State v. Coleman

• Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: Johnson
• Citation: State v. Coleman, 970 So.2d 511 (La. 2007)
• Decision Date: 02 November 2007
• Docket Number: No. 2006-KA-0518.,2006-KA-0518.
• Parties: STATE of Louisiana v. Robert Glen COLEMAN.

970 So.2d 511

STATE of Louisiana v. Robert Glen COLEMAN.

No. 2006-KA-0518.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

November 2, 2007.

Rehearing Denied January 7, 2008.

Capital Appeals Project, Jelpi Pierre Picou, Jr., Letty S. DiGiulio, for appellant.

Charles C. Foti, Jr., Attorney General, Paul Carmouche, District Attorney, Catherine Marion Estopinal, Hugo A. Holland, Jr., Edwin Blewer, III, Lea R. Hall, Jr., Assistant District Attorneys, for appellee.

JOHNSON, Justice.

The defendant now brings his direct appeal of his conviction and sentence to this Court pursuant to La. Const. art. 5, § 5 D¹ raising 36 assignments of error. We find merit as to one of the assignments raised by the defendant for the reasons set forth more fully below. Therefore, we reverse and vacate the conviction and death sentence, and remand for a new trial.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On February 14, 2003, defendant Robert Glen Coleman was indicted by a grand jury for first degree murder of Julian L. Brandon, Jr., in violation of LSA-R.S. 14:30, and attempted first degree murder of Alice Brandon, in violation of LSA-R.S. 14:27 and LSA-R.S. 14:30. On January 21, 2005, the State filed an amended indictment to first degree murder of Julian L. Brandon, Jr., in violation of LSA-R.S. 14:30.

On February 17, 2005, the jury unanimously returned a verdict of guilty as charged of first degree murder of Mr. Brandon. The penalty phase began the following day. On February 19, 2006, the jury returned a death verdict, finding all four aggravating circumstances urged by the State, namely that the offender was engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of an armed robbery, LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 905.4(A)(1); that the victim was older than 65 years of age, LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 905.4(A)(10); that the offender created a risk of death or great bodily harm to more than one person, LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 905.4(A)(4); and that the offender had previously been convicted of armed robbery, LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 905.4(A)(3). On April 6, 2005, the judge denied defendant's motion for new trial, and assigned reasons. Thereafter, the judge imposed the sentence of death in accordance with the jury's verdict.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

Defendant claims that the trial court erred in ruling that the defense failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). Specifically, defendant points to peremptory challenges exercised by the State against African-American jurors: Mason Miller, Sylvia Lampkin, Eddie Jordan, Daphne Smallwood, and Kim Ross².

In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986) the Supreme Court held that an equal protection violation occurs when a party exercises a peremptory challenge to exclude a prospective juror on the basis of race. According to Batson, a defendant must establish a prima facie case of discrimination by showing facts and relevant circumstances which raise an inference that the prosecutor used his peremptory challenges to exclude potential jurors on account of race. The burden then shifts to the State to come forward with a race-neutral explanation. If a race-neutral explanation is tendered, the trial court then must decide, in step three, whether the defendant has proven purposeful racial discrimination. State v. Harris, 01-0408 (La.6/21/02), 820 So.2d 471; Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 131 L.Ed.2d 834 (1995) (per curiam) (citations omitted); State v. Collier, 553 So.2d 815, 818 (La.1989); Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 358-59, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991).

In this case, the defendant based his Batson challenge on the fact that the prosecution used six of its eight peremptory challenges to strike African-American prospective jurors. The defendant alleged that the prosecution intentionally struck these African-American prospective jurors solely on the basis of their race. In response to the defendant's assertion, the prosecution argued that a "generic statement" as to how many black and white prospective jurors were stricken does not satisfy the first prong of Batson's three step analysis: a prima facie showing of discrimination. Nevertheless, to counter defendant's argument that there was sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, the prosecution proffered an explanation for the exercise of each peremptory strike.

At the close of argument, the trial court found that the defendant failed to make a prima facie showing of discrimination so as to satisfy the first step of the Batson analysis. Although the court opined that the lack of a prima facie showing did not require it to rule on the reasons proffered by the prosecution for the exercise of its challenges, the court nevertheless proceeded to rule that the prosecution offered race neutral reasons for the exercise of each of its challenges.

