State v. Coker, 85-1547

• Decision Date: 23 September 1987
• Docket Number: No. 85-1547,85-1547
• Citation: State v. Coker, 412 N.W.2d 589 (Iowa 1987)
• Parties: STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Joseph Everett COKER, Appellant.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 589

412 N.W.2d 589

STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v.Joseph Everett COKER, Appellant.

No. 85-1547.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Sept. 23, 1987.

Charles L. Harrington, Appellate Defender, and John P. Messina, Asst. Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Atty. Gen., David L. Dorff, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver D. Dillard, Co. Atty., and Harold Deaton, Asst. Co. Atty., for appellee.

Considered en banc.

REYNOLDSON, Chief Justice.

DefendantJoseph Everett Coker appeals from a judgment entered upon jury verdicts finding him guilty of first-degree robbery and unauthorized possession of an offensive weapon.SeeIowa Code §§ 711.2,724.3 (1985).The court of appeals, dividing equally, affirmed Coker's convictions by operation of law.SeeIowa Code § 602.5106(1)(1985).We vacate the court of appeals decision, reverse trial court's judgment, and remand to the district court for new trial.

The underlying facts are undisputed.February 26, 1985, Coker, armed with a sawed-off shotgun, robbed a neighborhood grocery store in Cedar Rapids.He was quickly apprehended and identified as the robber.

February 27, 1985, the State charged Coker with first-degree robbery and unauthorized possession of an offensive weapon.SeeIowa Code §§ 711.2,724.3 (1985).Arraignment was completed March 12, 1985.August 5, 1985, Coker, having acquired new counsel, filed notice of his intent to raise an intoxication defense at trial.¹SeeIowa R.Crim.P. 10(11)(c).At the same time, Coker, who was indigent, filed application with trial court for appointment of an expert witness to assist him in the preparation of his defense.²SeeIowa R.Crim.P. 19(4);Iowa Code §§ 815.4, .5 (1985).

One month later, Coker's motion came on for hearing.Counsel for Coker professionally stated:

[I]f the Court deems it necessary to provide substantial evidence that Mr. Coker did have a serious substance abuse problem, the most telling evidence of that, I suppose, is that shortly after his arrest and [while] being held in the Linn County[jail]he went through grand mal seizures and had to be hospitalized; and this was associated with withdrawal from the abuse of substances.

September 4, 1985, trial court, the Honorable Larry J. Conmey, judge, denied Coker's motion, concluding Coker had "failed to show how the appointment of an expert witness would in this case assist [him] in his defense of intoxication."

September 6, 1985, Coker moved for a continuance so that funds then raised by his family could be used to retain an expert witness who could evaluate him and testify at trial.In his motion Coker indicated his willingness to waive his right to a speedy trial.On the same day trial court, through Judge Conmey, found Coker had failed to show good cause why trial should be continued and denied Coker's motion.

Trial commenced three days later.Through family, friends, and his own testimony, Coker presented a substantial intoxication defense that detailed his long history of alcohol abuse.This included substantial evidence of his severe alcoholism in the days and weeks immediately preceding the robbery.

As part of this defense, Coker presented the testimony of Dr. R. Paul Penningroth.Dr. Penningroth, a specialist in psychiatry with extensive experience in the area of substance abuse, treated Coker during his hospital stay following his arrest.

In his testimony, Dr. Penningroth detailed Coker's serious withdrawal symptoms indicative of both alcoholic withdrawal syndrome and the more serious alcoholic withdrawal delirium.Based upon Coker's laboratory reports, Dr. Penningroth also opined Coker was extremely intoxicated, even stuporous, at the time of the robbery.

When asked whether he had an opinion concerning Coker's ability to form the specific intent to commit a robbery, Dr. Penningroth stated he had none, although psychiatrists were able to render such opinions.Penningroth testified that to express such an opinion he would require further examination of Coker, including a complete medical and psychiatric history, as well as interviews with friends and family.

Trial court, with respect to count I (robbery) instructed the jury on Coker's claim of intoxication.The jury, rejecting Coker's defense, found him guilty of first-degree robbery.The jury also found him guilty of unauthorized possession of an offensive weapon.

Seeking a new trial, Coker challenged trial court's denial of his motions for appointment of an expert and for continuance.Trial court, the Honorable David B. Hendrickson, judge, denied Coker's new trial motion without discussion, and entered judgment imposing sentences.

In this appeal Coker challenges trial court's denial of his pretrial motions for appointment of an expert and for continuance.He contends these actions violated his constitutional rights of compulsory process and due process of law.

