State v. Cole

• Decision Date: 25 May 1917
• Docket Number: 9689.
• Citation: State v. Cole, 107 S.C. 285, 92 S.E. 624 (S.C. 1917)
• Parties: STATE v. COLE.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

92 S.E. 624

107 S.C. 285

STATE v. COLE.

No. 9689.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

May 25, 1917

Appeal from Common Pleas Circuit Court of Greenville County; Ernest Moore, Judge.

J. H Cole was convicted of bribery, and he appeals. Appeal dismissed.

McCullough Martin & Blythe, of Greenville, for appellant.

J. R Martin, Sol., of Greenville, for the State.

GARY C.J.

The defendant was tried and convicted under the following indictment:

" The jurors of and for the county aforesaid, in the state aforesaid, upon their oath present that J. R. Cole, late of the county and state aforesaid, did on the 24th day of October, in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and sixteen, with force and arms, at Greenville, in the county and state aforesaid, willfully unlawfully, and corruptly offer to take and did accept a gift of gratuity in the nature of a bribe of $15 good and lawful money of the United States, under the agreement and with the understanding that he would, as a witness in a case pending in the court of general sessions for Greenville county, to wit, the case of John Dixon indicted for violation of the dispensary law, alter, change, vary, and falsely give testimony to aid and benefit the said John Dixon; he, the said J. E. Cole, at the same time being a witness named in said indictment against the said John Dixon."

The defendant's attorneys demurred to the indictment on the following grounds:

"That it does not state facts sufficient to constitute an offense at common law, because: (1) There is no such offense known at common law as the accepting of a bribe or offering to accept a bribe by a witness; (2) because the indictment alleges a mere bald agreement or promise to commit perjury for money received, and such mere promise is no offense at common law; (3) because it is not alleged that the defendant was an officer, that the alleged bribe was a bribe in connection with official misconduct, and therefore the alleged offense is not bribery; (4) because there is no actual obstruction of justice by defendant alleged, no attempt by him to obstruct justice, and no allegation of lawful summons or other process alleged or set out in the indictment; (5) because the indictment fails to show that defendant was a witness in case charging a criminal offense."

If the allegations of the indictment are sufficient to constitute any offense whatever, then the demurrer was properly overruled.

The first question that will be considered is whether there is such an offense at common law as the accepting or offering to accept a bribe by a witness.

"Bribery may be defined to be the giving, offering, or receiving of any thing of value intended to influence one in the discharge of a legal duty." 4 Enc. of Law, 907.

"Bribery is the voluntary giving or receiving of any thing of value, in corrupt payment of an official act done or to be done; the giving, offering or receiving of any thing of value intended to influence one in the discharge of a legal duty; or the crime of offering any undue reward or remuneration to any public officer, or other person intrusted with a public duty, with a view to influence his behavior in the discharge of his duty. Bribery is an offense against public justice. The essence of it is the prostitution of a public trust, the betrayal of public interests, the debauchment of the public conscience. It was an indictable offense at common law. A bribe is a price, reward, gift, or favor bestowed or promised with a view to pervert the judgment or corrupt the conduct of a judge, witness, or other person." 9 Corpus Juris, 402.

"It has frequently been said that at common law the offense of bribery can be predicated only of a reward given to a judge or to the person concerned in the administration of public justice, but it has been denied that the common-law offense is thus limited. In any event the modern definition of bribery, whether statutory or otherwise, commonly includes as the subject of it all persons whose official conduct is in any way connected with the administration of the government general or local, whether judicial, legislative, executive, or ministerial, and persons who execute the functions of a public office or who hold any place of profit or trust under any law of the state." Id. 406,

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