State v. Compton, s. 55192

Decision Date10 June 1983
Docket Number55233,Nos. 55192,55218 and 55303,s. 55192
Citation664 P.2d 1370,233 Kan. 690
PartiesSTATE of Kansas, Appellant, v. Joe N. COMPTON, Appellee. STATE of Kansas, Appellant, v. Thomas A. WILLIAMS, Appellee. STATE of Kansas, Appellant, v. Kelly R. KEENAN, Appellee. STATE of Kansas, Appellant, v. Jose RAMIREZ, Appellee.
CourtKansas Supreme Court
Syllabus by the Court

1. There is no duty placed on an arresting officer, making an arrest for the offense of driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, to explain to the accused the consequences of a refusal to submit to a blood alcohol chemical test.

2. In a prosecution for driving while under the influence of alcohol, in violation of K.S.A. 8-1567(a), the admissibility into evidence of the accused's refusal to submit to a blood alcohol test is not dependent upon a finding that the refusal to take the test was made knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently.

3. In a prosecution for driving while under the influence of alcohol, in violation of K.S.A. 8-1567(a), the admission into evidence, pursuant to K.S.A. 8-1001(c), of the accused's refusal to take a blood alcohol test does not violate the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, or Section 10 of the Bill of Rights of the Constitution of Kansas, following South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 103 S.Ct. 916, 74 L.Ed.2d 748 (1983).

4. K.S.A. 8-1001(c) is a constitutional enactment.

5. The basic meaning of the separation of powers doctrine is that the whole power of one department should not be exercised by the same hands which possess the whole power of either of the other departments.

6. A statute is presumed to be constitutional. All doubts must be resolved in favor of its validity, and before a statute may be stricken down, it must clearly appear the statute violates the constitution.

7. When a statute is challenged under the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers, the court must search for a usurpation by one department of the powers of another department on the specific facts and circumstances presented.

8. A usurpation of powers exists when there is a significant interference by one department with operations of another department.

9. In determining whether or not a usurpation of powers exists a court should consider (a) the essential nature of the power being exercised; (b) the degree of control by one department over another; (c) the objective sought to be attained by the legislature; and (d) the practical result of the blending of powers as shown by actual experience over a period of time.

10. K.S.A. 8-1567, prohibiting plea bargaining when entered into for the purpose of permitting a person charged with DUI to avoid the mandatory penalties therefor, is examined and held not to be a sufficient encroachment upon the powers of the prosecutor so as to constitute a violation of the constitutional separation of powers doctrine.

Philip D. Lunt, County Atty., argued the cause and Robert T. Stephan, Atty. Gen., was with him on the brief for appellant in State v. Compton and State v. Williams.

Richard N. Raleigh, Medicine Lodge, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellee Compton.

Michael S. Holland, Russell, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellee Williams.

James D. Hall, Asst. Dist. Atty., Clark V. Owens, Dist. Atty., and Robert T. Stephan, Atty. Gen., were on the brief for appellant in State v. Keenan.

Paul D. Handy, County Atty., argued the cause, and Robert T. Stephan, Atty. Gen., was with him on the brief for appellant in State v. Ramirez.

Dennis M. Bahr, Garden City, was on the brief for appellee Ramirez.

MILLER, Justice:

The State of Kansas appeals in these drunken driving cases from orders of the trial courts declaring portions of K.S.A. 8-1001 and 8-1567 unconstitutional. The defendants, Joe N. Compton, Thomas A. Williams, Kelly R. Keenan and Jose Ramirez, were each charged with driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol (DUI) in violation of K.S.A. 8-1567. None of the cases has been tried. In Compton and Williams, the State appeals as a matter of right under K.S.A. 22-3602(b)(1) from orders finding K.S.A. 8-1001(c) and K.S.A. 8-1567(c), (d) and (e) unconstitutional and dismissing the case. In Keenan, the State brings an interlocutory appeal under K.S.A. 22-3603 from an order suppressing evidence of the results of the blood alcohol test administered to the defendant, based upon a finding that K.S.A. 8-1001(c) is unconstitutional. In Ramirez, the State brings an interlocutory appeal, K.S.A. 22-3603, from an order suppressing evidence of defendant's refusal to take a blood alcohol test, based on the trial court's holding that K.S.A. 8-1001(c) is unconstitutional. Because of the identity of issues, the cases were consolidated for hearing on appeal.

