State v. Coleman
| Decision Date | 16 May 2023 |
| Docket Number | 2021AP1982-CR |
| Parties | State of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Quartez D. Coleman, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Wisconsin Court of Appeals |
This opinion will not be published. See Wis. Stat. Rule 809.23(1)(b)5.
APPEAL from a judgment and an order of the circuit court for Milwaukee County Cir. Ct. No. 2018CF4946 JOSEPH R. WALL and GLENN H. YAMAHIRO, Judges. Affirmed.
Before Brash, C.J., Donald, P.J., and Dugan, J.
Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in Wis.Stat. Rule 809.23(3).
¶1 Quartez D. Coleman appeals from a judgment entered following a jury trial convicting him of one count of trafficking a child, and an order denying postconviction relief.[1] On appeal, Coleman contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the trafficking a child jury instruction and failing to request a unanimity instruction. Coleman also contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to sufficiently object to testimony that Coleman and the victim, S.H., had a sexual relationship, or in the alternative, that the trial court erred in admitting the evidence that Coleman had a sexual relationship with S.H. For the reasons discussed below, we reject Coleman's arguments and affirm.
¶2 According to the criminal complaint, on August 1, 2018 police received information from a youth care worker at the Lad Lake Residential Campus that a resident of the facility fifteen year-old S.H., disclosed that she had been a victim of sex trafficking in Milwaukee days earlier.
¶3 Police spoke with S.H., who indicated that she had met with Coleman when she was temporarily residing at the St. Rose group home in Milwaukee. Coleman pulled up outside the group home and asked if she needed a ride. S.H. got in the car and they drove and talked. They exchanged Facebook information and Coleman identified his account as "Quartez D Coleman."
¶4 After St. Rose, S.H. was placed at Lad Lake. Coleman contacted S.H. on Facebook asking her to meet up, but they did not, due to the distance. On July 27, 2018, S.H. was granted a home pass to visit her family in Beloit, Wisconsin. S.H. told Coleman that she was going to be in Beloit, and he offered to pick her up.
¶5 That weekend, Coleman picked S.H. up in Beloit and drove her to Milwaukee. At the intersection of 26th Street and Center Street, Coleman told S.H. to get out of the car, and that she needed to make money before she goes home. Coleman told S.H to get into the cars with men, and "make some money." Coleman stated that S.H. needed to prostitute herself, and give him the money she earned. S.H. believed that if she did not do as Coleman said, she would be stranded in Milwaukee. S.H. then engaged in acts of sexual intercourse for money and turned the money over to Coleman.
¶6 The next morning, Coleman took S.H. to 26th Street and National Avenue in Milwaukee and told her to do the same thing. S.H. told him "this is the last time," and he said, "we gonna see." Near this location, S.H engaged in another act of sexual intercourse with a male for money. The next night, S.H. did not make any money. Coleman was upset about this, and pointed a handgun at her.
¶7 Certified Facebook records showed communications between Coleman and S.H. Coleman made various comments to S.H., including that "you been outside all day and haven't made nun smh," and "talk to them white guys down there."
¶8 The case proceeded to trial. After jury selection, and before opening statements, trial counsel sought to exclude evidence that S.H. had consensual sex with Coleman. Trial counsel asserted that Coleman was not on trial for having sex with an underage minor. Accordingly, trial counsel requested that the State be limited to just addressing the trafficking charge.
¶9 The State responded that the evidence was relevant to show the grooming process and was not other-acts evidence. The State explained that this was a situation where fifteen-year-old S.H. thought she was in a boyfriend/girlfriend relationship with twenty-six year-old Coleman and engaged in consensual sex with him during a grooming period before he sold her on the street.
¶10 The trial court agreed with the State, and overruled the objection. The court stated that the evidence was not other-acts evidence and goes towards the grooming process. The court, however, noted that because it was a crime to have sex with S.H. due to her age and Coleman was not on trial for that, the parties should get together and draft a cautionary instruction.
