State v. Colton
Decision Date | 08 August 1995 |
Docket Number | No. 14885,14885 |
Citation | 663 A.2d 339,234 Conn. 683 |
Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
Parties | STATE of Connecticut v. Murray COLTON. |
Kenneth Rosenthal, with whom was Bonnie L. Patten, New Haven, for appellant (defendant).
Jack W. Fischer, Asst. State's Atty., with whom, on the brief, were Michael Dearington, State's Atty., and James G. Brown, Asst. State's Atty., for appellee (State).
Before PETERS, C.J., and CALLAHAN, BERDON, NORCOTT and KATZ, JJ.
The defendant, Murray Colton, appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying his motion to dismiss, on the ground of double jeopardy, the criminal prosecution pending against him. The defendant has been tried three times for the murder of Patricia Konesky, whose body was found on January 13, 1987, in the dugout of a baseball field in New Haven. 1 See General Statutes §§ 53a-54a and 53a-8. 2 The first two trials were conducted in 1989 and 1990 and both resulted in mistrials after the jurors had reported that they were deadlocked. After a third trial, which was conducted in 1991, the defendant was convicted of murder and was sentenced to a fifty year term of imprisonment. On the defendant's appeal from his conviction, we reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded the case for a new trial, concluding that the trial court had violated the defendant's constitutional right to confrontation by precluding certain evidence showing motive and bias on the part of the state's chief witness, Janice Tourangeau. State v. Colton, 227 Conn. 231, 233, 630 A.2d 577 (1993). 3
Subsequently, the state initiated a fourth prosecution of the defendant on the same charge. The defendant moved to dismiss, asserting that: (1) double jeopardy principles bar a fourth trial because of prosecutorial misconduct at the third trial; (2) there is insufficient evidence to proceed to trial because the testimony of the state's chief witness, who is now deceased, is unavailable; (3) a fourth trial would undermine the integrity of the court; and (4) a fourth trial would undermine the interests of justice. After a two day evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the defendant's motion, reasoning that the claim of prosecutorial misconduct could not be brought in a motion to dismiss, because the defendant had not alleged prosecutorial misconduct either in a motion for mistrial during the previous trial or on appeal from his conviction at that trial. 4
The defendant appeals 5 from the trial court's ruling claiming that: (1) the court improperly concluded that his double jeopardy 6 claim on the basis of prosecutorial misconduct was barred as a matter of law; and (2) the trial court improperly prevented him from questioning the prosecutor to support his claim of double jeopardy on the basis of prosecutorial misconduct. 7 We are persuaded by the defendant's first argument. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for further proceedings.
The defendant first claims that the trial court improperly denied his motion to dismiss his fourth prosecution on double jeopardy grounds on the basis of alleged prosecutorial misconduct at his third trial. Under Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 102 S.Ct. 2083, 72 L.Ed.2d 416 (1982), and its progeny, the double jeopardy clause will bar the retrial not only of a criminal defendant whose conviction was reversed for evidentiary insufficiency, but also of a defendant whose conviction in the first trial was secured by prosecutorial misconduct.
The defendant's claim concerns the prosecutor's conduct in connection with the testimony of the state's chief witness, Tourangeau. Tourangeau's testimony at the third trial was summarized in Colton I as follows: "At trial, Tourangeau gave the following account of her activities on the night of the victim's murder. On the night of January 12, 1987, Tourangeau had been dropped off on Kimberly Avenue [in New Haven] by her friend, Cathleen Jones. Tourangeau was looking for the victim because she wanted the victim to obtain drugs for her. Tourangeau found the victim at Don Phillips Cafe, a bar owned by the defendant's father. The victim agreed to take drugs with Tourangeau, but told Tourangeau that Tourangeau would have to wait because she had something to do first.
8 9 State v. Colton, supra, 227 Conn. at 235-237, 630 A.2d 577.
"Tourangeau also testified on direct examination that, at the time of the murder, she had been addicted to heroin. She described her lifestyle at that time as a street life in which her principal interests were surviving and getting drugs, and explained that one of the reasons she had not come forward sooner had been the difficulty she would have had obtaining drugs if she had become known as a snitch. Tourangeau testified that prostitution was how she had made money at that time, and that she would spend all of her earnings on drugs. Tourangeau further testified that at the present time she was no longer addicted to drugs or engaged in prostitution. She stated that she had managed to overcome her addiction while in jail in 1989.
" Id., at 239-40, 630 A.2d 577.
In his motion to dismiss the fourth prosecution on the ground of double jeopardy, the defendant claimed that
The defendant proffered several documents, some of which are sealed, in support of his claim of prosecutorial misconduct. These documents include police reports from both New Haven and Milford, which, the defendant alleges, indicate that Tourangeau continued her prior lifestyle even after 1989, the time that she claimed to have overcome her drug addiction and ceased to engage in prostitution. The gravamen of the defendant's claim is that although the prosecutor...
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