State v. Collier

• Decision Date: 25 October 2016
• Docket Number: No. 49S04–1610–PC–554.,49S04–1610–PC–554.
• Citation: 61 N.E.3d 265
• Parties: STATE of Indiana, Appellant (Respondent below), v. Robert COLLIER, Appellee (Petitioner below).
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

61 N.E.3d 265

STATE of Indiana, Appellant (Respondent below),

v.Robert COLLIER, Appellee (Petitioner below).

No. 49S04–1610–PC–554.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

Oct. 25, 2016.

Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General, Henry A. Flores, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Appellant.

Steven T. Owens, Public Defender of Indiana, Vickie Yaser, Deputy Public Defender, Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Appellee.

On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 49A04–1508–PC–1036

DAVID

, Justice.

At issue in this case is whether the post-conviction court erred in granting Collier's motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Trial Rule 60(B)(8)

. In light of the facts and circumstances of this case and given the deferential standard of review, we affirm finding that: 1) Collier filed his motion within a reasonable time given his incarceration, lack of education, limited resources and potential cognitive and/or mental deficiencies; 2) there were extraordinary circumstances due to the post-conviction court's failure to refer Collier's petition to the State Public Defender in accordance with the Post–Conviction Rules; and 3) Collier has alleged a meritorious claim.

Facts and Procedural History

In 1997, Robert Collier pled guilty to possession of cocaine as a class D felony. He was sentenced to 545 days in the Department of Correction with 521 days suspended and 90 days of probation.

In 2001, Collier filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief wherein he alleged that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel, was misled by his attorney and the trial court and his guilty plea was not knowing, intelligent and voluntary. Collier indicated he wished to have a public defender appointed to represent him and submitted an affidavit of indigence. The postconviction court appointed a public defender for Collier, but his petition for post-conviction relief was ultimately withdrawn without prejudice in 2005 after Collier's motion to file a belated appeal was denied and his public defender withdrew as counsel.

In 2007, Collier filed a new pro se petition for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, claiming he did not make an intelligent and voluntary plea and requesting his plea agreement be vacated. Collier again indicated that he wished to have a public defender appointed and completed an affidavit of indigence. However, the court did not refer the petition to the State Public Defender and the court summarily denied Collier's petition.

In December 2008, Collier wrote to the court asking about the status of his petition and request for representation. According to an entry in the court's chronological case summary (CCS), Collier was sent a copy of the order denying his 2007 petition in December 2008. Between May 2009 and September 2012, Collier submitted multiple requests or motions seeking documents related to his conviction and the order denying his 2007 petition. In August 2009, the court sent him a copy of the CCS. In September 2012, the court again sent him a copy of the order denying his 2007 petition.

In September 2014, Collier filed another pro se petition for post-conviction relief. He again requested representation and submitted an affidavit of indigence. Thereafter, in April 2015, Collier, by counsel, filed both a verified motion for leave to amend his petition for post-conviction relief and a verified motion for relief from the September 2007 order (that summarily denied his 2007 petition for post-conviction relief) pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 60(B)(8)

and Indiana Post–Conviction Rule 1 Section 2¹ .

In his motion for relief from judgment, Collier argued that in his 2007 petition, he requested representation and included an affidavit of indigence. As such, Post–Conviction Rule 1(2)

imposed a duty upon the post-conviction court to order a copy of the petition to be sent to the State Public Defender. He further argued that he was not timely notified of the court's summary denial of his petition and so he could not perfect a timely appeal. Finally, his counsel argued that it was her belief that Collier suffered from cognitive and/or mental deficiencies that impacted Collier's ability to represent himself² Collier has limited education and that review of the record reveals that there are issues that have merit.

The post-conviction court granted Collier's motion for relief from judgment before receiving a response from the State. The State then filed an objection and a motion to reconsider the order granting Collier's motion for relief from judgment. The State argued that Collier's motion for relief was not timely filed and was not supported by extraordinary circumstances. It further argued that Collier should have sought to file a successive petition for post-conviction relief instead.

The post-conviction court granted the State's motion to reconsider. After two hearings, the post-conviction court determined that it would reinstate Collier's 2007 petition for postconviction relief. The court reasoned:

I think I was the one who signed that order to summarily dismiss or deny the petition and I guess what my thinking is in fairness Mr. Collier ought to have a shot at retrying a P.C.R. with counsel but then I would anticipate the State possibly filing ... filing to appeal that ... I think it was a mistake for the [c]ourt not to appoint counsel and to summarily deny the P.C.R....and so that is what the [c]ourt is deciding.

