State v. Conaway
Decision Date | 30 June 2022 |
Docket Number | 99592-3 |
Citation | 512 P.3d 526 |
Parties | STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Jeffrey David CONAWAY, Petitioner |
Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Lila Jane Silverstein, Washington Appellate Project, 1511 3rd Ave., Ste. 610, Seattle, WA, 98101-1683, for Petitioner(s).
Michael William Safstrom, Attorney at Law, P. O. Box 5000, Coupeville, WA, 98239-5000, for Respondent(s).
Mark Bruns Middaugh, Attorney at Law, 600 University St., Ste. 3020, Seattle, WA, 98101-4105, for Amicus Curiae on behalf of Washington Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.
Alexandria Marie Hohman, The Washington Defender Association, 110 Prefontaine Pl. S., Ste., 610, Seattle, WA, 98104-2626, for Amicus Curiae on behalf of Washington Defender Association.
Donna Lynn Wise, King County Prosecutor's Office, 516 3rd Ave., Ste. W554, Seattle, WA, 98104-2362, for Amicus Curiae on behalf of Washington Association of Prosecuting Attorneys.
¶ 1 In Jeffrey Conaway's prosecution for felony indecent exposure under RCW 9A.88.010(2)(c), the State entered evidence of a docket entry showing that Conaway previously pleaded guilty to misdemeanor indecent exposure, complied with the conditions of a deferred sentence and was allowed to change his plea to not guilty, and had his case dismissed. See RCW 3.66.067. The trial court determined that Conaway had "previously been convicted" of indecent exposure, making his current offense punishable as a felony. RCW 9A.88.010(2)(c). The Court of Appeals affirmed Conaway's conviction.
¶ 2 We granted review to decide whether the dismissal of a previous misdemeanor conviction following completion of a deferred sentence precludes consideration of that conviction under RCW 9A.88.010(2)(c). We agree with the lower courts that it does not. This court recently recognized that the definition of "conviction" in the Sentencing Reform Act (SRA) of 1981, ch. 9.94A RCW, encompasses a dismissed misdemeanor conviction. State v. Haggard , 195 Wash.2d 544, 551, 461 P.3d 1159 (2020). Consistent with Haggard , we hold that Conaway's prior guilty plea to indecent exposure was sufficient to establish that he was previously convicted of that crime for purposes of proving the element of a prior conviction under RCW 9A.88.010(2)(c).
¶ 3 In June 2016, Conaway exposed his penis to a 17 year old girl, C.M., at a garage sale. He was arrested the next day after C.M. identified him at a coffee shop. The State charged Conaway with felony indecent exposure under RCW 9A.88.010(2)(c), alleging, as an element of that crime, that Conaway had "previously been convicted" of indecent exposure. Clerk's Papers (CP) at 7. The State amended the charge to add a special allegation of sexual motivation.
¶ 4 To prove the prior conviction element for felony indecent exposure, the State entered into evidence a certified docket entry showing that Conaway pleaded guilty to indecent exposure in 2007, and that he was subsequently allowed to withdraw his guilty plea and have his case dismissed. The State also elicited testimony from a witness as to Conaway's actions that formed the basis of his 2007 guilty plea to indecent exposure. The jury found Conaway guilty of felony indecent exposure with sexual motivation.
¶ 5 Conaway appealed and argued that the admission of testimony regarding his previous offense violated ER 404(b) because it constituted improper propensity evidence. Concluding the testimony was not admissible for any proper purpose under ER 404(b), the Court of Appeals agreed with Conaway and reversed his conviction and remanded for a new trial. State v. Conaway , No. 77107-8-I, slip op. at 4-5, 13, 2018 WL 6310131 (Wash. Ct. App. Dec. 3, 2018) (unpublished), http://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/771078.PDF.
¶ 6 Following remand, the State charged Conaway with felony indecent exposure, but it dismissed the allegation of sexual motivation. At Conaway's retrial, the State again sought to prove that Conaway had been previously convicted of indecent exposure through the docket entry of Conaway's 2007 guilty plea. Specifically, the docket shows that the court entered a judgment on that charge, that Conaway received a deferred sentence, and that the court set a hearing to determine whether Conaway had complied with the various conditions imposed. At the hearing, the court found that Conaway complied with the conditions, allowed Conaway to change his plea to not guilty, and dismissed the case. Other records related to the proceedings for Conaway's 2007 conviction for indecent exposure had apparently been destroyed.
