State v. Coleman, 20000626-CA.

• Decision Date: 27 September 2001
• Docket Number: No. 20000626-CA.,20000626-CA.
• Citation: 2001 UT App 281,34 P.3d 790
• Parties: STATE of Utah, Appellant, v. Larry Dean COLEMAN, Appellee.
• Court: Utah Court of Appeals

34 P.3d 790

2001 UT App 281

STATE of Utah, Appellant, v. Larry Dean COLEMAN, Appellee.

No. 20000626-CA.

Court of Appeals of Utah.

September 27, 2001.

Mark L. Shurtleff, Attorney General, Kris C. Leonard, and Brenda J. Beaton, Assistant Attorney General, Salt Lake City, for Appellant.

James A. Valdez and Heather Johnson, Salt Lake Legal Defender Association, Salt Lake City, for Appellee.

Before Judges JACKSON, BILLINGS, and DAVIS.

OPINION

JACKSON, Associate Presiding Judge:

INTRODUCTION

¶ 1 The State appeals the trial court's order granting Larry Dean Coleman's (Defendant) motion to dismiss charges of operation of a clandestine laboratory, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37d-4(1), -5(1) (1998); possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(iii) (Supp.2000);¹ and possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5(1) (1998). The trial court based its order "on grounds that prosecution of this case is barred under Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1 (1999)" (Speedy Trial Statute), which requires the State to bring an incarcerated defendant to trial within 120 days of receiving notice from the defendant requesting disposition of pending charges. We reverse and remand.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 Because the date of each event is important to the outcome of this case, the undisputed facts are listed chronologically as follows:

September 28, 1999 Defendant was arrested.

October 19, 1999 The State filed an information charging Defendant with the offenses listed above.

October 28, 1999 Defendant executed a Notice and Request for Disposition of Charges, (Notice) and an Office Memorandum.

November 2, 1999 Defendant requested a preliminary hearing. However, instead of requesting the preliminary hearing within ten days of Defendant's arrest, as Rule 7(g) of the Utah Criminal Code requires the prosecution to do when an in-custody defendant requests such a hearing, Defendant requested a preliminary hearing thirty days from the date of his request. See Utah R.Crim. P. 7(g). The hearing was scheduled for November 30, 1999.

November 15, 1999 Utah State Prison stamped Defendant's Notice as "Received."

November 30, 1999 Defendant's preliminary hearing was continued because defense counsel noted a possible conflict of interest counsel might have had with Defendant's wife. The hearing was continued to December 21, 2000.

December 21, 1999 The preliminary hearing was continued to January 20, 2000 to allow time to resolve the above-mentioned conflict of interest.

January 20, 2000 The preliminary hearing began, but was not completed due to another commitment by the trial court and Defendant's desire to subpoena another witness. The court attempted to reschedule the hearing to February 1, 2000, but defense counsel was unavailable on that date. The hearing was scheduled for February 24, 2000, the trial court's next available date.

February 24, 2000 The preliminary hearing was completed, and Defendant was bound over for trial.

March 20, 2000 Defendant was arraigned and requested a hearing on an anticipated motion to dismiss (based on the Speedy Trial Statute) and a motion to suppress.

March 24, 2000 Defendant's counsel filed a Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (Memorandum). A document entitled "Motion to Dismiss" was never filed.

March 27, 2000 Defendant's counsel filed a Motion to Suppress with a supporting memorandum.

May 15, 2000 A hearing on both motions was held. The trial court determined that 6 days remained on the 120-day period, and ruled that because it could not hear the matter within that time, unless the State could get another judge to hear the matter, it would dismiss Defendant's charges with prejudice when that time expired.

May 23, 2000 The trial court dismissed Defendant's charges pursuant to the Speedy Trial Statute.

The state appeals.

ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 3 The State first challenges the trial court's ruling that the Speedy Trial Statute² bars prosecution of Defendant, contending that the trial court "miscalculated the elapsed time." "[W]e have interpreted both Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1 and its predecessor as granting discretion to the trial court." State v. Petersen, 810 P.2d 421, 424-25 (Utah 1991) (footnote omitted) (applying "the same standard of review" to all subsections of the Speedy Trial Statute). Accordingly, we review a trial court's determination that a defendant's charges should be dismissed pursuant to the Speedy Trial Statute for abuse of discretion. See State v. Trujillo, 656 P.2d 403, 405 (Utah 1982) ("[T]he trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that there was `good cause' that the matter was not heard within the time designated."); see also 21A Am.Jur.2d Criminal Law § 1048 (2000) (stating abuse of discretion standard is used to review a grant of dismissal under speedy trial statute). An appellate court will find abuse of discretion only where there is no "reasonable basis in the record to support" the trial court's Speedy Trial Statute determination of "good cause." State v. Bonny, 25 Utah 2d 117, 477 P.2d 147, 148 (Utah 1970); see also Petersen, 810 P.2d at 424-25 (stating that a trial court may make a Speedy Trial Statute "good cause" determination "if there is a reasonable basis in the record" to do so).³

