State v. Connery

• Decision Date: 16 September 2022
• Docket Number: 49268
• Parties: STATE OF IDAHO, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. ADAM DAVID CONNERY, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Idaho Court of Appeals

STATE OF IDAHO, Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
ADAM DAVID CONNERY, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 49268

Court of Appeals of Idaho

September 16, 2022

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District, State of Idaho, Kootenai County. Hon. John T. Mitchell, District Judge. James Combo, Magistrate.

Decision of the district court, on intermediate appeal reversing the magistrate court's order granting defendant's motion to suppress, affirmed; and case remanded.

Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellate Public Defender; Jenny C. Swinford, Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. Jenny C. Swinford argued.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Kenneth K. Jorgensen argued,

HUSKEY, JUDGE

Adam David Connery appeals from the decision of the district court, on intermediate appeal from the magistrate court, reversing the magistrate court's order granting his motion to suppress. Connery asserts the district court erred by reversing the magistrate court. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the district court.

I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

While on patrol in downtown Coeur d'Alene around 1:00 a.m. on Sunday, November 1, 2020, Sergeant Klitch saw the driver of a truck accelerate too quickly and momentarily lose control just as people finished crossing the street in front of the truck. Sgt. Klitch observed that the truck

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did not have mud flaps or fender flares and had a modified exhaust in violation of Idaho Code § 49-937. Based on these observations, Sgt. Klitch stopped the truck. Sgt. Klitch contacted Connery, the driver, at the front passenger door because the driver's side window did not work. Sgt. Klitch asked for Connery's identification, which Connery provided and it indicated Connery was nineteen years old. Sgt. Klitch noticed that Connery had glassy, bloodshot eyes and his movements were slow. Sgt. Klitch asked Connery to get out of the truck so that he could point out the equipment violations, talk to Connery about his poor and careless driving, and because Sgt. Klitch felt standing next to a "lifted" truck like Connery's presented safety issues. At Sgt. Klitch's request, Connery got out of his truck. Sgt. Klitch again noticed that Connery's speech and movements were slow.

Sgt. Klitch testified that when Connery got to the rear of the truck, Sgt. Klitch discussed Connery's traffic and equipment violations and asked Connery about consuming alcohol, which Connery denied. Sgt. Klitch conducted a brief, modified Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus test (HGN) and noticed a lack of smooth pursuit, which indicated to Sgt. Klitch that Connery had consumed alcohol or used some sort of central nervous system depressant. Sgt. Klitch again asked Connery about consuming alcohol, and Connery admitted to drinking an alcoholic beverage. Sgt. Klitch then asked Connery about his "health and medications and contacts, glasses [or] head injuries" to rule out other possible explanations for Connery's lack of smooth pursuit. Sgt. Klitch had Connery complete three field sobriety tests (FSTs): an HGN, a walk-and-turn test, and a one-leg stand test. Connery scored four out of six clues on the HGN, zero clues on the walk-and-turn, and zero clues on the one-leg stand. The number of clues correspond to an individual's level of impairment; more clues indicate more impairment. Sgt. Klitch arrested Connery for driving under the influence under the age of twenty-one (under 21 DUI) and administered a breathalyzer test--the results were 0.05 and 0.05. Sgt. Klitch cited Connery for under 21 DUI, I.C. § 18-8004(1)(d).

Connery moved to suppress the evidence, arguing Sgt. Klitch did not have reasonable suspicion for the stop and that he twice unlawfully prolonged the stop: first, when he began a DUI investigation without reasonable suspicion; and second, when he detained Connery for a breathalyzer test without probable cause or reasonable suspicion. The magistrate court concluded Sgt. Klitch had reasonable suspicion that Connery had violated I.C. § 49-937 and I.C. § 49-949 based on his modified muffler and failure to equip the rear wheels of the truck with wheel fenders or covers and, therefore, the initial stop was justified. Considering whether Sgt. Klitch had

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reasonable suspicion that Connery was operating his truck in violation of I.C. § 18-8004, the magistrate court found that although the totality of the circumstances could be indicative of someone driving under the influence, each factor also had an alternate, innocent explanation and, therefore, even in the aggregate, the circumstances did not give rise to a reasonable suspicion of any criminal activity.^[1] The magistrate court concluded that Sgt. Klitch did not have reasonable suspicion that Connery was driving under the influence sufficient to conduct the field sobriety tests. Accordingly, the magistrate court granted Connery's motion to suppress.

The State appealed to the district court. The district court concluded Sgt. Klitch had reasonable suspicion to conduct field sobriety and breathalyzer tests on Connery. The district court found the magistrate court failed to consider that Connery admitted consuming alcohol before the HGN and that by the time Sgt. Klitch administered the HGN, he had already noticed a lack of smooth eye pursuit. The district court also concluded the magistrate court erred in failing to consider the low level of blood alcohol concentration required for an under 21 DUI in its totality of the circumstances analysis. As a result, the district court reversed the magistrate court's decision granting Connery's motion to suppress. Connery timely appeals.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

For an appeal from the district court, sitting in its appellate capacity over a case from the magistrate court, we review the record to determine whether there is substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate court's findings of fact and whether the magistrate court's conclusions of law follow from those findings. State v. Korn, 148 Idaho 413, 415, 224 P.3d 480, 482 (2009). However, as a matter of appellate procedure, our disposition of the appeal will affirm or reverse the decision of the district court. State v. Trusdall, 155 Idaho 965, 968, 318 P.3d 955, 958 (Ct. App. 2014). Thus, we review the magistrate court's findings and conclusions, whether

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the district court affirmed or reversed the magistrate court and the basis therefor, and either affirm or reverse the district court. "[S]ubstantial and competent evidence exists if there is evidence in the record that a reasonable trier of fact could accept and rely upon in making the factual finding challenged on appeal." State v. Ish, 166 Idaho 492, 509, 461 P.3d 774, 791 (2020).

The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but we freely review the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996). The trial court's determination of reasonable suspicion, however, is reviewed de novo. State v. Bonner, 167 Idaho 88, 93, 467 P.3d 452, 457 (2020).

III. ANALYSIS

Connery asserts the district court erred when it reversed the magistrate court's decision granting his motion to suppress. First, Connery argues the district court erred by misperceiving the chain...