State v. Coleman
Decision Date | 22 July 1997 |
Docket Number | No. 15515,15515 |
Citation | 699 A.2d 91,241 Conn. 784 |
Parties | STATE of Connecticut v. Charles COLEMAN. |
Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
Marjorie Allen Dauster, Assistant State's Attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Michael Dearington, State's Attorney, and John Waddock, Assistant State's Attorney, for appellant (State).
Richard Emanuel, Assistant Public Defender, for appellee (defendant).
Before CALLAHAN, C.J., and BORDEN, KATZ, McDONALD and PETERS, JJ.
The sole issue raised in this certified appeal is whether, under the circumstances of this case, the trial court improperly admitted into evidence testimony concerning four knives, as well as the knives themselves as the Appellate Court concluded. The defendant, Charles Coleman, was convicted after a jury trial of burglary in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-101(a)(2), burglary in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-102(a), sexual assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1985) § 53a-70(a), and unlawful restraint in the first degree in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1985) § 53a-95(a). 1 We granted the state's petition for certification to appeal 2 to this court from the judgment of the Appellate Court, which had reversed the judgment of conviction. 3 See State v. Coleman, 42 Conn.App. 78, 679 A.2d 950 (1996).
On appeal to this court, the state claims that the Appellate Court improperly concluded that the trial court should not have admitted evidence regarding the knives found in the defendant's vehicle and on his person at the time of his arrest. We agree with the state and reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.
There was evidence before the jury that the victim lived with her mother on the first floor of a two-family house in New Haven. Id., at 80-81, 679 A.2d 950. The assailant then had sexual intercourse with the victim against her will.
After her assailant had left, the victim Id., at 81, 679 A.2d 950.
When the police arrived, "they processed the scene for fingerprints, and found seven latent fingerprints on the windowsills of the window of entry and the victim's bedroom window." Id., at 81, 679 A.2d 950. Two of the fingerprints found on the exterior of the bedroom window were identified as being those of the middle and ring fingers of the defendant's right hand. 4 Additionally, the police found that the window screens in the living room had been sliced on both sides with a sharp cutting instrument, and the assailant had reached through the slices in the screen in order to unlatch the locks and gain entry to the apartment.
The defendant was arrested the following day, July 8, 1986, in connection with this incident. At the time of the defendant's arrest, he was sitting in his car and was carrying a knife. That knife was seized by the police, who, acting pursuant to a search warrant, subsequently seized three more knives from the defendant's automobile. At trial, the state sought to introduce evidence of the four knives claiming that they demonstrated that the defendant had the means with which to have cut the victim's window screens, and could thereby have reached in with his fingers to unlatch the locks and enter the victim's apartment. The defendant objected to the admission of any evidence regarding the knives, claiming that the evidence was irrelevant and more prejudicial than probative. The trial court overruled the objection, ruling that the evidence was relevant to establish the means of entry and that the objections were more suited to the weight of the evidence than to its admissibility.
The evidence admitted with respect to the four knives was the testimony of the officer who had executed the search warrant, Detective James Stephenson, and a stipulation regarding the testimony of the arresting officer, Detective Ray Della Camera. 5 Additionally, the knives themselves were introduced as exhibits.
We begin our analysis with the well established laws of evidence. (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Prioleau, 235 Conn. 274, 305, 664 A.2d 743 (1995).
Further, (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Bruno, 236 Conn. 514, 549, 673 A.2d 1117 (1996). "We will make every reasonable presumption in favor of upholding the trial court's ruling, and only upset it for a manifest abuse of discretion." State v. Kulmac, 230 Conn. 43, 61, 644 A.2d 887 (1994).
Applying these principles to the facts of this case, we conclude that the Appellate Court improperly determined that the trial court should not have admitted the evidence concerning the four knives. Our review of the record persuades us that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that evidence regarding the knives was relevant to this case. The trial testimony indicated that the defendant had entered the victim's apartment by way of slits made in the window screen by a sharp cutting instrument. The state introduced evidence of the knives to show that the defendant, twenty-two hours after the offense, had a number of sharp cutting instruments at his immediate disposal. "It is the generally accepted rule that in a case in which the defendant is charged with the offense of burglary, after proof of the burglary has been introduced the prosecution may show that the defendant had burglar tools or implements in his possession soon after the time of the commission of the offense and may introduce such tools or implements in evidence." Sanders v. United States, 238 F.2d 145, 147 (10th Cir.1956); see also State v. Thomas, 205 Conn. 279, 283, 533 A.2d 553 (1987) ( ); State v. Miller, supra, 202 Conn. at 482, 522 A.2d 249 ( ); State v. Smith, 198 Conn. 147, 157, 502 A.2d 874 (1985) ( ); State v. Paoletto, 181 Conn. 172, 185-86, 434 A.2d 954 (1980) ( ). Accordingly, the Appellate Court improperly concluded that the evidence with respect to the knives was irrelevant.
Further, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that the evidence of the knives was more probative than prejudicial. We have recognized that even where evidence is relevant there are State v. Greene, 209 Conn. 458, 478-79, 551 A.2d 1231 (1988); see also State v. DeMatteo, 186 Conn. 696, 702-703, 443 A.2d 915 (1982). None of these situations exists in this case. The state conceded in argument to the jury that the knives were relevant only to prove that the defendant had at his disposal the means to enter the victim's apartment. The state also conceded that it could not prove that any one of the knives was actually so used. The offer...
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