State v. Coleman

Decision Date27 June 2022
Docket NumberA21-1541
PartiesState of Minnesota, Appellant, v. Amanda Mae Coleman, Respondent.
CourtMinnesota Court of Appeals

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by Minn. R Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

Redwood County District Court File No. 64-CR-21-434.

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and Jenna M Peterson, Redwood County Attorney, Redwood Falls, Minnesota and Travis J. Smith, Special Assistant County Attorney, Slayton, Minnesota (for appellant).

Mark D. Nyvold, Fridley, Minnesota (for respondent).

Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Slieter, Judge.

Slieter, Judge.

In this pretrial appeal, appellant State of Minnesota argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying its motions to (1) admit a hearsay statement by the alleged victim to police, either as an excited utterance or a residual-hearsay exception, and (2) disqualify respondent's counsel for purportedly having made herself a necessary witness. Because the district court properly exercised its discretion by concluding that the hearsay exceptions do not apply, and that respondent's counsel is not a necessary witness, we affirm.

FACTS

In June 2021, respondent Amanda Mae Coleman and her boyfriend, A.R., were in the same house in Redwood Falls when A.R. apparently called C.W., his mother. C.W., in turn, called law enforcement and requested a welfare check based on concerns that Coleman had been drinking heavily, and that there was broken glass in the house. C.W. reported that Coleman had hit A.R., and that Coleman was passed out and may need an ambulance.

Redwood Falls police officers arrived at the residence shortly after being dispatched. After several minutes of knocking on the front door, shining flashlights into the house, and calling for the occupants, A.R. answered the door and stepped outside to speak with the officers. One officer observed that A.R. was visibly impaired, and A.R. admitted to consuming alcohol for the previous 24 hours. He later submitted to a preliminary breath test which displayed an alcohol concentration of 0.371.

A.R. "initially denied any cause for concern about a disturbance occurring inside of the residence" and "stated that everything was fine between [Coleman] and him." As A.R. continued speaking, he told another officer that he and Coleman had been arguing earlier that evening and Coleman had struck him with her fists "at least two or three times" on his forearm, face and head, and that she grabbed and pulled his testicles. A.R. showed the officer a bruise on his arm.

Officers entered the residence, with A.R.'s consent, and observed Coleman lying on the kitchen floor. Coleman was passed out with a visible laceration on her foot. She was "extremely intoxicated" and incomprehensible. One officer observed that the living room showed signs consistent with a physical struggle and contained multiple broken beer bottles.

Coleman was arrested and transported to the hospital where she received treatment and was later taken to jail. The following day, the state charged Coleman with one count of gross misdemeanor domestic assault, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.2242, subd. 2 (2020).

Three months later, Coleman's counsel recorded a telephone conversation with A.R. during which he recanted his earlier statement to police by stating that Coleman had never hit him and that his bruises were caused by his construction work. A.R. later provided a similar recorded statement to Coleman's counsel, this time with an investigator present.

As a result of A.R.'s recantation, Coleman moved, pursuant to State v. Dexter, 269 N.W.2d 721 (Minn. 1978),[1] to prohibit the state from calling A.R. to testify at trial. The state moved to admit A.R.'s statement to police either as an excited utterance or pursuant to the residual-hearsay exception. The state also moved to disqualify Coleman's counsel because she had purportedly made herself a necessary witness by taking A.R.'s initial recantation statement with no other witness present. The district court ruled that the state is prohibited from calling A.R. pursuant to Dexter, which the state does not challenge, and denied the state's motions. The state appeals.

DECISION

When reviewing a pretrial order suppressing evidence, we review the district court's factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. State v Gauster, 752 N.W.2d 496, 502 (Minn. 2008). We will not overturn the district court's pretrial order unless the state demonstrates clearly and unequivocally that the district court erred in its judgment and the error will critically affect the outcome of the trial. Id.

