State v. Compton

• Decision Date: 17 February 1986
• Docket Number: No. 15218,15218
• Citation: 104 N.M. 683,726 P.2d 837,1986 NMSC 10
• Parties: STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Joel Lee COMPTON, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: New Mexico Supreme Court

Page 837

726 P.2d 837

104 N.M. 683

STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Joel Lee COMPTON, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 15218.

Supreme Court of New Mexico.

Feb. 17, 1986.

Stay Granted March 5, 1986.

Stay Dissolved Oct. 22, 1986.

[104 N.M. 685] Janet Clow, Chief Public Defender, David Stafford, Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, for defendant-appellant.

Paul Bardacke, Atty. Gen., Tony Tupler, Asst. Atty. Gen., Santa Fe, for plaintiff-appellee.

OPINION

RIORDAN, Chief Justice.

Joel Lee Compton (Compton) was convicted of capital murder and aggravated assault. He was sentenced to death for the murder and eighteen months imprisonment for the aggravated assault. Compton appeals. We affirm.

The issues on appeal are:

I. Whether the trial court erred in admitting into evidence the testimony of Wrayan Humphries, Compton's wife, despite Compton's claim of husband-wife privilege.

II. Whether the state's argument during the penalty phase was improper, rendering the sentence impermissible under the doctrine of fundamental error.

III. Whether the imposition of the death sentence in this case is excessive or disproportionate under the circumstances.

IV. Whether the New Mexico statutory scheme for imposing the death penalty is unconstitutional in that it places a defendant who waives his right to remain silent on a better legal footing than a defendant who exercises that constitutional right.

V. Whether the jury must find that a defendant knew his victim was a peace officer before the death penalty can be imposed for the aggravating circumstance of killing a peace officer.

VI. Whether the New Mexico death penalty statutes violate due process in that the jury instructions demand a unanimous verdict in the penalty phase, where in fact a non-unanimous finding is equally conclusive.

VII. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to give Compton's tendered instructions on mitigating circumstances.

VIII. Whether the New Mexico death penalty statutes are unconstitutional in that the listed mitigating factor: "defendant did not have any significant history of prior criminal activity" is impermissibly vague.

IX. Whether the New Mexico death penalty statutory scheme is unconstitutional in that it provides no specific standards of evidence for the jury deliberations, shifts the burden of persuasion onto the defendant and fails thereafter to provide for meaningful appellate review.

X. Whether the trial court erred in conducting and permitting "death qualification" of the jury pool, and in the striking for cause of an anti-death penalty juror.

XI. Whether imposition of the death penalty is unconstitutional as violative of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Facts.

Compton and his wife, Wrayan Humphries (Wrayan), and her young daughter, left their home in Texas and travelled through several states before coming to Albuquerque in mid-February, 1983. They rented Room 24 at the Tewa Lodge on Central Avenue. Nearly destitute and unable to find work, Compton began to drink heavily. On February 24, 1983 he had been drinking all day.

That evening, Compton exchanged words with another patron at El Cid's Bar, threatening to shoot the man. No further contact ensued and Compton returned to the Tewa Lodge after stopping at a liquor store. Once there, he went to Room 25 and began banging on the door and yelling about the loud music coming from inside. He had complained earlier about the music and the "pimps" inside. Compton forced his way into Room 25 and began an altercation with the occupants. These occupants managed to push Compton out of their room. He subsequently returned to Room 25 with a rifle and began punching out several windows. The fight resumed and spilled into the parking lot. A passing couple saw the struggle over Compton's rifle and called the police. A friend of Compton's took the rifle away and the fighting stopped. Compton had been injured in the altercation and his arm was bleeding badly. Compton retrieved the rifle and again challenged the occupants of Room 25. Everyone scattered when Compton discharged a shot into the street. Compton and Wrayan then returned to their room (Room 24) and Compton sat at a table. He asked Wrayan how everything was outside and she replied that the police were coming.

Officer Gerald Cline (Cline) of the Albuquerque Police Department was dispatched to the Tewa Lodge after a call about a man with a rifle. With Cline was Alfred Gibson (Gibson), a citizen participating in the police department's "ride-along" program. Gibson testified that as the police car pulled into the parking lot of the Tewa Lodge, he saw a man standing in the doorway of Room 24. The man then turned and walked down the sidewalk and into the darkness.

