State v. O'Connor

Decision Date11 June 1960
Docket NumberNo. 41682,41682
Citation186 Kan. 718,353 P.2d 214
PartiesSTATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. John C. O'CONNOR, Appellant.
CourtKansas Supreme Court

Robert E. Hoffman, Asst. Atty. Gen., and John J. Stang, County Atty., La Crosse, John Anderson, Jr., Atty. Gen., on the briefs, for appellee.

John C. O'Connor on the brief pro se.

WERTZ, Justice.

John C. O'Connor, defendant (appellant), was charged on an information with bank robbery as defined by G.S.1949, 21-531. He entered a plea of guilty and was sentenced to confinement in the state penitentiary for a term of not less than ten nor more than fifty years as provided by the mentioned statute. He appeals from the judgment and sentence, contending only that the trial court erred in fixing the minimum sentence at ten years as provided by 21-531, instead of fixing the minimum sentence at seven years as provided by G.S.1959 Supp. 62-2239.

G.S.1949, 21-531, a part of our crimes act, provides in pertinent part that if any person shall enter the premises of a bank with intent to hold up or rob any bank or any person therein of any money or anything of value, he shall on conviction thereof be sentenced to be imprisoned in the penitentiary at hard labor for a term of not less than ten years nor more than fifty years.

G.S.1959 Supp. 62-2239 appears as section 14, chapter 331 of the Laws of 1957 relating to post conviction procedure and providing for a system of probation and parole in criminal cases, and reads insofar as is pertinent hereto:

'Whenever any person has been found guilty of a crime or offense upon verdict or plea, the court may adjudge as follows: (1) Release the defendant on probation; (2) suspend the imposition or the execution of sentence; (3) impose a fine as provided by law for the offense; (4) impose any combination of (1), (2), and (3); or (5) commit the defendant to an institution or jail with or without a fine for confinement or execution, as provided by law for the offense. * * *

'In committing a defendant to an institution, the court shall not fix a maximum term of imprisonment, but the maximum term provided by law for the offense for which the prisoner was convicted and sentenced shall apply in each case: Provided, In those cases where the law does not fix a maximum term of imprisonment for the offense for which the prisoner was convicted and sentenced, the court shall fix the maximum term of imprisonment. The court may in its discretion fix a minimum term of imprisonment, which shall in no case exceed the minimum term prescribed by law or one-third of the maximum term provided by law for the offense for which the defendant was convicted, or seven years, whichever is less.' [Emphasis supplied.]

While defendant appears here prose and has filed no brief supporting his views, it appears that his contention is that G.S.1959 Supp. 62-2239 has so amended the crimes act as to abolish all minimum sentences except as may be imposed at the trial court's discretion in accordance with the formula presented therein; i. e., that which shall in no case exceed the minimum term prescribed by law for the offense for which the defendant was convicted or one-third of the maximum term, or seven years, whichever is less, and that if a minimum sentence was to be imposed upon him for bank robbery, it could not exceed seven years, which sentence, as may be noted, is less than either the ten-year minimum (21-531) or one-third of the fifty-year maximum.

We are unable to agree with defendant's contention for the reason that the italicized portion of the statute is so contradictory and vague as to prevent its application.

In the first instance, this portion could have a totally different meaning read into it than that attributed it by defendant; namely, these lines do not contemplate the repealing of all minimum sentences of the crimes act but, rather, where the court does not fix a minimum sentence in accordance with the formula set out, the minimum provided for the specific offense under the crimes act applies. The first paragraph of this same statute provides that 'Whenever any person has been found guilty of a crime * * *, the court may adjudge as follows: * * * (5) commit ...

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13 cases
  • State v. Hill
    • United States
    • Kansas Supreme Court
    • 3 d6 Março d6 1962
    ...Ashton, 175 Kan. 164, 262 P.2d 123, and State ex rel. Anderson v. Fleming Co., 184 Kan. 674, 682, 339 P.2d 12. See, also, State v. O'Connor, 186 Kan. 718, 353 P.2d 214. Section ten of our bill of rights provides that 'In all prosecutions, the accused shall be allowed * * * to demand the nat......
  • Mann v. State
    • United States
    • Kansas Supreme Court
    • 27 d6 Janeiro d6 1968
    ...the appellant's motion, and has been abandoned by the appellant in his brief. Cases which have dealt with this point are State v. O'Connor, 186 Kan. 718, 353 P.2d 214; Bridges v. State, 197 Kan. 704, 421 P.2d 45; Richardson v. Hand, 182 Kan. 326, 320 P.2d 837; and Chambers v. State, For the......
  • State v. Wood
    • United States
    • Kansas Supreme Court
    • 26 d6 Janeiro d6 1963
    ...by law for the offense for which the defendant was convicted, or seven years, whichever is less, was before this court in State v. O'Connor, 186 Kan. 718, 353 P.2d 214. It was there held the foregoing provision conflicts to such an extent with the provisions of the first paragraph of the se......
  • State v. Tague
    • United States
    • Kansas Supreme Court
    • 8 d6 Julho d6 1961
    ...to December 16, 1959, when the trial court entered its sentence. On June 11, 1960, this court decided the case of State v. O'Connor, 186 Kan. 718, 353 P.2d 214, holding section 62-2239, supra, void as being judicially inoperative. Later, on November 12, 1960, in Murray v. Hand, 187 Kan. 308......
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