Both K.S.A. 8-1001 and 8-1567 were amended by the legislature in 1982. See L.1982, ch. 144, §§ 3, 5. The 1982 amendments are the versions of these statutes before us in this case. They read in pertinent part as follows:

"8-1001. ... (a) Any person who operates a motor vehicle upon a public highway in this state shall be deemed to have given consent to submit to a chemical test of breath or blood, to determine the alcoholic content of the person's blood whenever the person is arrested or otherwise taken into custody for any offense involving operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol in violation of a state statute or a city ordinance and the arresting officer has reasonable grounds to believe that prior to arrest the person was driving under the influence of alcohol. The test shall be administered at the direction of the arresting officer.

....

"(c) If the person so arrested refuses a request to submit to a test of breath or blood, it shall not be given and the person's refusal to submit to the test shall be admissible in evidence against the person at any trial for driving under the influence of alcohol.... (Emphasis added.)

"8-1567. ... (a) No person shall operate any vehicle within this state while under the influence of alcohol.

....

"(c) Upon a first conviction of a violation of this section, a person shall be sentenced to not less than 48 hours' imprisonment or 100 hours of public service nor more than 6 months' imprisonment and fined not less than $200 nor more than $500, or by both such fine and imprisonment. The person convicted shall not be eligible for release on probation or suspension or reduction of sentence until the minimum sentence has been satisfied. In addition, the court shall enter an order which (1) restricts the person convicted to operating a motor vehicle on the highways of this state only in going to or returning from the person's place of employment in the course of the person's employment or during a medical emergency or in going to or returning from the place such person is required to go to attend an alcohol and drug safety action program as provided in K.S.A. 8-1008 or a treatment program as provided in K.S.A. 8-1008 for a period of time of at least 90 days and not to exceed one year and (2) requiring that the person enroll in and successfully complete an alcohol and drug safety action program as provided in K.S.A. 8-1008 or a treatment program as provided in K.S.A. 8-1008, or both such education and treatment programs. In the event the person convicted has a suspended or revoked driver's license, the court shall not make the restricted license, provided under this subsection, applicable until any such suspension or revocation is terminated. No plea bargaining agreement shall be entered into nor shall any judge approve a plea bargaining agreement entered into for the purpose of permitting a person charged with a violation of this section, or any ordinance of a city in this state which prohibits the acts prohibited by this section, to avoid the mandatory penalties established by this subsection or the ordinance. For the purpose of this subsection, entering into a diversion agreement pursuant to K.S.A. 22-2906 et seq. shall not constitute plea bargaining.

"(d) On a second conviction of a violation of this section, a person shall be sentenced to not less than 90 days' nor more than one year's imprisonment and fined not less than $500 nor more than $1,000. The person convicted shall not be eligible for release on probation or suspension of sentence until the minimum sentence has been satisfied .... No plea bargaining agreement shall be entered into nor shall any judge approve a plea bargaining agreement entered into for the purpose of permitting a person charged with a violation of this section, or any ordinance of a city in this state which prohibits the acts prohibited by this section, to avoid the mandatory penalties established by this subsection or the ordinance.

"(e) On the third or subsequent conviction of a violation of this section, a person shall be sentenced to not less than 90 days' nor more than one year's imprisonment and fined not less than $1,000 nor more than $2,500. The person convicted shall not be eligible for release on probation or suspension or reduction of sentence.... No plea bargaining agreement shall be entered into nor shall any judge approve a plea bargaining agreement entered into for the purpose of permitting a person charged with a violation of this section, or any ordinance of a city in this state which prohibits the acts prohibited by this section, to avoid the mandatory penalties established by this subsection or the ordinance." (Emphasis added.)

We turn first to the issue of the alleged unconstitutionality of K.S.A. 8-1001(c). All of the claims and all of the decisions of the trial courts were premised upon the claim that the admissibility of an accused's refusal to take the test violated his or her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.

At the time the cases were presented to and considered by the trial courts, a similar provision of a South Dakota statute had been...

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