(Tr. 24

–25.) Thus, the court granted Collier's “Petition to Reinstate.” The State appealed and the Court of Appeals reversed the post-conviction court “conclud[ing] that Collier's motion was not filed within a reasonable time.” State v. Collier, 2016 WL 1567245, No. 49A04–1508–PC–1036, slip op. *7, 10 (Ind.Ct.App. April 19, 2016). We now accept transfer and affirm the postconviction court, thereby vacating the Court of Appeals opinion. Ind. App. Rule 58(A).

Standard of Review

The decision of whether the grant a Trial Rule 60(B)(8)

motion is left to the equitable discretion of the trial court, and is reviewable only for abuse of discretion. Gipson v. Gipson, 644 N.E.2d 876, 877 (Ind.1994). “An abuse of discretion occurs if the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom.” McElfresh v. State, 51 N.E.3d 103, 107 (Ind.2016) (internal quotations and citations omitted). The reviewing court does not reweigh the evidence. Gipson, 644 N.E.2d at 877.

Discussion

At issue here is whether the post-conviction court abused its discretion in granting Collier's Trial Rule 60(B)(8)

motion for relief from judgment. Trial Rule 60(B) provides in relevant part:

On motion and upon such terms as are just the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a judgment, including a judgment by default, for the following reasons:

(1) mistake, surprise, or excusable neglect;

(2) any ground for a motion to correct error, including without limitation newly discovered evidence, which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a motion to correct errors under Rule 59;

(3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party;

(4) entry of default or judgment by default was entered against such party who was served only by publication and who was without actual knowledge of the action and judgment, order or proceedings;

* * * *

(8) any reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment, other than those reasons set forth in sub-paragraphs (1), (2), (3), and (4).

A motion for relief from judgment filed for reason (8) shall be filed within a reasonable time and must allege a meritorious claim or defense. Ind. Trial Rule 60(B)

. The passage of time alone is not enough to warrant the denial of a motion on the basis of timeliness. See

Fairrow v. Fairrow, 559 N.E.2d 597 (Ind.1990) (This Court granted relief eleven (11) years after the judgment due to the unusual circumstances of the case.) Determining what is a reasonable time period depends on the circumstances of each case, as well as the potential prejudice to the party opposing the motion and the basis for the moving party's delay. Parham v. Parham, 855 N.E.2d 722, 728 (Ind.Ct.App.2006) (citations omitted). “Finality and fairness are both important goals. When faced with an apparent conflict between them, this Court unhesitatingly chooses the latter.” State v. Huffman, 643 N.E.2d 899, 901 (Ind.1994).

For the purposes of Rule 60(B)

, a meritorious claim or defense is “one that would lead to a different result if the case were tried on the merits.” Butler v. State, 933 N.E.2d 33, 36 (Ind.Ct.App.2010) (quoting Bunch v. Himm, 879 N.E.2d 632, 637 (Ind.Ct.App.2008) ). Additionally, in order to be granted relief pursuant to Ind. Trial Rule 60(B)(8), the moving party must demonstrate some extraordinary or exceptional circumstances justifying equitable relief. Smith v. State, 38 N.E.3d 218, 221 (Ind.Ct.App.2015) ; In re Adoption of T.L.W., 835 N.E.2d 598, 601 (Ind.Ct.App.2005) ; WW Extended Care, Inc. v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 755 N.E.2d 712, 719 (Ind.Ct.App.2001) (The moving party must show failure to act was not merely due to omission involving mistake, surprise, or excusable neglect, but due to some extraordinary circumstance.)

Thus, in order to be granted relief, Collier must show that: 1) he brought his claim within a reasonable time in light of the circumstances of the case; 2) extraordinary or exceptional circumstances justify that relief; and 3) he has alleged a meritorious claim or defense. Ind. Trial Rule 60(B)

; Parham, 855 N.E.2d at 728 ; Smith, 38 N.E.3d at 221–222.

Here, Collier's motion for relief from judgment was filed in 2015, seven and one half (7½) years after his 2007 petition for post-conviction relief was summarily denied. The record demonstrates that Collier wrote to the court asking about the status of...