Cline got out of his vehicle to investigate, leaving his revolver in its holster. He checked rooms 25 and 24, speaking into his walkie-talkie that a subject was walking away. Suddenly a shot rang out. Cline shouted something and then collapsed. From the shadows a man emerged with a rifle, stood over Cline's body and then moved on. Gibson testified that this was the same man he had seen earlier standing in the doorway of Room 24. This man was later identified by witnesses as Compton.

Compton then ran with the rifle across the street and approached the car of Carl and Sandra Smith, who had just driven up to a nearby restaurant. Compton pointed the rifle through the car window at Mr. Smith, who begged him not to shoot. As other police cars began arriving at the scene, Compton promptly threw the rifle onto the roof of the Smith's car. He then lay prone, spread-eagled, in the parking lot. Compton was apprehended in that position shortly afterward by other officers that had arrived at the scene.

It was later determined that Cline died almost instantly from a single bullet wound through the heart.

I. Wrayan Humphries' testimony.

NMSA 1978, Evid. Rule 505(a) (Repl.Pamp.1983) defines a communication as confidential if it is made privately and if it is not intended for further disclosure. Evid.Rule 505(b) further states:

A person has a privilege in any proceeding to refuse to disclose and to prevent another from disclosing a confidential communication by the person to that person's spouse while they were husband and wife.

Evid. Rule 505(c) shows that the privilege may be claimed by the spouse making the confidential communication or by the spouse to whom the confidential communication was made.

The challenged testimony herein concerned a conversation between Compton and Wrayan moments before the shooting of Cline. After a hearing, the trial court concluded that the husband-wife privilege had been waived by Wrayan when she made a sworn statement to police shortly after the shooting. See NMSA 1978, Evid.R. 511 (Repl.Pamp.1983). On appeal, Compton argues that the admission of Wrayan's statement was error. He argues that since it is Compton and not Wrayan claiming the privilege in this case, NMSA 1978, Evid. Rule 512(b) (Repl.Pamp.1983) applies to negate the claim that Wrayan waived the privilege. That rule states:

Evidence of a statement or other disclosure of privileged matter is not admissible against the holder of the privilege if the disclosure was * * * made without opportunity to claim the privilege.

Compton contends that as a holder of the privilege, Wrayan's disclosure to police after the shooting of Cline was made when he did not have an opportunity to claim the privilege, and therefore, Wrayan's statement should be inadmissible against him. Compton thus argues that the trial court erred in ruling that Wrayan waived the privilege and by allowing admission of her statement. We agree with Compton that the trial court erred in admitting this statement. However, we conclude that the admission of Wrayan's statement was harmless error because it could only have had an insignificant effect on the verdict, in light of the other evidence that was introduced at trial showing Compton's awareness that a police officer was on the premises.¹

For trial court error to be considered harmless, there must be:

(1) substantial evidence to support the conviction without reference to the improperly admitted evidence, (2) such a disproportionate volume of permissible evidence that, in comparison, the amount of improper evidence will appear so miniscule that it could not have contributed to the conviction, and (3) no substantial conflicting evidence to discredit the State's testimony.

State v. Moore, 94 N.M. 503, 504, 612 P.2d 1314, 1315 (1980) (citations omitted).

In the instant case, there was testimony presented through Mr. Gibson (who was riding in the patrol car with Cline) that, upon their arrival at the Tewa Lodge, he saw Compton standing in the doorway of Room 24. Further, there was no substantial conflicting evidence that would have discredited the testimony of Gibson. Therefore, although the admission of Wrayan's testimony was error, it was harmless error and Compton's conviction is properly affirmed under this point.

II. Prosecutorial misconduct in sentencing phase.

Compton claims on appeal that he was denied due process during the sentencing phase of his trial because the prosecutor's closing and rebuttal arguments were improper. Compton made no objection to the arguments, though he did move for a mistrial immediately thereafter on the grounds claimed here. Ordinarily, unless a timely objection is made to an allegedly improper comment, it will not be reviewed. State v. Ruffino, 94 N.M. 500, 612 P.2d 1311 (1980). Compton concedes this point but contends that in a capital sentencing trial, egregious prosecutorial misconduct violates the due process requirement of fundamental fairness, and so constitutes fundamental error.

Certainly it would have been preferable for Compton's counsel to have entered timely objections so that any alleged errors could have been corrected by the trial court, who is in the best position to gauge their...