State v. Compo, 138 advanced to 100B.

• Decision Date: 01 February 1932
• Docket Number: No. 138 advanced to 100B.,138 advanced to 100B.
• Citation: 158 A. 541
• Parties: STATE v. COMPO.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

158 A. 541

STATE

v. COMPO.

No. 138 advanced to 100B.

Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey.

Feb. 1, 1932.

Syllabus by the Court.

1. "Robbery" at common law is stealing property with violence from the person or personal custody of another person. It is necessary, in order to constitute that crime, that the goods shall be on the person of the owner, or the owner's agent, or shall be in his presence and in his custody.

2. The word "robbery," as used in the statute defining murder in the first degree, includes the common-law offense as well as that defined by our statute, if the latter can be regarded as having a different meaning.

3. A confession of guilt cannot be received in evidence until it is proved to the satisfaction of the trial court that the same was voluntarily given.

4. After a confession has been received in evidence, the jury may neither reject or disregard the same, irrespective of whether they believe the same was voluntarily given or not.

5. The jury must, however, determine the weight and credibility of a confession in the same manner that they weigh and consider the credit to attach to any other piece of evidence.

Error to Circuit Coust, Essex County.

Eugene Compo was convicted of murder in the first degree, and he brings error.

Affirmed.

Edward R. McGlynn, of Newark (Charles Basile, of Newark, of counsel), for plaintiff in error.

Joseph L. Smith, of Newark, for the State.

BODINE, J.

Eugene Compo was convicted of murder in the first degree. The proofs show that on the evening of December 23, 1930, he ordered, at closing time, the manager of a Butler Bros, chain grocery store to open up. Upon the manager's failure so to do, the defendant shot and killed him. The essential facts in the case were established by the testimony of a number of witnesses, as well as by statements made by Compo to the police, which the trial judge found, on the proofs presented, were voluntarily given. The proofs abundantly support the finding.

It appears from the voluntary statements that the defendant and a companion determined to rob a man named Lynch, the manager of this store, anticipating that they could secure some three or four hundred dollars apiece. On the night of the attempt they waited in the vicinity until the customers had all left. While the manager was closing the store, they went over, and one of them placed a revolver near his ribs and ordered him to stick up his hands and open up the store. His refusal resulted in his death.

On this state of the proofs, plaintiff in error argues the following point: There was no evidence to justify the finding by the jury that the shooting of the manager of the chain store occurred in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate a felony.

The statutory definition of "murder" is as follows: "Murder which shall be perpetrated by means of poison, or by lying in wait, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated killing, or which shall be committed in perpetrating or attempting to perpetrate any arson, burglary, rape, robbery or sodomy, shall be murder in the first degree; and all other kinds of murder shall be murder in the second degree." 1 Cum. Supp. Comp. Stat. (1911-24) "Crimes," § 52—107.

The proofs show that the homicide was committed in the attempt to perpetrate a robbery. Section 120 of the Crimes Act (2 Comp. St. 1910, p. 1785) defines "robbery" as follows: "Any person who shall forcibly take from the person of another, money or personal goods and chattels, of any value whatever, by violence, or putting him in fear, and his aiders, procurers and abettors, shall be guilty of a high misdemeanor. * * *" This provision was embodied in our statutes in essentially the precise form at least as early as the revision of 1846, Nixon's Digest, p. 167, § 38, and has been continuously on the statute books ever since. The common-law definition of "robbery" has, notwithstanding, been uniformly approved and followed in cases where homicide has been committed in the perpetration of a robbery.

Chancellor Magie, speaking for this court, in State v. Lyons, 70 N. J. Law, 635, at page 645, 58 A. 398, 401, said: "Under the statute, which makes killing in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate the crime of robbery murder in the first degree, the court properly proceeded to define what robbery is. This is the language of the court: 'Robbery is stealing property with violence from the person or personal custody of another person. It is necessary, in order to constitute that crime, that the goods shall be on the person of the owner, or the owner's agent, or shall be in his presence and in his custody.'"

If we were at liberty to exscind from the proofs the order to the manager to stick up his hands, still we believe the words "to open up" evidence a purpose to feloniously take property by means of violence from the person or personal custody of the manager of this store. In view of all the evidence in the case and particularly the testimony that the defendant, or his companion, was armed and that a revolver was applied to the ribs of the manager at the time the order was given, we cannot feel that the jury would be justified in doing otherwise than they did.

The only other point raised before us, which we deem to have merit sufficient to justify discussion, relates to the following portion of the court's charge: "The State has produced the following testimony of police officers who have produced here a statement made by Compo at police headquarters, in fact, two statements I believe. There is some question as to the voluntariness with which those statements were given. It is for you to decide whether or not, when Compo gave those statements, he gave them voluntarily, and whether the things which are in those statements are the truth."

It is urged by the plaintiff in error that the court should have instructed the jury to disregard or reject the confessions if it determined that the same were not voluntarily given. We do not think that this is the law. The court having determined that the...