Ordinarily, a trial court's conclusion that the defendant failed to satisfy his or her initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination would end the inquiry. State v. Allen, 03-2418, p. 17-19 (La.6/29/05), 913 So.2d 788, 802-803. However, in this case, the trial court accepted the prosecutor's proffered race neutral reasons for the exercise of the peremptory strikes, and ruled on them, ultimately finding "no Batson issue." Under these circumstances, we find that the rule announced in Hernandez v. New York, supra., and adopted in State v. Green, 94-0887, p.25 (La.5/22/95), 655 So.2d 272, 288, applies: "Once a prosecutor has offered a race-neutral explanation for the peremptory challenges and the trial court has ruled on the ultimate question of intentional discrimination, the preliminary issue of whether the defendant had made a prima facie showing becomes moot."

Our review of the record convinces us that the State's proffered reasons for the exercise of its peremptory challenges merit careful scrutiny, especially as regards prospective juror Mason Miller.

The State and the Defense both used the State's power point presentation to allow prospective jurors to explain their position on the death penalty. The State's power point presented the following choices:

(A-1)-Death is proper in all cases of first degree murder.

(B-2)Death is the proper penalty, unless something convinces you to give life.

(C-3) Life is the proper penalty, unless something convinces you to give the death penalty.

(D-4)-Life, but in exceptional circumstances you would vote for the death penalty.

(E-5)Life in all cases; would never vote for the death penalty.

The State and the Defense used both A-E, and 1-5 interchangeably in the power point presentation.

Mason Miller

Mason Miller, an African-American male, was tentatively accepted as a juror but subsequently dismissed when the State used its third peremptory challenge to back strike him. In defending its use of the peremptory challenge to exclude the prospective juror, the State offered:

The State did that because it needed to check information concerning Mr. Miller based on his employment. He advised he was a captain with the fire department in Bossier City. Mr. Miller has filed a lawsuit against the city alleging institutional discrimination. Defense counsel voir dired on the race issue.³ There is a black defendant in this case. There are white victims. He said if he was 100 percent on the evidence, the death penalty was okay. With his body language, the State believes he is way passed(sic) where he self-described himself as a C but is actually a D or number four.

After entertaining the State's explanation, the trial court reiterated that the defendant had failed to satisfy the first step of the three-step Batson analysis, i.e., a prima facie showing of discrimination. However, the court then proceeded to rule on the State's articulated reasons for the exclusion of this prospective juror.

To be facially valid under Batson, the State's articulated reasons need not be persuasive or even plausible. Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the State's explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race-neutral. Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. at 767-768, 115 S.Ct. at 1770-1771. In this case, the trial court accepted the State's articulated reasons as racially neutral and overruled the Batson objection, finding "no problem" with the articulated reasons for striking Miller. We disagree with this conclusion, finding that the State's proffered explanation is not facially race-neutral.

A review of the reasons articulated in the record reveals that the State initially rested its challenge of Miller on a lawsuit that it apparently learned about independently. According to the State, Miller had filed a lawsuit against Bossier City alleging "institutional discrimination." The prosecutor did not elaborate or attempt to explain what this involved, or what was meant by "institutional discrimination." As a general proposition, a prospective juror's preoccupation with ongoing litigation has been deemed a race-neutral explanation supporting a peremptory strike. United States v. Copeland, 321 F.3d 582, 599-600 (6th Cir.2003) (Hispanic juror involved in a personal injury lawsuit requiring attendance at settlement conference during trial excused without violating Batson); Harper v. State, 91-0699 (Miss.4/7/94), 635 So.2d 864, 867-69 (Fact that African-American prospective juror may have been hostile to the state due to her pending sex discrimination lawsuit was race-neutral reason supporting peremptory strike).

However, in this case, there was no attempt by the State to explain how bias might operate from the mere existence of this lawsuit. Miller was never questioned about the impact the lawsuit would have on his ability to serve as a juror. Moreover, the prosecutor's very next statement following the mention of the "institutional discrimination" lawsuit interjected the issue of race, undercutting the acceptable "ongoing litigation" explanation and suggesting that the reasons...