I.Central to Coker's appeal is Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 19(4).This rule provides:

Witnesses for indigents.Counsel for a defendant who because of indigency is financially unable to obtain expert or other witnesses necessary to an adequate defense of the case may request in a written application that the necessary witnesses be secured at public expense.Upon finding, after appropriate inquiry, that the services are necessary and that the defendant is financially unable to provide compensation, the court shall authorize counsel to obtain the witnesses on behalf of the defendant.The court shall determine reasonable compensation and direct payment pursuant to Iowa Code chapter 815.

Iowa R.Crim.P. 19(4)(emphasis added).This rule protects the indigent defendant's sixth amendment right to compulsory process as well as his or her fourteenth amendment due process right to prepare and present an adequate defense.³SeeEnglish v. Missildine, 311 N.W.2d 292, 293(Iowa1981).

Rule 19(4) mirrors in purpose and in relevant language 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e)(1)(1982).In relevant part, section 3006A(e)(1) provides:

Counsel for a person who is financially unable to obtain investigative, expert, or other services necessary for an adequate defense may request them in an ex parte application.Upon finding, after appropriate inquiry in an ex parte proceeding, that the services are necessary and that the person is financially unable to obtain them, the court ... shall authorize counsel to obtain the services.

18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e)(1)(1982)(emphasis added).⁴

This federal statute, like Iowa's rule 19(4), is intended to protect the indigent's right to due process of law.SeeUnited States v. Sloan, 776 F.2d 926, 928(10th Cir.1985)(" '[W]hen a State brings its judicial power to bear on an indigent defendant in a criminal proceeding, it must take steps to assure that the defendant has a fair opportunity to present his defense.' ")(quotingAke v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 76, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 1093, 84 L.Ed.2d 53, 61(1985));United States v. Sims, 617 F.2d 1371, 1375(9th Cir.1980)(quotingUnited States v. Rosales-Lopez, 617 F.2d 1349, 1355(9th Cir.1980)("We recognize that the government's duty 'to provide an indigent criminal defendant with the essential tools of trial defense is of both a constitutional and statutory dimension.' ")).

In view of the similar language and purposes of the Iowa and federal provisions, federal authority is persuasive in interpreting our own rule.Telegraph Herald, Inc. v. McDowell, 397 N.W.2d 518, 520(Iowa1986);Mount Pleasant Community School Dist. v. Public Employment Relations Bd., 343 N.W.2d 472, 480(Iowa1984).

Returning to Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 19(4), we initially note two requirements are embodied in the rule: (1)defendant must be indigent and (2) the services of an expert must be necessary to the preparation and presentation of an adequate defense.SeeIowa R.Crim.P. 19(4).The State does not question Coker's indigency.Thus, our focus is on whether Coker made sufficient showing an expert's services were necessary to his defense.

In examining Coker's contentions, we find guidance in our prior decision, State v. McGhee, 220 N.W.2d 908(Iowa1974).McGhee teaches that trial court, in considering defendantcounsel's application for appointment of an expert, should give substantial weight to defendant's application but should also:

[E]ffect an objective evaluation of such application, taking into consideration all relevant factors....If trial court, focusing upon needs of defense counsel, finds the application is reasonable then it should be granted, but if found to be frivolous, unreasonable or without underlying factual support then a denial is in order.

Id. at 913.

In the final analysis, the test to be applied in cases like this is one of reasonableness.SeeUnited States v. Lincoln, 542 F.2d 746, 749(8th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1106, 97 S.Ct. 1138, 51 L.Ed.2d 558(1977).Although trial court should prevent random fishing expeditions undertaken in search of rather than in preparation of a defense, seeState v. Aguilar, 325 N.W.2d 100, 102(Iowa1982), it should not withhold appointment of an expert when the facts asserted by counsel reasonably suggest further exploration may prove beneficial to defendant in the development of his or her defense.United States v. Schultz, 431 F.2d 907, 911(8th Cir.1970).When trial court, upon its independent review of the record made when the motion is submitted, concludes counsel's request is reasonable under the circumstances and may lead to development of a plausible defense, counsel's request should be granted.

This same standard, although variously stated, has been adopted by the federal courts.SeeUnited States v. Goodwin, 770 F.2d 631, 635(7th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1084, 106 S.Ct. 858, 88 L.Ed.2d 897(1986);United States v. Durant, 545 F.2d 823, 827(2d Cir.1976);United States v. Hartfield, 513 F.2d 254, 257(9th Cir.1975);United States v. Theriault, 440 F.2d 713, 717(5th Cir.1971)(Wisdom, C.J., concurring);...