State v. Coleman

• Decision Date: 03 February 1903
• Citation: 98 N.W. 175,17 S.D. 594
• Parties: STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA, Defendant in error, v. JOSEPH P. COLEMAN, Plaintiff in error.
• Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

17 S.D. 594

98 N.W. 175

STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA, Defendant in error,

v.

JOSEPH P. COLEMAN, Plaintiff in error. South Dakota Supreme Court Error to Circuit Court, Faulk County, SD Hon. Loring E. Gaffy, Judge Affirmed. A. W. Campbell, L. W. Crofoot, T. A. Pickier Attorneys for plaintiff in error. Philo Hall, Atty. Gen. Frank Turner, State’s Atty D. H. Latham Attorneys for the State. Opinion filed February 3, 1903

CORSON, P. J.

The plaintiff in error was indicted, tried, and convicted in the circuit court of Faulk county of the crime of murder, and sentenced to the penitentiary for the period of his natural life. A motion for new trial was made and denied, and the case is now before us for review on writ of error.

The plaintiff in error, whom we shall hereafter denominate defendant, contends, first, that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction; second, that the court erred in the admission and exclusion of evidence; third, that the court erred in its refusal to give to the jury certain instructions requested by the defendant; fourth, that the court erred in its instructions to the jury given upon its own motion, and instructions given at the request of the state; and, firth, that the court erred in denying the defendant’s motion for new trial upon the ground of newly discovered evidence.

It appears from the evidence that the defendant and the deceased, Edward B. Coleman, were brothers, and resided together on a cattle ranch in the northwesterly portion of Faulk County, and, with the exception of a hired man who was occasionally in their employ, they were the only persons occupying the residence on said ranch; that on the afternoon of tie 30th day of April, 1902, the deceased died from the effect of a gunshot wound inflicted upon his person; that the ball passed through the body of the deceased, practically destroying the heart; that the defendant, soon after the fatal shot was fired, left the deceased upon a bed, and rode some two miles or more to a neighbor, notifying him of the injury to his brother, and that he subsequently notified other neighbors of the fact, that his brother was shot, and requested them to go with him to his residence. Mr. Solly, the first neighbor to arrive, found the deceased dead; and during the night of that day the remains were placed in a box prepared for the occasion, and the defendant early the next morning started with the body of his brother for Mellette, a point in Spink county about 70 miles distant from the ranch, where he intended to take the evening train for Winona, Minn., near which place he and his brother formerly resided, Defendant gave no notice to the authorities of Faulk county of the death of his brother, and no coroner’s inquest was held until after the body arrived at Mellette, where there was an autopsy of the same made; and subsequently an inquest was held at Faulkton by the proper authorities of Faulk county, and a preliminary examination had. The autopsy at Mellette seems to have been made at the request of the officers of Faulk county, who had heard from some source of the homicide, and who proceeded to Mellette to investigate the matter, resulting in the arrest of the defendant.