¶ 7 Conaway moved to exclude the certified docket, arguing that it was insufficient to establish that he had a previous conviction for indecent exposure. The trial court disagreed and admitted the certified docket. It cited the SRA definition of "conviction" as controlling. The SRA defines "conviction" as "an adjudication of guilt pursuant to Title 10 or 13 RCW and includes a verdict of guilty, a finding of guilty, and acceptance of a plea of guilty." RCW 9.94A.030(9). Because Conaway pleaded guilty to indecent exposure in 2007, the trial court concluded as a matter of law that "under the plain definition of the term ‘conviction’ in RCW 9.94A.030(9), Mr. Conaway did have a conviction for indecent exposure previously." 2 Verbatim Report of Proceedings (June 18, 2019) at 62.
¶ 8 In addition to the certified docket, the State called Linda Bass, the court clerk who recorded the docket in Conaway's case, who testified to her understanding of a deferred sentence:
A deferred sentence, a defendant pleads guilty. The sentencing of the charge is deferred for a period of time, depending on whether it's a misdemeanor, gross misdemeanor, 12 months, 24 months. And conditions are set. If all of the conditions are completed at the end of the deferral period, then the guilt—guilty plea is then changed to not guilty and the case is dismissed.
Id . at 475-76. Bass also testified that the certified docket entry showed that Conaway's plea was changed to not guilty and that his case was dismissed.
¶ 9 The jury instructions reflected the trial court's ruling that Conaway's guilty plea qualified as a prior conviction for RCW 9A.88.010(2)(c). The "to convict" instruction stated that the State must prove "[t]hat the defendant had been previously convicted of indecent exposure." CP at 108. The jury instructions further stated that "[a] ‘[c]onviction’ includes a defendant's plea of guilty followed by a deferred sentence and dismissal." CP at 111. The jury found Conaway guilty of indecent exposure, and the court sentenced Conaway to a nine month term of confinement.
¶ 10 Conaway again appealed his conviction, arguing in part that the State failed to provide sufficient evidence of a predicate conviction for felony indecent exposure because his 2007 guilty plea to that crime resulted in a deferred sentence and dismissal. The Court of Appeals disagreed. State v. Conaway , No. 80214-3-I, slip op. at 2-3, 2021 WL 778096 (Wash. Ct. App. Mar. 1, 2021) (unpublished), http://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/802143.pdf. Like the trial court, the Court of Appeals applied the SRA's definition of "conviction", and it relied on this court's decision in Haggard , 195 Wash.2d at 551, 461 P.3d 1159, which held that an initial guilty plea qualifies as a "conviction" under the SRA's definition even when the successful completion of a deferred sentence later results in a change of plea and dismissal. Conaway , No. 80214-3-I, slip op. at 5. The court also rejected the notion that the reasoning in Haggard was limited to the sentencing context, stating that "[w]hile Haggard concerned sentencing, the court still held that a deferred sentence and dismissal does not invalidate or erase the initial finding of guilt." Id.
¶ 11 Last, the Court of Appeals noted previous cases in which the SRA definition was used to establish a previous conviction as an element of a subsequent felony offense. Id. at 5-6 (citing State v. LaPointe , 1 Wash. App. 2d 261, 269, 404 P.3d 610 (2017) ; State v. Benitez , 175 Wash. App. 116, 123, 302 P.3d 877 (2013) ). Because "Washington case law dictates that a deferred sentence is a conviction," the Court of Appeals concluded that the certified docket showing that Conaway pleaded guilty to indecent exposure provided sufficient evidence that he had previously been convicted of that crime even though his case was later dismissed. Id. at 4-5.
¶ 12 Conaway petitioned for review, which we granted. After granting review, we accepted amicus briefing from the Washington Association of Prosecuting Attorneys.1
¶ 13 Conaway argues that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that his guilty plea to indecent exposure was sufficient evidence of a predicate conviction for felony indecent exposure. In addition, Conaway argues that the Court of Appeals applied the incorrect standard of review for his sufficiency of the evidence claim, thereby violating his right to due process. We disagree and hold that when Conaway pleaded guilty to indecent exposure, he was "convicted" for the purposes of proving a predicate conviction for felony indecent exposure under RCW 9A.88.010(2)(c).
¶ 14 RCW 9A.88.010 defines the crime of indecent exposure and further delineates the classification of punishment for committing that crime. Subsection (2)(a) provides that indecent exposure is generally punished as a misdemeanor. RCW 9A.88.010(2)(a). However, the statute increases the severity of punishment to a felony "if the person has previously been convicted under this section or of a sex offense as defined in RCW 9.94A.030." RCW 9A.88.010(2)(c). Because felony indecent exposure includes a prior conviction as an element of the crime, it is a recidivist offense. RCW 9.94A.030(41)(d).
¶ 15 Conaway argues that the docket showing that he pleaded guilty to indecent exposure but ultimately had his case...
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