The state asserts, and Coleman does not disagree, that the suppression of A.R.'s statement to police will critically affect the outcome of the trial because A.R.'s testimony is the state's only direct evidence that an assault occurred. Based on our review of the record, we conclude that the state has little to no other evidence of the alleged assault. Therefore, we conclude that suppression of A.R.'s statement to the police will have a critical effect on the outcome of the trial. See id. ("[B]ecause the suppression of evidence led to the dismissal of the charges against Gauster, it is not disputed that the suppression had a critical impact on the outcome of Gauster's case.").

I. Excited Utterance

"We review a district court's evidentiary ruling on hearsay for an abuse of discretion." See State v. Vangrevenhof, 941 N.W.2d 730, 736 (Minn. 2020). "A district court abuses its discretion when its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the record." State v. Guzman, 892 N.W.2d 801, 810 (Minn. 2017).

In State v. Ortlepp, 363 N.W.2d 39, 43 (Minn. 1985), the supreme court held even if the state is precluded from calling a witness pursuant to Dexter, the state may still offer the witness's testimony as substantive evidence if an exception to the hearsay rule applies. Relying on Ortlepp, the state argues that A.R.'s statement to police is admissible substantively as an excited utterance pursuant to Minn. R. Evid. 803(2) or as a residual hearsay exception pursuant to Minn. R. Evid. 807.

An excited utterance is "[a] statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition." Minn. R. Evid. 803(2). To be admissible, an excited utterance must meet three requirements: (1) "there must be a startling event or condition;" (2) "the statement must relate to the startling event or condition;" and (3) "the declarant must be under a sufficient aura of excitement caused by the event or condition to insure the trustworthiness of the statement." State v. Daniels, 380 N.W.2d 777, 782 (Minn. 1986). "The lapse of time between the startling event and the out-of-court statement is not always determinative." State v. Hogetvedt, 623 N.W.2d 909, 913 (Minn.App. 2001), rev. denied (Minn. May 29, 2001).

The district court denied the admission of A.R.'s statement as an excited utterance because "[b]ased on a totality of the circumstances, the Court does not find that th[e] 'excitement caused by the event eliminates the possibility of conscious fabrication' on A.R.'s part, and 'insures the trustworthiness' of his statement to law enforcement." The record supports the district court's conclusion.

A. Startling Event

The state argues that "the district court did not analyze whether there was a startling event or condition," and that this omission tainted the district court's entire analysis. The record belies this claim. The district court addressed whether a startling event occurred, finding that "A.R. made the statements to the officers roughly 25 to 30 minutes after the incident occurred," and concluding that this fact is not fatal because "the lapse of time between the startling event and the out-of-court statement is not always determinative." (Emphasis added); see Hogetvedt, 623 N.W.2d at 913 ("The lapse of time between the startling event and the out-of-court statement is not always determinative."). Thus, it is clear that the district court concluded that a startling event had occurred.

B. The Statement Related to the Startling Event

The state next argues that the district court "did not analyze whether [A.R.]'s statements related to that startling condition." Again, the record does not support the state's contention. The district court addressed the issue, finding that A.R. "denied any disturbance," but "[h]is later statements do disclose reports of [Coleman] assaulting [him]." The district court also found that "while the later part of [A.R.'s] statement, the part during which he discloses details of an assault, is supported by some corroborating evidence (i.e., the bruises on the arm), other statements are not so supported." Thus, it is clear that the district court concluded that the statement related to the startling event.

C. Sufficient Aura of Excitement Ensuring Trustworthiness

The state argues that "the court failed to determine whether A.R. was under the 'aura of excitement.'" The record suggests otherwise. The district court found that

the demeanor [A.R.] presented after the audio was initiated (which the Court has reviewed) demonstrate[d] no pressured speech, no excitement or agitation (except when he is told he was going to the hospital), and no specific statements to lead the Court to believe he was still operating under the excitement caused by the event.

The district court also found "that A.R. was significantly impaired" and "his speech [was] slurred and slow." Moreover, the district court found that because A.R.'s statement to police was "internally inconsistent," it...

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