The evidence tending to prove the defendant guilty of the shooting of his brother was entirely circumstantial, and the motive claimed by the state to have caused the shooting of the deceased by his brother was to secure the money due upon certain life insurance policies, one of which had been issued to the deceased for $5,000 and of which the defendant had been made beneficiary by the will alleged to have been executed by the deceased in his favor, and also to secure the sum of $5,000 on a policy of insurance which had been obtained by the defendant by forging the name of the deceased to an application for the same, and which had been issued by the company, but had not in fact been delivered to the deceased, and also to cover up the alleged forgery of the name of the deceased on the second application for $5,000 insurance. It appears from the undisputed evidence that in January preceding the homicide the de. fondant applied to the Northwestern Mutual Insurance Company for a policy of $5,000 upon his own life, and that he made a will bequeathing the same to his brother, the deceased; that the deceased about the same time applied for a policy of 5,000 upon his life, which was issued to him, and this policy was found in the possession of the defendant, with a will purporting to have been executed by his brother, bequeathing the amount secured by the policy, in case of his death, to the defendant. There was also evidence tending to prove that the defendant some time in March applied for a further policy for himself for the sum of $5,000, and that he forged the name of the deceased to an application for a second $5,000 policy, and that the defendant gave his note for the premium for the two policies. There was evidence on the part of the state tending to prove that the defendant had made contradictory statements in regard to the manner in which the shooting occurred to a number of different parties, including his neighbors near the ranch, his acquaintances at Mellette and at Faulkton, and as a witness before the coroner’s jury. There was also evidence tending to prove that the conduct of the defendant after the death of the deceased was, throughout, indicative of his guilt. There were a number of medical experts who testified as to the result of the autopsy, and their evidence tended to prove, that the ball causing the death of the deceased entered the back near the spine, and made its exit from the front of the body; that it carried with it a portion of one of the ribs fractured by the ball which was found lodged in the muscles in the front portion of the body, near the aperture made by the ball; and the evidence of the experts tended to prove that it was not probable, if possible, that the wound could have been made by the deceased either accidentally or with suicidal intent. The evidence of the experts tended to further prove that the death of the deceased must have resulted within a very few minutes after he received the fatal shot. The record of the evidence is very voluminous, comprising several hundred pages of closely typewritten matter; and its reproduction, or even a summary of it, would extend this opinion to unwarranted length, and serve no useful purpose. It must suffice to say, therefore, that, after a careful examination of the evidence, we are of the opinion that it was amply sufficient to justify the verdict of the jury. Of the weight of the evidence the jury were the exclusive judges, under proper instructions by the court.

The evidence on the part of the state tended to prove a state of facts not only consistent with the defendant’s guilt, but entirely inconsistent with his innocence. State v. Lindley,(1900). The conduct and contradictory statements of the defendant cannot be reconciled upon any theory of his innocence of the crime charged. The defendant claims that the shooting was accidental, or that the deceased committed suicide from despondency resulting from large losses of cattle during the spring of the year. The jury evidently arrived at the conclusion that the theory of the state was the true one, and that the defendant was guilty of deliberately taking the life of his brother.

The first alleged error of law complained of is that the court erred in admitting Exhibit 17 in evidence, and allowing it to be used as a basis for comparison of the handwriting by the expert called as a witness by the state. Exhibit 17 is a letter addressed to Frank Turner, and purports to have been signed by defendant. This letter reads as follows:

“Faulkton, S. D.

5-22, 1902

Mr. Turner

Dear Sir:

I thought I would write you a few lines in regard to my grip, can I have it, I would like to have the clothing. Hoping to hear from you in the near future.

I remain,

Yours truly,

J. P. Coleman.”

It is contended by the defendant that the use of this letter for the purpose of a basis for the comparison of handwriting was erroneous

(1) for the reason that it was not proven that the letter

and signature were in the handwriting of the defendant; and

(2) for the reason that the letter was not properly in evidence in the case as evidence tending to prove the guilt of the defendant.

The evidence as to its having been written and signed by the defendant was that, while he was in jail at Faulkton upon the charge for which he was tried, he handed this letter to one of the guards of the jail, with directions to deliver the same to Mr. Turner, and upon the further evidence of Miss Mammie Coleman and William J. Coleman as to the genuineness of the defendant’s signature, Miss Mammie Coleman, sister of the defendant, testified, “Exhibit 17 is in Joseph’s handwriting.” And William J. Coleman, brother of the defendant, testified, “Exhibit 16 and 17, purporting to be a letter and envelope written by Joseph P. Coleman, and directed to Frank Turner, is in Joseph Coleman’s handwriting.” The contention, therefore, that there was no proof that the letter was written and signed by the defendant, is not sustained by the record. And in addition to this evidence is the admission of counsel made at the trial. It appears from the cross-examination of the witness Stoddard that this exhibit was assumed by the defendant to be in the admitted and proved handwriting of the defendant. Mr. Stoddard, on cross-examination, was asked the following question:

“Mr. Stoddard, Exhibit 30, Exhibit 26, Exhibit 2, Exhibit 2-1, Exhibit 1, Exhibit 33, Exhibit 17, are the proved and admitted signatures of Joseph P. Coleman. I wish you would state to this jury whether or not the hand that signed these exhibits which I have just enumerated signed the name ‘Edward B. Coleman’ to the will, Exhibit 21 ?”

It will thus be seen that it was expressly admitted by counsel for the...