in one of the two classes named will ever arise. Those two classes will be likely to embrace every possible case in which public interests are involved; and it is difficult to conceive how the rights of parties in civil actions can be made to depend upon the regular and ordinary proceedings of a grand jury. When such a case does arise, then will be the proper time to consider the question to which we have alluded.

The question now before us is of a different character. It is whether the declarations of the prisoner, made to two or three individuals, not as jurors, and forming no part of their proceedings, must be excluded merely because they were made in the grand jury room, and the witnesses who heard them were jurors. No case cited has gone quite so far as this. The declarations sworn to by the witnesses were in no proper sense a part of the secrets of the cause. They relate to the prisoner, it is true, and tend to connect him with the crime, but they were in nowise connected with the investigation. They were not and could not have been properly elicited by the grand jury. They had no right to allow the prisoner to testify, or even to make a statement. His statements were wholly voluntary, and they appear to have been made when the proceedings were at a standstill,—probably while waiting for a witness to come in. Suppose that, under such circumstances, he had chosen to make an unqualified confession that he was the murderer. Can it be seriously claimed that evidence of such a confession would have been inadmissible? It was no part of the duty of the grand jury to procure such a confession. In listening to it they stood upon the same footing with any other person who might have happened to hear it, and may with the same propriety testify to it. The statements made in this case do not differ in principle from full confessions. We think there was no error in admitting this evidence.

On the trial the prosecution offered to give in evidence the testimony of the prisoner before the coroner. He was summoned there as a witness. The finding is that "Coffee made certain voluntary statements under oath, in answer to questions put by the coroner, after the latter had cautioned Coffee that he need not say anything unless he chose; that he could not compel him to make any statement, but that if he desired he might...