State v. Coffman

• Court: Iowa Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: SHERWIN, J.
• Citation: State v. Coffman, 112 Iowa 8, 83 N.W. 721 (Iowa 1900)
• Decision Date: 04 October 1900
• Parties: THE STATE OF IOWA v. EARL COFFMAN, Appellant

83 N.W. 721

112 Iowa 8

THE STATE OF IOWA v. EARL COFFMAN, Appellant

Supreme Court of Iowa, Des Moines

October 4, 1900

Appeal from Keokuk District Court.--HON. JOHN T. SCOTT, Judge.

THE defendant was convicted of the crime of seduction, and appeals.

Reversed.

C. H Mackey and D. W. Hamilton for appellant.

Milton Remley, Attorney General, and Chas. A. Van Vleck, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.

SHERWIN J. GRANGER, C. J. not sitting.

OPINION

SHERWIN, J.

The seventh paragraph of the court's charge to the jury is as follows: "(7) Even though the defendant had sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix, as by her claimed, and she was at the time of previously chaste character, yet, unless she yielded her person to the defendant by reason of some art, promise, or deception practiced upon her by him, there can be no conviction; but the kind and character of these however, are not so important as the effect they may and did have upon her mind, if any; nor is it important as to the manner in which her ruin was accomplished. If the arts promises, or deceptions testified to by the prosecuting witness were, in fact, practiced upon her and these, under all the circumstances, considering her age, habits of life, experience in the ways of the world, and all the surroundings, were such as were reasonably calculated to deceive her, and, in fact, did deceive her, and she, believing them, was induced to, and did, surrender herself to the defendant, and sexual intercourse resulted therefrom and by reason thereof, then the evidence is sufficient upon this point." It is claimed by the defendant that the necessary element of "deception" is omitted from this instruction. Taken as a whole, the legal mind would probably understand from it that the promises therein referred to must have been false, and consequently deceptive, and that the court only intended to instruct the jury that the exact nature of the arts, promises, and deceptions were not as important as the fact that the seduction was accomplished by the use of artifice, false promise, and deception. To the average juror, however, the instruction may not have conveyed or left the same impression. It directed the jurors that the "kind and character" of the arts, promises, and deception were of secondary importance, and that the manner in which the ruin of the prosecutrix was accomplished was of no importance. Neither of these propositions...