¶ 4 Before reviewing the trial court's determination for abuse of discretion, however, we review the trial court's legal conclusions for correctness, and its factual findings for clear error.⁴ See Petersen, 810 P.2d at 425.

¶ 5 In the alternative, the State challenges the trial court's dismissal of "all three charges pending against [D]efendant based on a violation of his statutory speedy trial right when [D]efendant had invoked [the Speedy Trial Statute] only as to one charge." "Matters of statutory interpretation present questions of law which we review for correctness, according no particular deference to the trial court's interpretation." State v. Lindsay, 2000 UT App 379, ¶ 4, 18 P.3d 504. However, because the State

did not object on the record [to the dismissal of all three charges] at trial, [it] can only obtain relief by demonstrating plain error. Plain error requires a showing that "`(i) an error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for [the State].'"⁵

State v. Garcia, 2001 UT App 19, ¶ 6, 18 P.3d 1123 (citations omitted).

ANALYSIS

¶ 6 We first address the trial court's ruling that dismissal was appropriate under the Speedy Trial Statute. The trial court entered an Order of Dismissal after it determined that it could not "find there's good cause." "`Deciding whether the district court properly denied [a defendant's] motion to dismiss pursuant to the detainer statute requires a two-step inquiry. First we must determine when the 120-day period commenced and when it expired.'"<sup>6</sup>State v. Lindsay, 2000 UT App 379, ¶ 9, 18 P.3d 504 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). "`Second, if the trial was held outside the 120-day period, we must then determine whether "good cause" excused the delay.'"⁷Id. (citation omitted). A finding of "good cause" that will excuse failure of the prosecution to bring a defendant to trial within the time required means (1) delay caused by the defendant— such as asking for a continuance; or (2) "a relatively short delay caused by unforseen problems arising immediately prior to trial." State v. Petersen, 810 P.2d 421, 426 (Utah 1991) (footnote omitted); see also State v. Heaton, 958 P.2d 911, 916-17 (Utah 1998); State v. Velasquez, 641 P.2d 115, 116 (Utah 1982).

¶ 7 The State characterizes this issue as a mere miscalculation by the trial court of time elapsed under the Speedy Trial Statute. Specifically, the State disputes the trial court's calculation as to the following periods: (1) from November 15, 1999, to November 30, 1999; (2) from February 1, 2000, to February 24, 2000; and (3) from March 24, 2000, to March 30, 2000. However, the effect of the State's dispute is to challenge the trial court's determination that "the failure of the prosecuting attorney to have the matter heard within the time required is not supported by good cause." Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(4) (1999). Thus, we first discuss those factual findings and legal conclusions of the trial court which effect the three challenged time periods, and then discuss whether the trial court exceeded its discretion in determining that no "good cause" existed.

From March 24, 2000, to March 30, 2000

¶ 8 The trial court correctly ruled that Defendant's Motion to Suppress tolled the 120-day time period because the motion was a delay caused by Defendant. See State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325, 1329-30 (Utah 1986) (stating that a defendant's actions which delay the trial and toll the time period include "delay caused to hear defendant's motion to . . . exclude evidence of his prior convictions"); Petersen, 810 P.2d at 426. However, the State challenges the trial court's use of Defendant's motion to suppress, rather than his motion to dismiss, as the appropriate date to begin tolling the Speedy Trial Statute.⁸ ¶ 9 Notwithstanding Defendant's failure to file a document entitled "Motion to Dismiss," neither party contends that Defendant did not, in fact, move the trial court to dismiss. Indeed, the trial court's Order of Dismissal states that Defendant "motioned this Court to dismiss." Confusion has arisen, however, regarding when Defendant's motion was made. The State suggests that Defendant made his motion on March 24, when he submitted his Memorandum, and that the Speedy Trial Statute was tolled from that date.

¶ 10 A request to the trial court for an order "shall be by motion. A motion other than one made during a trial or hearing shall be in writing unless the...