¶11 Trial counsel then added that the testimony was "extremely prejudicial" and repeated that it was not related to the issue on trial. The court responded that trial counsel's objection was noted and preserved. Later, the court stated to the defense, Ultimately, no cautionary instruction was sought, or given.
¶12 At trial, S.H. testified she met Coleman through Facebook. She testified that Coleman picked her up from the St. Rose's group home and they had sex. The next time she met up with Coleman, he picked her up from Beloit when she was on a home pass from Lad Lake and they went to Milwaukee. Prior to going to Milwaukee, S.H. believed that she was in a girlfriend/boyfriend relationship with Coleman. Once in Milwaukee, S.H. testified that Coleman told her that he was going to sell her body. She testified she had oral sex with men in exchange for money five or six times over the course of three or four days. In support of S.H.'s testimony, the State introduced the Facebook conversations between Coleman and S.H.
¶13 The jury also heard testimony from several police officers, including Officer Gerardo Orozco, who is a member of the Milwaukee Police Department Human Trafficking Task Force. Officer Orozco described the difference between what is known as a "Romeo pimp" and a "gorilla pimp." He explained that Romeo pimps pretend to be the boyfriend, and then bring the girls in, which is the grooming stage. After the Romeo pimp makes a girl believe he is her boyfriend, he turns into a gorilla pimp, who becomes violent and at times uses drugs to control women. Detective Orozco testified that Romeo pimps are most common with child victims.
¶14 The jury found Coleman guilty as charged. Coleman filed a motion for postconviction relief. Coleman asserted that he was entitled to a new trial because his trial attorney was ineffective for failing to object to the testimony from S.H. that she and Coleman had sex. Coleman contended that trial counsel should have objected on the grounds that the evidence constituted improper other-acts evidence under Wis.Stat. § 904.04(2) (2021-22),[2] the evidence was irrelevant under Wis.Stat. § 904.02, and the probative value of the evidence was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice under Wis.Stat. § 904.03. In addition, Coleman asserted that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the jury instructions and failing to request a unanimity instruction.[3]
¶15 The circuit court denied Coleman's postconviction motion without an evidentiary hearing. The court first found that trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the jury instructions or for failing to request a unanimity instruction. The court stated that the child trafficking statute, Wis.Stat. § 948.051(1) (2017-18), creates a single offense with alternative modes of commission and the modes were conceptually distinct. Thus, the instructions as given were appropriate.
¶16 In regards to S.H.'s testimony that she had sex with Coleman, the circuit court found that trial counsel's objection "sufficiently apprised the court of the bases for the objection, was considered by the court, and was denied, thereby preserving the objection for review." Thus, the circuit court found that trial counsel was not deficient, and Coleman was not prejudiced. This appeal follows.
¶17 On appeal, Coleman renews his arguments that trial counsel was ineffective.
¶18 When evaluating an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, we apply the well-established test in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
Under Strickland, a defendant must show both that counsel performed deficiently, and that the deficiency was prejudicial. Id. at 687. To demonstrate deficient performance, the defendant must show that counsel's representation fell below objective standards of reasonableness. See State v. McDougle, 2013 WI.App. 43, ¶13, 347 Wis.2d 302, 830 N.W.2d 243. To prove prejudice, a defendant must show "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." See id. (citation omitted). If a defendant fails to make an adequate showing as to one prong of the test, we need not address the other. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.
¶19 When a postconviction motion is denied without an evidentiary hearing, we review de novo "whether the motion on its face alleges sufficient material and non-conclusory facts that, if true, would entitle the defendant to relief" and "whether the record conclusively demonstrates that the defendant is not entitled to relief." State v. Jackson, 2023 WI 3, ¶8 405 Wis.2d 458, 983 N.W.2d 608. "[I]f the motion does not raise facts sufficient to entitle the movant to relief, or presents only conclusory allegations, or if the record conclusively...
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